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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

UNFRAMED DIRECT INTERIOR MONOLOGUE IN EUROPEAN FICTION: A STUDY OF FOUR AUTHORS

BY

VLADIMIR A. TUMANOV ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

Edmonton, Alberta
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled UNFRAMED DIRECT INTERIOR MONOLOGUE IN EUROPEAN FICTION: A STUDY OF FOUR AUTHORS submitted by VLADIMIR A. TUMANOV in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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Abstract

This thesis deals with interior monologue as a literary genre in relation to narrative theory and findings from psychology. The genre is considered in general, and its place in discourse representation within narrative is discussed in terms of the *diegesis/mimesis* dichotomy. Various types of interior monologue are described, and *unframed direct interior monologue* (UDIM) is situated within this classification. UDIM is considered in contrast to certain basic characteristics of conventional first-person narrative and examined in the framework of the addresser/addressee relationship in the theory of communication. An argument is made that the reader considers the *private* communication illusion sought by a given UDIM plausible if such a text resembles conventional narrative as little as possible, since the latter is a form of *public* communication. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical and experimental study of inner speech within psychology and psycholinguistics. On the basis of the Theme/Rheme dichotomy in functional grammar these assumptions about inner speech are compared to certain basic elements of discourse structure in literary interior monologue. Subsequently, four examples of UDIM (V. M. Garshin's "Four Days," E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* A. Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* and V. Larbaud's *Amants, heureux amants...*) are studied in detail, on the basis of the above-mentioned methodology and premises. One of the most significant findings to come out of this analysis is that the illusion of private communication in this genre is achieved to a great extent through the imitation of elements typical of spontaneous oral discourse. It is postulated that the spontaneous oral discourse model is, on the one hand, instrumental in distancing UDIM from conventional narrative, and, on the other hand, it may account for the similarity between certain features of the literary representation of private discourse and what is assumed about the nature of inner speech in psychology.

Unframed Direct Interior Monologue in European Fiction

Vladimir Tumanov

Preface

The interior monologue technique has been studied extensively in the past few decades. Such critics as R. Humphrey, M. Friedman, L. Edel, G. Struve, D. Cohn, J. Spencer, D. Sallenave, G. Strauch (cf. Bibliography) and others have examined this genre with respect to its place in literary history and its relationship with other forms of fiction, as well as its principal devices and their effects, the thematic aspects of texts with interior monologue, the difficulties of this form, successful and less successful examples thereof etc. Although there has been considerable debate as to the origins of the genre and its definition, most critics agree that the "Penelope" section of Joyce's *Ulysses* is the most impressive example of interior monologue. It is considered so successful because it achieves a great deal of fictional *vraisemblance*, a concept underlying much of the discussion about this genre. This "realistic" aspect of interior monologue--the attempt to create the illusion of actual inner speech or self-communication--is at the centre of the present study.

Having chosen the interior monologue genre, the author finds him- or herself willy-nilly restricted by the *communicative premises* implied by this (fictional) discourse situation. Questions that arise include the following: What does it mean to be eavesdropping on a character's unuttered train of thought? Never having "tapped" directly into someone else's mind in reality, why should the reader view a text, purporting to be a *record* of such silent discourse, as *vraisemblable*? How does the communicative situation implied by interior monologue differ from the communicative process suggested by other fictional genres? How can the author create the impression that the language of external communication--which is, after all, the only code that s/he shares with the reader--is actually part of an internal communicative process or even adequate for its intrasubjective presentation? And finally, does fictional inner speech have a real-life equivalent, and if so, in what ways are the two different and/or similar and why?

In order to deal with these questions, I have chosen a conceptual apparatus that has not so far been employed in a systematic way in the critical literature on interior monologue. My approach will be three-fold. Firstly, I would like to consider the fictional illusion of self-communication in light of discourse linguistics, general communication theory and the communicative premises of *conventional realistic first-person narrative.* Secondly, I intend to turn to the *psychology of discourse*, examining the similarities and differences between various experimental findings from Soviet and American research on actual inner speech on the one hand, and its literary representation on the other. And thirdly, I will analyze examples of interior monologue in comparison with data from the linguistic study of real oral spontaneous discourse or face-to-face communication. By concentrating on the *communicative* aspects of this genre, I hope to make a contribution to the understanding of literary communication in general and of the narrative act in particular.

The literary texts to be examined in detail include: V. M. Garshin's "Четыре дня" ("Four Days," 1877), E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* (1887), A. Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* (1900) and V. Larbaud's *Amants, heureux amants...*(1921). These texts have been selected for two main reasons. Firstly, they are *unframed and direct,* i.e., no narratorial mediation and/or other "support" texts are used to present the inner discourse of the protagonist (cf. Chapter 1). Secondly and most importantly, these four works represent that brand of unframed direct interior monologue which is, broadly speaking, communicatively "realistic" as defined relative to the tradition of 19th century realism. Modernistic interior monologue, such as Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* or S. Sokolov's *School for Fools,* is radically different in its premises, devices and goals. And in conformity with the very different aesthetic assumptions and goals of modernism as a whole, such texts require a considerably different theoretical framework. They will therefore not form part of the present study, although some of my findings may also apply to them in whole or in part.

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I would like to extend my strongest gratitude to Professor U. Margolin who guided this thesis with wisdom, diligence and professionalism. His erudition, patience and efficiency were essential not only for the completion of this project, but also for the smoothness of the whole process. I am also indebted to the members of my supervisory committee: Professors E. Blodgett, E. Mozejko, G. Prince and A. Purdy who did everything with remarkable scholarly expertise, speed and efficiency. My Ph. D. examination also benefitted from the work of Professor M. Bortolussi who chaired it masterfully and deserves great thanks from me. I would equally like to thank Professors E. Musacchio and M. Verdicchio for their consultations. And a special thanks is due to Professor A. Tumanov for our long discussions of the topic, for his insightful comments and his loyal support. His own work was an example that inspired me through the entire process.

I am profoundly grateful to my wife Larissa whose love and whose professional and moral support were indispensable throughout my Ph. D. programme. Her parents Drs. Howard and Elizabeth Klein deserve a special thanks for their help and understanding. Finally, I would like to thank my mother Alla Tumanov to whom I am grateful for *everything*.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Theoretical Considerations 1

Chapter 2. Inner Speech 30

Chapter 3. V. M. Garshin: "Four Days" 67

Chapter 4. E. Dujardin: *Les Lauriers sont coupés* 121

Chapter 5. A. Schnitzler: *Leutnant Gustl* 181

Chapter 6. V. Larbaud: *Amants, heureux amants...* 249

Concluding Remarks 303

Bibliography 306

> Le monologue intérieur est, dans l'ordre de la poésie, le discours sans auditeur et non prononcé, par lequel un personnage exprime sa pensée la plus intime, la plus proche de l'inconscient, antérieurement à toute organisation logique, c'est-à-dire en son état naissant, par le moyen de phrases réduites au minimum syntaxial, de façon à donner l'impression "tout venant." (Édouard Dujardin, originator of the interior monologue technique in French literature.)[1]

Interior Monologue: Direct and Indirect

Interior monologue, which I will provisionally define as the inner speech of a fictional character, can be situated with respect to other types of speech representation on the basis of Plato's *diegesis/mimesis* dichotomy. Plato distinguishes between two basic ways of communicating the speech of fictional characters: *mimesis* (imitation) and *diegesis* (narration). As Socrates tells Adeimantus in Book III of *The Republic*, *mimesis* occurs when the poet "speaks as though he were some other person [...] but if the poet does not at all conceal himself, the poem and the narrative will be carried on without any imitation," i.e., through *diegesis*.[2]

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[1] E. Dujardin, *Le Monologue intérieur: son apparition, ses origines, sa place dans l'œuvre de James Joyce* (Paris: Albert Messein, 1931), p. 59. Cf. R. Humphrey's definition of interior monologue as: "the psychic content and processes of character, partly or entirely unuttered, just as these processes exist at various levels of conscious control before they are formulated for deliberate speech." R. Humphrey, *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 24.

[2] Plato, *The Republic III*, in A. H. Gilbert trans. and ed.

Therefore, given that the diegetic representation of a character's discourse involves the summary of his/her words by a narrator (Plato's poet), the *mimesis* of speech is something like a quotation.[3] And if all forms of fictional speech representation are classified between the diegetic and the mimetic poles, then interior monologue appears to be more mimetic than diegetic.

This can be illustrated with the help of B. McHale's scale of speech representation in fiction, ranging from the most diegetic to the most mimetic[4]: 1)*diegetic summary* is the least mimetic form of speech representation because it involves only the narrator's reference to the character's speech act; 2) "*less diegetic*" *summary* gives some information about the topic(s) of a character's discourse; 3) *indirect discourse* constitutes a paraphrase of a character's words; 4) *partially mimetic indirect discourse* reproduces a few of the formal elements of a character's verbal style; 5) *free indirect discourse* mixes the narrator's and the character's voices; 6) *direct discourse* is a verbatim reproduction of the character's discourse framed by the appropriate

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Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), p. 37.

[3] S. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction* (London: Methuen, 1983), pp. 106-108.

[4] Reproduced in S. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction*, pp. 106-108. I am introducing it here with minor modifications.

punctuation marks and usually *verba dicendi* ("s/he said"); 7) *free direct discourse* is the same as direct discourse minus the quotation marks and *verba dicendi*.[5] All seven categories can apply to the representation of both inner and outer speech.[6]

In the critical literature the terms *indirect* and *direct interior monologue* have been used in reference to fictional texts coming under McHale's 5th and 7th categories respectively. R. Humphrey provides the following description of indirect interior monologue:

> Indirect interior monologue is, then, that type of interior monologue in which an omniscient author presents unspoken material as if it were directly from the consciousness of a

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[5] In *Ugly Swans* by B. and A. Strugatsky there is a passage, which illustrates McHale's categories (numbered in square brackets following the appropriate examples) with respect to the representation of *inner* speech (thought): " 'The hell with inventors,' [6] Victor said. He felt drunk and happy. [±1] Everything was in its place. [1-2] He felt like not going anywhere [2-3] but staying here, in this empty dim hall [...] especially keeping in mind that outside in the whole world it is raining [...] [3-5] and one day the rain will wash it all away, but this will not happen very soon... on the other hand, these days nothing can be said to be in the distant future. Yes, my friends, it's long gone, the time when the future was a replay of the present, and all change was like a distant ship on the horizon [7]." B. and A. Strugatsky, *Gadkiie Lebedi* (Frankfurt/Main: Posev-Verlag, 1972), pp. 28-9 (my translation). A passage illustrating McHale's categories with respect to *outer* speech (spoken aloud) can be found on pp. 120-21 of this novel.

[6] Cf. F. K. Stanzel's remarks on the possibility of rendering outer and inner speech in free indirect discourse. F. K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative*, trans. Charlotte Goedsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 220-24.

> character and, with commentary and direct description, guides the reader through it. It differs from direct interior monologue basically in that the author intervenes between the character's psyche and the reader. The author is an on-the-scene guide for the reader.[7]

M. Friedman argues that free indirect discourse "is admirably suited as a model for what we might call indirect interior monologue,"[8] which is echoed by D. Bickerton's statement that "indirect interior monologue is inner speech rendered in free indirect speech."[9] F. K. Stanzel places indirect interior monologue within the *figural narrative situation*, where a character's voice is "filtered" through the discourse of a narrator.[10] And this is essentially the same as Bickerton's and Friedman's above-mentioned views, since, as Stanzel puts it, "if the extent of free indirect style in a narrative increases to the point that it largely replaces authorial utterances, a figural narrative situation results."[11] Figural narrative or indirect interior monologue was first used extensively in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* and has become the hallmark of discourse representation in 20th century prose fiction.

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[7] R. Humphrey, p. 29.

[8] M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 21.

[9] Cf. D. Bickerton, "Modes of Interior Monologue: A Formal Definition," *MLQ* 28 (1967), p. 238. For a discussion of Free Indirect Discourse, also known as Erlebte Rede or Style Indirect Libre, cf. for example D. Cohn, "Erlebte Rede im Ich-Roman," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift* NS 19 (1969) or A. Staube, "Erlebte Rede aus linguistischer Sicht," *Zeitschrift für Germanistik* 4 (1985), pp. 389-406.

[10] F. K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative*, p. 272. Cf. W. Schmid's *Textinterferenz* in *Der Textaufbau in den Erzählungen Dostojevskijs* (München: W. Fink Verlag, 1973), p. 45.

Direct interior monologue, which comes under McHale's *free direct discourse* category (cf. above), involves no direct narratorial mediation, which is why W. Schmid argues that

> der innere Monolog als solcher keineswegs mit der erlebten Rede oder andern Interferenzphänomenen identisch ist [...] Ist ein sprachlich mehr oder weniger ausgeformter Bewußtseinsvorgang in der Ich-Form gehalten und sind alle Merkmale dieser ausgedehnten inneren Rede auf die Bedeutungsposition und die raum-zeitliche Origo dieses Ich bezogen [...] können wir nach Analogie zur direkten Rede von einem direkten inneren Monolog sprechen."[12]

Therefore, instead of mixing with a narrator's voice (Schmid's "Interferenzphänomenen"), a character's inner speech appears to us presumably in pure form. Schmid's "Analogie zur direkten Rede" is similar to L. E. Bowling's view of this form of discourse as

> that narrative method by which the author attempts to give *a direct quotation of the mind*--not merely of the language area but of the whole consciousness. Like the kind of direct quotation which is applied to the spoken word, the stream of

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[11] F. K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative*, p. 197.

[12] W. Schmid, pp. 58-9.

> consciousness technique may be applied exclusively throughout a whole book or section of a book, or intermittently in short fragments. The only criterion is that it introduce us directly into the interior life of a character, without any intervention by way of comment or explanation on the part of the author.[13]

Bowling's "direct quotation from the mind" and Schmid's "die raumzeitliche Origo dieses Ich" necessarily imply that direct interior monologue has to be a form of *personal discourse*.[14] And because such a monologist says "I," direct interior monologue appears to be related to conventional personal narrative. This is why D. Cohn points out that the "vanishing-point of the autobiographical genre is the precise starting-point for interior monologue as a fictional genre [...]."[15]

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[13] L.E. Bowling, "What is Stream of Consciousness?" in Shiv K. Kumar ed. *Critical Approaches to Fiction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 364. Although Bowling uses the term "stream of consciousness" for this definition, his concepts correspond to my "direct interior monologue." As my discussion will demonstrate, the term "narrative" in Bowling's definition is inappropriate. With respect to the idea that direct interior monologue is a direct quotation from the mind cf. M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness*, p. 7.

[14] Cf. N. Tamir's arguments against the use of the terms third- and first-person narration in "Personal Narration and its Linguistic Foundation," *PTL* 1 (1976), pp. 403-29. I will replace these terms with "impersonal" and "personal" narration respectively.

[15] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 189.

Similarly, within the framework of his typological circle encompassing the various types of fictional narrative situations, F. K. Stanzel places direct interior monologue next to the "quasi-autobiographical first-person narrative" situation: "this sector of the continuum of forms is characterized by the gradual withdrawal of the narrating self and the increasing emphasis of the presentation of the experiencing self."[16] Stanzel argues that with the complete withdrawal of the narrating self we enter the realm of direct interior monologue where only the experiencing self is heard: "If we go one step further along the typological circle, we come to interior monologue proper ('direct interior monologue')."[17]

As D. Cohn points out, once the retrospectively-oriented narrating self disappears and the experiencing self is the sole source of discourse, the monologist's inner verbalization and on-going experience become simultaneous.[18] Therefore, Cohn argues that the short temporal distance separating experience and its verbalization in the fictional private diary, makes the diary form the closest relative--among all the personal narrative forms--of direct interior monologue. However, she adds that

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[16] F. K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative,* p. 209.

[17] F. K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative,* p. 226. Given Stanzel's premise that "mediacy is the generic characteristic which distinguishes narration from other forms of literary art," (p. 4) and given the absence of mediacy implied by the disappearance of the narrating self, the place of direct interior monologue on Stanzel's typological circle of *narrative* situations is highly problematic. For an extensive criticism of this point cf. D. Cohn, "The Encirclement of Narrative. On Franz Stanzel's *Theorie des Erzählens,*" *Poetics Today* 2 (Winter 1981), p. 170 and below: the discussion on the non-narratorial nature of direct interior monologue.

[18] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* pp. 191-98.

> in another respect the diarist has not progressed beyond the autobiographer: he is still in the same position--sitting at his desk, pen in hand. He can therefore never record instant happenings at the instant they happen, at least not without breaking the mimetic norms of his genre."[19]

The thinker[20] in direct interior monologue, on the other hand, does "record instant happenings at the instant they happen," and this elimination of the retrospective prism, characteristic of all conventional personal narrative, allows the reader to view the *fabula*[21] in the most direct way possible.

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[19] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,*p. 209.

[20] When referring to the source of discourse in interior monologue, I will use the term "thinker" instead of "narrator" for reasons which will become obvious from the discussion below.

[21] This term was used by the Russian Formalists to make a basic distinction between story and narrative in prose. The terms used by Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum were *fabula* and *siuzhet,* where *fabula* stands for "the basic story stuff, the sum-total of events to be related in the work of fiction" and *siuzhet* indicates "the story as actually told or the way in which events are linked together." Victor Erlich, *Russian Formalism: History—Doctrine* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), p. 240. I am using the term *fabula* specifically with reference to the *main* story-line, i.e., those events taking place simultaneously with the monologist's discourse.

However, in some texts such direct access to the *fabula* is partially "muffled" when it is combined with a presenting narrative *frame*, i.e., the discourse of a heterodiegetic/extradiegetic narrator,[22] which surrounds a character's direct interior monologue. This is normally done when the "thinker's" external (physical) reality needs to be presented in order to provide an explanatory context for the interior monologue. Such *framed direct interior monologue,* is a convenient way of compensating for the absence of the narrating self: the framing narrator provides the reader with direct access to the kind of information about the external world that the inwardly-oriented monologist could not be expected to verbalize. Probably the most famous examples of framed direct interior monologue are Leopold Bloom's and Stephen Dedalus's respective monologues in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Because the narrator's discourse is not linked by quotation marks or *verba dicendi* to the thinker's inner speech, this type of interior monologue is located within the realm of McHale's *free direct discourse* category.

When a character's direct interior monologue appears on its own, i.e., without any framing narrative context, we enter the realm of *unframed direct interior monologue* (hereinafter UDIM), to which

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[22] This is G. Genette's terminology referring to an impersonal narrator (heterodiegetic) who exists outside of the fictional world presented by his/her discourse (extradiegetic). G. Genette, *Figures III* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 255-56.

D. Cohn so aptly refers as "a mere dot on a large map of literary genres."[23] Cohn calls this type of inner discourse "autonomous interior monologue" and proposes that the "Penelope" section of *Ulysses* is the most classic and famous example. Nevertheless, she adds the following:

> given its position within the broader context of Joyce's novel, however, the question must be raised whether it is at all legitimate to consider "Penelope" as an example of an autonomous fictional form. Would it even be comprehensible to a reader unfamiliar with the preceding sections of the novel? A difficult question to answer [...].[24]

Cohn's reservations are quite understandable: even though no narrator provides a context *within* Molly's monologue in "Penelope," this context is at least partially provided by the previous chapters of *Ulysses*. The same can be said about Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* where each interior monologue is framed by surrounding texts, which provide (indirect) explanations and contexts.

Therefore, an even greater autonomy and directness can be achieved if a character's inner discourse appears *entirely* on its own, i.e., unsupported by any context, narrative or otherwise. And it is this degree of monologic independence that I am going to consider on the basis of four UDIM texts: V. M. Garshin's "Четыре дня," ("Four Days") E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* A. Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* and V. Larbaud's *Amants, heureux amants...* I intend to focus on the following question: how can the author, who is unable to rely on any context outside the character's mental discourse, communicate "what is going on" to the reader without allowing the monologist to destroy the illusion of self-communication by acknowledging the reader's presence and needs?

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[23] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* p. 174.

[24] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* p. 217-18.

As this question suggests, I am interested in UDIM as an attempt to create a *realistic* (*vraisemblable*) illusion that the reader is allowed to eavesdrop on someone else's private internal discourse. The four texts chosen for this purpose do not manifest such modernistic features as self-referentiality, "laying bare the device" or any other form of *conscious* violation of the illusion implied by UDIM, which would stress their literary and artificial nature. Instead, they seek to achieve a kind of "*mimesis*" by trying to adhere to the formal implications of the self-communication premise.

Furthermore, the four texts in question represent a character's inner discourse, which is grounded in a definite "now," and this is an essential element of the *vraisemblance* effect sought by these examples of UDIM. The protagonist's inner discourse in Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* and in Simon's *La Route des Flandres,* on the other hand, is entirely retrospective, lacking the present moment altogether. This "absolute temporal void" stresses the *literariness* of such texts, which are defined by Cohn as "memory monologues." Cohn argues that memory monologues are located somewhere in-between narration and interior monologue:

> In contrast to other autonomous monologues, in memory monologues the present moment of locution is a moment emptied of all contemporary, simultaneous experience: the monologist exists merely as a disembodied medium, a pure memory without clear location in time and space [...][25]

This "surrealistic" effect is entirely absent from the four examples of "realistic" UDIM chosen for the present study.

UDIM and the Question of Mimesis

I began my discussion by citing McHale's scale of speech representation, which suggests that direct interior monologue (his *free direct discourse*) is the most mimetic form of speech representation in prose fiction. My subsequent arguments would imply that UDIM, in its turn, is the most mimetic type of direct interior monologue. And, if considered within Plato's *diegesis-mimesis* opposition (cf. above), this appears to make sense. However, if the concept of *mimesis*, i.e., imitation, is taken by itself, then one is tempted to ask the following question: what kind of discourse does UDIM *imitate*?

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[25] D. Cohn, *Transparent minds*,p. 247.

In order to answer this question, I would like to return to the idea that because the thinker in UDIM says (thinks) "I," s/he is a relative of the personal narrator.[26] According to M. Glowinski, personal fictional narrative normally imitates certain forms of communication familiar to the reader:

> The first-person narration is the domain of *formal mimetics*: an imitation, by means of a given form, of other forms of literary, paraliterary, and extraliterary discourse, as well as--what is a common enough phenomenon--ordinary language. It is a form of appeal resorting to the socially fixed norms of expression, usually firmly rooted in a given culture.[27]

Glowinski adds that the literariness of a given fictional text is derived from deliberately imperfect *mimesis*, so that "the 'imitating' element does not become absolutely subordinate to the 'imitated' one."[28] Nevertheless, the model must be relatively clear, since "detecting the model is the indispensable condition of understanding the narration which refers to the model."[29] Therefore, the closer the form of a given personal fictional narrative is to that of its extraliterary communicative model, the more formal *vraisemblance* is achieved. For example, in Swift's *Moll Flanders* the narrator's discourse is formally "realistic" because it borrows many aspects from the autobiographic genre. This cannot be said about a novel, such as Robbe-Grillet's *Djinn*.

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[26] My operational definition of narration will be: discourse relating and establishing some kind of a connection between two or more sequentially arranged events. Cf. S. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction*, pp. 2-3.

[27] M. Glowinski, "On the First-Person Novel," *New Literary History*, 9 (1977), p. 106. According to D. Cohn, "the vast majority of first-person novels [...] present themselves as written memoirs (like *David Copperfield* or *Felix Krull*), or as spoken discourse subsequently recorded by a listener (i.e., framed, like Joseph Conrad's novels, or *The Immoralist*)." *Transparent Minds*, p. 175. Also cf. R. Ohmann, "Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, I (1971), pp. 12-24.

However, as soon as we leave the realm of the *mimesis* of public discourse and enter the communicative situation implied by the UDIM genre, we can no longer talk about *vraisemblance* in terms of Glowinski's formal mimetics. Given that real thought is

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[28] M. Glowinski, "On the First-Person Novel," p. 106. Cf. Iu. Lotman: "[Artistic] imitation never involves the reproduction of the imitated in its entirety; instead, only certain aspects, functions or states of the imitated are selected, and this selection process is an important link in the cognitive chain" (my translation). Iu. M. Lotman, *Lektsii po strukturalnoi poetike: vvedeniie, teoriia stikha* (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1968), p. 27.

[29] M. Glowinski, "On the First-Person Novel," p. 106. Cf. M. L. Pratt who also stresses this need for the reader to recognize the discourse prototype: "[...] the reader who picks up a work of literature of a given genre already has a predefined idea of 'what the nature of the communication situation is.' Although the fictional discourse in a work of literature may in theory take any form at all, readers have certain expectations about what form it will take, and *they can be expected to decode the work according to those assumptions.*" M. L. Pratt, *Toward a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 204.

silent and therefore *unobservable,* the reader cannot be expected to consider a given UDIM realistic via the recognition of its underlying communicative model. Instead, the "mimetic" effect in this genre is achieved *in contrast* to those recognizable communicative models, which constitute the formal basis of conventional personal narrative. In other words, the self-communication situation in UDIM is suggested by elimination: fictional silent private discourse sounds "realistic" if it *appears different* from realistic personal narrative forms. This is why D. Cohn call this genre "a non-narrative form of fiction."[30] Discourse mimesis in UDIM is therefore, paradoxically, achieved by the apparent *avoidance* of discourse mimesis.

According to R.-A. de Beaugrande and W. U. Dressler, public discourse, upon which conventional personal narrative is normally modeled, is considered communicative if it meets seven standards of textuality: cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality. **Cohesion** is the use of an acceptable system of *grammatical* dependencies establishing relationships between elements. For example, a road sign with the inscription "children play slow at" is not cohesive. **Coherence** is the presence of *conceptual* links among elements, such as causality. Thus, in the sentence "Jack fell down and broke his crown" coherence is established by the cause-and-effect nature of the conceptual chain: falling leads to injury. **Intentionality** is the manifestation of the addresser's desire to achieve cohesion and coherence, and to make the message intelligible. **Acceptability** is the addressee's assumption that the addresser intends the message to be cohesive and coherent. **Informativity** is the novelty of the message for the addressee: low informativity causes boredom and might disrupt communication. **Situationality** has to do with the appropriateness of the message to the situation in which it is communicated. **Intertextuality** concerns message types (genres), which must be identifiable as such if the other six standards of textuality are to be received appropriately.[31]

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[30] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* p. 174.

The first three standards of textuality are the most relevant to conventional narrative and are typically observed by conventional personal narrators. Therefore, it is primarily the violation of cohesion, coherence and intentionality that should be most conducive to the self-communication illusion in UDIM. The violation of cohesion takes place when thinkers use "sloppy" syntax, omit links between sentence elements, leave out sentence elements altogether etc. The violation of coherence is the result of associative digressions so typical of the UDIM genre, and the frequent failure on the part of the thinker to establish clear conceptual links between thoughts. Ambiguous reference, especially in the use of pronouns, is also a form of incoherence found in UDIM. Intentionality is violated as a result of faulty cohesion and coherence, as well as other specific devices: it is a general "effect" creating the impression that the thinker, who is naturally unaware of having his/her thoughts monitored, does not take the reader's needs into account and is not trying to make his/her discourse clear. The resulting UDIM seeks to create the illusion that the reader decodes the text not with the help of but *in spite of* the self-communicating thinker.

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[31] R.-A. de Beaugrande and W. U. Dressler, *Introduction to Text Linguistics* (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 3-11.

However, in addition to the need for distancing UDIM from conventional personal narrative, the author has a converse goal, which potentially works against the "realistic" aspects of the genre: making the thinker's private discourse intelligible for the reader. The more a given UDIM violates cohesion, coherence, intentionality and/or other conventions of narrative, the more difficult is the reader's decoding task. On the other hand, if these violations do not take place or occur infrequently and/or with too much moderation, the UDIM text is bound to resemble conventional personal narrative, which risks compromising the illusion of self-communication sought by the genre.

And so, UDIM exists in a state of constant tension, because two essentially *opposite* goals are being pursued at the same time: the *quasi-mimetic,* which reflects the non-narratorial relationship between the internal addresser and addressee in the self-communicating mind of the thinker, and the *informatory*, which is the communicative act transpiring between the author and the reader. To quote R. Humphrey, the most challenging aim for an author seeking to create the illusion implied by the UDIM genre "is to capture the irrational and incoherent quality of private unuttered consciousness and in doing so still to communicate to his readers."[32] Although most UDIM texts can be classified along a continuum reflecting the *general* dominance of the informatory or the quasi-mimetic goal, any given DIM usually vacillates and “shuttles” between these two goals.[33]

Of course, since UDIM is a form of literature, i.e., a form of *public* communication, the quasi-mimetic goal is ultimately subservient to the informatory goal: the standards of textuality and other conventions of narrative mentioned earlier may appear to be violated on the *microcommunicative* level, i.e., within the thinker's mind, but on the *macrocommunicative* level, i.e., between the author and the reader, they must be observed to a large extent. This necessarily means that the violation of cohesion, coherence, intentionality etc. is merely a form of artifice, i.e., camouflaged *external* communication. Therefore, UDIM represents a communicative paradox, which is summed up very well by M. Raimond with respect to Joyce's *Ulysses* :

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[32] R. Humphrey, p. 62. Cf. M. Raimond's statement: "il faut qu'il [author — V.T.] s'arrange pour mêler à la trame du monologue intérieur des indices explicatifs qu'il addresse *discrètement* au lecteur." (my italics) M. Raimond, *La Crise du Roman* (Paris: Corti, 1966), p. 269.

[33] The “communicative rhythm” created by this vacillation can be said to correspond to Stanzel's "narrative rhythm," which is the alternation of narrative situations within one text. *A Theory of Narrative*, p. 69.

> on comprenait que c'était de fausser une pensée fugitive que de la fixer en mots. Jamais le procédé joycien ne devait permettre d'échapper à l'antinomie de *l'impression* et de *l'expression*: soucieux de rendre l'impression intime, comment y parviendrait-il en recourant à des phrases qui, si disloquées qu'elles soient, relèvent cependant d'un autre ordre, qui est celui de l'expression? Dès lors [...] [le monologue intérieur] est une contradiction dans les termes, ou du moins, une synthèse instable de deux éléments, puisqu'il réunit une activité de discours et une passivité intime, et qu'il prétend traduire celle-ci par celle-là.[34]

Raimond's "antinomie de *l'impression* et de *l'expression*" implies that the reader can never become totally caught up in the UDIM illusion, no matter how masterfully it is executed. The "synthèse instable de deux éléments, [qui] réunit une activité de discours et une passivité intime" is bound to remind us continually that this genre cannot help but be inconsistent with respect to its communicative premise and its execution. In fact if UDIM is viewed from the point of view of reader-response theory, the

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[34] M. Raimond, pp. 269-70.

"thinness" of the DIM illusion fits into the general reading process involved in the *Konkretisation* (to use Ingarden's term) of most fictional texts. W. Iser places the burden of illusion-making on the reader who seeks some form of consistency in a given text and from that creates an illusion:

> The text provokes certain expectations which in turn we project onto the text in such a way that we reduce the polysemantic possibilities to a single interpretation in keeping with the expectations aroused, thus extracting an individual, configurative meaning. The polysemantic nature of the text and the illusion-making of the reader are opposed factors. If the illusion were complete, the polysemantic nature would vanish; if the polysemantic nature were all-powerful, the illusion would be totally destroyed. Both extremes are conceivable, but in the individual literary text we always find some form of balance between the two conflicting tendencies. The formation of illusions, therefore, can never be total, but it is this very incompleteness that in fact gives it its productive value.[35]

Therefore, whether from the reader's or the author's point of view, the illusion created by UDIM is part of a complex, unstable and contradictory process.

Addresser v. Addressee: The Communicative Implications of the Self-Communication Premise in UDIM

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[35] W. Iser, "The Reading Process: a Phenomenological Approach," in Jane Tompkins ed. *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism* (Baltimore: Johns-Hopkins UP, 1980), pp. 59-60.

It is clear that UDIM is a technique which consists of elements that are in a state of tension with each other by virtue of their respective polarity. It could be argued that their antipodal nature stems from a basic opposition inherent in the communicative process: *addresser* v. *addressee*. In reference to R. Jakobson's model of communication[36] Yu. Lotman points out that "in fact not one but two codes are used during the communicative process: one for enciphering and the other for deciphering the message. In this connection we talk of rules for the addresser and rules for the addressee."[37] Differences between the addresser's code and the addressee's code create potential for obstacles to the communicative process even in direct communication. Such obstacles are greatly increased in UDIM, where the author tries to create the illusion that only internal communication is taking place.

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context
[36] addresser---------------------message--------------------->addressee
contact
code

R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in *R. Jakobson: Selected Writings III* (The Hague: Mouton, 1981), p. 22. The addresser sends a message, in reference to a context, to an addressee. "Contact" refers to the act of establishing and/or maintaining the channel of communication, while "code" stands for the rules and conventions for the transmission and decoding of the message.

[37] Yu. M. Lotman, *Struktura khudozhestvennogo teksta* (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1968), p. 21 (my translation). Cf. R. Jakobson, *Izbrannyie raboty* (Moscow: Progress, 1985), p. 313.

This is because on the macrocommunicative level (author-reader) a much greater degree of correspondence normally exists between the two codes in conventional narrative than during the "mimesis" of internal message transmission (UDIM).

B. Uspensky argues that in direct communication the main source of conflict between the addresser and the addressee is the fact that both strive for the *economy of effort.* The addresser wants to encode the message as easily and as quickly as possible, while the addressee wants to spend as little time as possible decoding it. The more the addresser's and addressee's codes correspond, the more effort is economized on both sides in a balanced way. However, as Uspensky points out, "the economy of effort on the part of the addresser can often be disadvantageous for the addressee and vice versa... and in light of this it could be assumed that one of the two tendencies--the addresser's or the addressee's--can be dominant..."[38] Uspensky even proposes that there are addresser's or addressee's languages (or aspects thereof), depending on the dominant tendency.[39]

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[38] B. A. Uspensky, "Problemy lingvisticheskoi tipologii v aspekte razlicheniia 'govoriashchego' (adresanta) i 'slushaiushchego' (adresata)," in: *To Honor Roman Jakobson III* (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1967), p. 2089 (my translation).

[39] An example of the addresser's dominance in a language would be vowel elimination in the written form of such Semitic languages as Hebrew and Arabic. The addresser economizes effort by using fewer letters, while the addressee requires additional

Clearly, on the macrocommunicative level the communicative situation in UDIM implies the apparent dominance of the addresser's (author's) tendency, the addressee's (reader's) needs being satisfied only *indirectly*. This is because the author tries to avoid as much as possible the *overt* correspondence between his/her code and that of the reader, which is the opposite of what normally occurs in conventional narrative. At the same time on the microcommunicative level (within the thinker's mind) the addresser and addressee are the same person, which means that the reader is not part of the internal communicative act and assumes the role of eavesdropper. In fact on the microcommunicative level maximal economy of effort is achieved since the addresser's and the addressee's codes correspond perfectly. This means that the thinker in UDIM is likely to provide only minimal information, structure and explanations, since all the contexts and links between elements should be taken for granted. The result is that *from the reader's position* discourse in UDIM is likely to be addresser-dominant at both the micro- and macrocommunicative levels, since the reader is the one who will probably achieve the least economy of effort, struggling to decipher everything left implicit by the self-communicating thinker. Therefore, the more in tune are the codes of the internal addresser

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effort in decoding the message since the missing vowels must be inferred from the morpho-lexical context. The recursive reading required for such vowel reconstruction will be discussed below.

and addressee at the microcommunicative level, the more potentially out of tune are the codes of their counterparts at the macrocommunicative level in UDIM.

Lotman argues that in order to increase the correspondence of the two codes in direct communication "natural languages tend to insure themselves against the distortion of messages through a semantic surplus..."[40] In this case Lotman is referring to the addressee's needs, since, as Uspensky points out, the addressee is oriented toward the *syntagmatic,* while the addresser favors the *paradigmatic.* In other words, the addressee economizes effort when the message is characterized by synonymy, pleonasms etc.: if content-element X is not understood when represented by form Y, it will probably be understood when forms W and Z are used (as is illustrated by this very explanation of Uspensky's reference to syntagmatic and paradigmatic dominance).[41] In the absence of synonymy and pleonasms, i.e., if each signified is represented by only one signifier, it is the addresser who economizes effort, which is why s/he favors the paradigmatic. However, in this case the addressee often has to make an extra effort in order to decode the message: not having an alternate form to rely on when trying to grasp content-element X, the addressee must either ask the addresser what s/he means or--in the case of a written message--go back and try to decode X from the context.

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[40] Yu. M. Lotman, *Struktura khudozhestvennogo teksta,* p. 34 (my translation).

[41] In this connection Uspensky maintains that homonymy is a typical reason for the addressee's need of pleonasms, and, referring to Jakobson's work, he points out that "no homonymy exists for the addresser; it can exist in principle only for the addressee" (my translation). "Problemy lingvisticheskoi tipologii," p. 2098.

According to Uspensky, in direct communication the addresser economizes effort not only by avoiding pleonasms, but also by going a step further in his/her paradigmatic tendency and using *elliptical* constructions in the hope that the addressee will fill in the syntactic gaps from the context. Naturally, the addressee wants the most syntactically *complete* message possible, because trying to compensate for ellipses takes up much more effort than decoding a message with all the relationships between elements actualized.[42] If the addressee's tendency prevails on the macrocommunicative level in UDIM, i.e. given the presence of pleonastic constructions and the tendency to leave few or no structural gaps in the text, the UDIM will become more readable and therefore more like narrative, which may pose a risk to the self-communication illusion (cf. above).

Clearly, then, the addresser's code favors *message reduction* while the code of the addressee tends toward *message expansion*. In this connection Uspensky points out that when decoding a written message, an addressee wants to avoid *recursiveness*, but message reduction creates a situation where the need to go back in order to make up for the missing elements is more likely. Because in UDIM the reader's needs are ostensibly not taken into account by the addresser on the micro- and macrocommunicative levels, the thinker's discourse often involves message reduction: contexts are dropped, pronoun referents are missing, sentence syntax is incomplete etc. The more reduced such a private message is, the more likely is the recursive reading of a UDIM text on the part of the reader. Certain UDIM texts usually have to be read several times if the *fabula* is to be recovered, which is why many readers find it difficult to get through such novels as *Ulysses* or *The Sound and The Fury.*[43] In connection with the recursive nature of the reading process involved in the decoding of certain UDIM texts, L. Edel evokes J. Frank's statement that "a stream-of-consciousness novel [UDIM — V.T.] cannot be 'read' in the usual sense--it can only be reread."[44]

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[42] Cf. R.-A. de Beaugrande and W. U. Dressler, p. 54.

Furthermore, it could be argued that a message characterized by addresser dominance will be more likely to violate traditional sequences of elements. The less concerned the addresser is about the needs of the addressee, the more s/he will allow the elements of his/her message to be linked associatively and/or in violation of customary syntax, i.e., reflecting a psychological rather than a grammatical/architectonic order--not forming a broader structured whole. Such absence of explicitly *constructive* features in the addresser's discourse in UDIM will naturally make the decoding of the message more difficult for the reader who will not be able to place everything in perspective. Therefore, in addition to message reduction, the violation of element sequences familiar to the reader often necessitates the recursive reading of UDIM texts. Commenting on message reduction and "unsequencing" in interior monologue, M. Friedman points out that: "if ever language is made to coincide with original thought, it is at the point of departure, when the mind surrenders itself to the immediate... Joyce and Faulkner express this by means of clipped phrases often deprived of a significant part of speech, inverted syntax, and 'amputated' words."[45] And so, the texts of such authors as Joyce and Faulkner require a greater amount of recursive reading than do less reduced and less "unsequenced" texts, e.g., Garshin or Dujardin.

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[43] Cf. D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* p. 250.

[44] L. Edel, *The Modern Psychological Novel* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), p. 72.

In spite of this addresser-addressee conflict, according to Uspensky, during direct communication the addresser's message reduction tendency is checked by the addressee who allows the elimination of "only the most common (and therefore most predictable) words... [and tolerates] elliptical constructions only in the most predictable cases..."[46] No such reduction restraint is to be expected at the microcommunicative level in UDIM because the thinker is his/her own addressee. However, because we are still dealing with a (masked) macrocommunicative message, reduction in UDIM must itself be "reduced." In other words, the author can never hope or even try to match the extent to which real thought is *presumably* abbreviated (cf. Chapter 2). Ideally message reduction and "unsequencing" in UDIM should be just enough to maintain the illusion of eavesdropping on thought and still allow for the motivated disclosure of the *fabula*. This means that the violation of the addressee's (reader's) code has its limits, although different texts may vary as to how far they push the reader's tolerance.

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[45] M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness*, p. 80.

The addresser's willingness to accommodate the addressee, i.e., place him/herself in the addressee's position, generates "decentered language." It is the opposite of "egocentric language," which characterizes the thoughts of a thinker in UDIM. However, as J. R. Johnson points out, "it is possible for a sender to produce an egocentric message but have it make sense because the listener or reader decentered to the sender's perspective."[47] This means that the writing and reading of UDIM texts requires the author and reader to meet more or less half-way. While the author must strive to decenter his/her thinker's message up to a point, the reader

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[46] B. A. Uspensky, "Problemy lingvisticheskoi tipologii," p. 2104.

[47] J. R. Johnson, "The Role of Inner Speech in Human Communication," *Communication Education*,33 (July 1984), pp. 216-17.

must also abandon his/her normal reading habits and decode this message with maximum attention to contextual clues and the thinker's point of view. The addresser-addressee conflict and the difficulty of writing and reading certain UDIM texts are summed up by L. Edel:

> It may be that... the [UDIM author] makes unprecedented and unreasonable demands upon us as readers. We must recognize, however, that he forces nothing upon us; it rests with us, if we wish to, to make the effort to discover whether communication with him is at all possible. It is not always possible, inevitably; and while this may give the reader a sense of frustration and may sometimes be the fault of the artist, generally it must be recognized rather as a failure of the consciousnesses involved to establish a harmonious relationship. This happens often enough in life; there is no reason why we may not expect it to happen sometimes in our relationship to certain novels that we read.[48]

In this chapter I have discussed certain theoretical implications of UDIM. Now it remains to examine the four UDIM texts chosen for this thesis in light of the foregoing, as well as other narratological and communicative considerations. However, before proceeding to textual analysis, I would like to consider a problem which is related to interior monologue but which is normally ignored by literary criticism: the contribution of psychology in the area of thought and discourse.

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[48] L. Edel, p. 139.

Inner Speech: Fact or Fiction?

So far I have argued that UDIM is not the "mimesis" of thought *in actu,* but rather an artifice: an attempt to create the illusion of private silent discourse by means of various anti-narrative strategies, based on certain assumptions about a *fictional* communicative act. I would now like to turn to the non-fictional counterpart of this communicative act, i.e., self-communication in the form of inner speech. To begin with, is there such a thing? If there is, then, according to P. Willemen, Jakobson's communication scheme

context
addresser---------------------message--------------------->addressee
contact
code

must be modified in a way that would reflect the self-communicative nature of the act. Note the similarities between Willemen's description of inner speech and Uspensky's description of the relationship between the addresser and addressee (cf. Chapter 1):

> In inner speech, addresser and addressee are the same or at least intrapersonal, which means firstly, that the context need not be taken into account, no need for redundancies and repetitions, elaborate syntagmatic arrangements and so on; secondly that there is no need for metalinguistic verifications of the code or even to maintain the process within a given code; and thirdly, that the phatic function, ascertaining

> contact, can be dispensed with. Of course, this does not mean that none of these things occurs in inner speech; merely that they are not indispensable to it.[1]

However, the discussion remains rather Laputan unless a very practical question is addressed: how do we know that inner speech exists in the first place? What if the principal UDIM hypothesis--verbal thought--is wrong to begin with? In other words, we must determine whether any real evidence exists to counter the Würzburg school hypothesis that we think without words.

In the beginning of this century the most prominent members of the Würzburg Institute of Psychology--O. Kulpe, C. Marbe and N. Ach--denied any connection between the thought process and the linguistic process. As L. Vygotsky, one of the pioneers in the research of inner speech, points out,

> The Würzburg school, whose main object was to prove the impossibility of reducing thinking to a mere play of associations and to demonstrate the existence of specific laws governing the flow of thought, did not revise the association theory of word and meaning, or even recognize the need for such a revision. It freed thought from the fetters of sensation and imagery and from the laws of association, and turned it into a purely spiritual act... Thought and speech had never been as widely separated as during the Würzburg period."[2]

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[1] P. Willemen, "Cinematic Discourse: The Problem of Inner Speech," in *Cinema and Language* (Los Angeles: The American Film Institute, 1983), p. 156. Also cf. Cf. R. Jakobson, *Izbrannyie Raboty,* p. 324 and Yu. M. Lotman, "Two Models of Communication," in Daniel P. Lucid ed. and trans. *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 99.

Although Vygotsky chastises such proponents of speechless thought as O. Selz, who "came to the conclusion that man's productive thinking and the mental operations of chimpanzees were identical in nature--so completely did he ignore the influence of words on thought,"[3] he does not subscribe to the behaviorist position either. J. B. Watson, the "father" of behaviorist theory, proposed in 1924 a speech-thought relationship that was the antipode of the Würzburg position: "The behaviorist advances the view that *what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves.*"[4] For reasons that will hopefully become clear below, Vygotsky points out that his "own research led [him] to believe that Watson poses the problem incorrectly. There are no valid reasons to assume that inner speech develops in some mechanical way through a gradual decrease in the audibility of speech (whispering)."[5]

Vygotsky takes the middle road between the behaviorists and

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[2] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* A. Kozulin trans. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986), p. 214. For examples of the Würzburg school position cf. for instance N. Ach, *Über die Begriffsbildung* (Bamberg: Buhner, 1921).

[3] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* pp. 214-215.

[4] J. B. Watson, "What is Thinking?" in F. J. McGuigan ed. *Thinking Studies of Covert Language Processes* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 10.

[5] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* p. 84

the Würzburg school, arguing that inner speech does exist, but it is different from the kind of speech that characterizes external communication. He bases his argument on a polemic with J. Piaget regarding the role of private speech in children younger than approximately 7 years of age. It is a well-known fact that preschoolers often "think out loud": a tendency which is called *private* or *egocentric* speech. According to Piaget, it is a manifestation of the child's basic autism, and he classifies the talk of preschoolers into two groups: the egocentric and the socialized. Piaget argues that the former does not follow any intelligible communicative code "chiefly because [the child] does not attempt to place himself at the point of view of his hearer."[6] As a result, Piaget concludes that egocentric speech is useless since it provides no communication and disappears roughly after the age of 7.

To begin with, Vygotsky contests Piaget's idea that egocentric speech simply vanishes past the age of 7, arguing that "when egocentric speech disappears, it does not simply atrophy but 'goes underground,' i.e., turns into inner speech."[7] One of the main reasons for adopting this view has to do with the change in the quality of observable egocentric speech as the child grows older. Vygotsky found that very little qualitative difference exists between the egocentric and the social speech of a three-year-old. However, by the time a child reaches the age of 7, "we have [egocentric] speech that in structure and function is totally unlike social speech."[8] The egocentric speech of a seven-year-old is much more difficult to follow than that of a three-year-old because it is functionally "speech for oneself," and has no external communicative function. As L. Kohlberg points out, "the self is a more 'intimate' and 'understanding' auditor than another so that the dialogue [with the self, i.e., egocentric speech] can be abbreviated and short-circuited."[9] As the child grows older, his/her baggage of communicative codes increases and becomes more differentiated; this includes the differentiation of the external and internal communicative codes. Vygotsky points out that past the age of 7, "with the progressive isolation of speech for oneself, its vocalization becomes unnecessary and meaningless and, because of growing structural peculiarities, also impossible."[10] This is why the study of egocentric speech in children can shed light on inner speech and serve as a point of reference and comparison with respect to direct interior monologue in literature.

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[6] Quoted in L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, p. 26.

[7] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, pp. 32-33.

With respect to Piaget's idea that egocentric speech is useless,

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[8] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* pp. 229-30.

[9] L. Kohlberg et al., "Private Speech: Four Studies and a Review of Theories," *Child Development,*39 (Sept. 1968), p. 696.

[10] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* p. 230.

Vygotsky points out that his experimental data suggest "that egocentric speech does play a specific role in the child's activity."[11] In his experiments Vygotsky discovered that the amount of egocentric speech increases when the smooth flow of a child's activities is disrupted, and it doubles when children are given problem-solving tasks. He concludes that egocentric speech is a problem-solving aid and helps the child to become aware of a given activity.[12] Vygotsky's findings and conclusions have been confirmed by a number of recent studies, e.g., L. Berk,[13] W. Frawley et al.,[14] as well as L. Kohlberg et al.[15] One of Vygotsky's own experiments even suggested that egocentric speech shapes actions: "A child of five-and-a-half was drawing a streetcar when the point of his pencil broke... the child muttered to himself, 'It's broken'... and began drawing a broken streetcar after an accident..."[16]

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[11] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* pp. 26-29.

[12] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* pp. 30-31.

[13] L. E. Berk, "Relationship of Elementary School Children's Private Speech to Behavioral Accompaniment to Task, Attention, and Task Performance," *Developmental Psychology,*22 (Sept. 1986), pp. 671-680.

[14] W. Frawley and J. P. Lantolf, "Private Speech and Self-Regulation: A Commentary on Frauenglass and Diaz," *Developmental Psychology,* 22 (Sept. 1986), pp. 706-708.

[15] L. Kohlberg et al., "Private Speech: Four Studies and a Review of Theories," *Child Development,*39 (Sept. 1968), pp. 691-736.

[16] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language,* p. 31. As shall be

Kohlberg et al., trying to expand Vygotsky's view of private speech as a self-regulatory or self-guiding phenomenon, describe a hypothetical course of private speech development in children, based on experimental data:

> Level I. Presocial Self-stimulating Language
>
> 1. Word play and repetition.—Repeating words and phrases for their own sake (e.g [of a child's recorded private speech]... "A whats, a whats. Doodoodoo, round up in the sky.")
>
> Level II. Outward-directed Private Speech
>
> 2. Remarks addressed to nonhuman objects.—... "Get back there," addressed to a piece of sticky paper clinging to the child's finger.
>
> 3. Describing own activity... The description is in a form which has no task-solving relevance or planning function. It is present tense rather than past tense.
>
> Level III. Inward-directed or Self-guiding Private Speech
>
> 4. Questions answered by the self. [Internal dialogue —V. T.]—For example... "Do you know why we wanted to do that? Because I need it to go a different way."
>
> 5. Self-guiding comments.—[for example]... "The wheels go here. We need to start it all over again."... The difference between this category and 3... is that these comments are task or goal oriented. Speech precedes and controls activity rather than follow it [cf. Vygotsky above —V.T.]...
>
> Level IV External Manifestations of Inner Speech
>
> 6. Inaudible muttering.—Statements uttered in such a low voice that they are indecipherable to an auditor close by.
>
> Level V. Silent Inner Speech or Thought[17]

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demonstrated later, this clearly *associative* shift is especially pertinent to one of the basic principles of UDIM: thought association.

A number of parallels can be drawn between some of these private speech categories, especially self-guiding interior dialogue, and fictional UDIM (cf. Chapter 5). I shall return to the forms and properties of inner speech later, but now I would like to address the question of experiments aimed at the study of inner speech proper.

Electromyographic and Other Experimental Data: Indirect Evidence

If we turn to studies with adult subjects, we discover that a totally different methodology is required for the detection of inner speech because, as Vygotsky points out, private speech is no longer vocalized and turns into inner speech approximately past the age of 7. One of the foremost researchers of inner speech in the former Soviet Union was Alexander N. Sokolov. In the 1960s and 70s he set out to collect empirical evidence regarding inner speech, rejecting introspective descriptions of this phenomenon as being too inconsistent, contradictory and unreliable.[18] In fact the introspective analysis of inner speech had already been rejected by an illustrious predecessor, William James, who had coined the term

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[17] L. Kohlberg et al., pp. 707-708.

[18] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," *International Journal of Psychology,* 6 (1971), p. 80.

"stream of consciousness" in his famous work entitled *The Principles of Psychology* (1890).[19] The following statement by this pioneer of modern psychology indirectly supports the idea that whatever UDIM may be, it cannot be the "mimesis" of thought:

> The rush of thought is so headlong that it almost always brings us up at the conclusion before we can arrest it [...] As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop [...] The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks.[20]

Although contemporary psychologists, such as E. Tarasov and N. Ufimtseva do not totally dismiss the fruitfulness of the introspective analysis of inner speech, they point out that "when we study the data of introspective analysis [of thought - V.T.], we are dealing with segments of thought of which the subject is aware; this, however, does not exclude the unfolding of thought processes, including inner speech, on the subconscious level, which is supported by indirect data."[21]

And so, instead of relying on the reports of subjects based on introspective analysis, Sokolov decided to use manifestations of speech kinesthesia--sensations caused by the movement of articulatory muscles in the throat and mouth--as the basic indicator of inner speech. Arguing that "kinesthetic control of the articulatory movements is required to obtain correct phonation," he maintains that children acquire and internalize a certain kinesthetic code as they

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[19] W. James, *The Principles of Psychology I* (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), p. 239.

[20] Quoted by L. Edel, p. 20.

[21] E. Tarasov and N. Ufimtseva, "Znakovyie oposredovateli myshleniia" in *Issldedovaniie rechevogo myshleniia v psikholingvistike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 67 (my translation).

> correlate the kinesthetic sensations which arise during articulation with the auditory perception of their own speech [...], [comparing] the latter with the acoustic standards of the speech of adults [and trying] to approximate their own articulation to these standards.[22]

This kinesthetic code becomes an inseparable part of language, and the detection of speech kinesthesia would imply the presence of covert linguistic activity. It is important to note that Sokolov's assumption was that all linguistic activity must be accompanied by speech musculature activity because of the kinesthetic code.

Arguing against the presence of "the brain speech divisions into exclusively 'motor' areas which are connected only with the vocalization of speech, and 'ideational' areas which are connected only with the semantics of speech," Sokolov set out to prove the motor/ideational connection by monitoring kinesthetic speech muscle activity during various thought processes. Working from the premise that "the stimulation of muscle fibers is associated with action currents, which precede the contraction of the muscle and are indicators of a hidden (latent) phase of their stimulation by the motor neurons of the spinal cord and the *medulla oblongata,*"[23] Sokolov conducted electromyographic investigations of the thought process by attaching very thin sensitive and unobtrusive electrodes to the speech musculature of the throat, lips and/or tongue in order to record their activity at various stages of thinking. The resulting oscillograms confirmed Sokolov's initial hypothesis.

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[22] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 81

He found that speech musculature activity is characterized by two states during the thought process: the tonic state (increased tone of the speech musculature) and the phasic state (micromovements of the speech musculature):

> To various degrees these manifestations of electroactivity of the speech musculature accompany all forms of thought; however, during perception and concrete thinking tonic electroactivity predominates, while mental reasoning more often involves bursts of explosive phasic electroactivity.[24]

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[23] A. N. Sokolov, *Vnutrenniaia rech i myshleniie* (Moscow: Prosveshcheniie, 1968), p. 131 (my translation).

[24] A. N. Sokolov, "Speech-Motor Afferentiation and the Problem of the Brain Mechanism of Thinking," *Voprosy psikhologii,* 13:3 (1967), p. 48 (my translation).

As an example of the tonic state of the speech musculature during the thought process, Sokolov provides experimental electromyographic data from an oscillograph, demonstrating the increase in the tone of lower lip musculature as the subject listens to a text by Turgenev.[25] When subjects were given abstract reasoning and problem-solving tasks, Sokolov's oscillograph recorded bursts of speech muscle twitching--the phasic state--and these hidden kinesthetic speech impulses increased with the difficulty of the task in question.[26] The automatization of thinking tasks--repeated mental counting etc.--was associated with a reduction of hidden articulation.[27] However, the moment "even an insignificant change in the usual order of counting (for example, transition from an increasing to a decreasing sequence...)" is introduced, electromuscular activity of the speech musculature increases.[28]

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[25] A. N. Sokolov, "Speech-Motor Afferentiation and the Problem of the Brain Mechanism of Thinking," p. 48.

[26] Sokolov's and Vygotsky's findings that the rate of inner speech increases in the face of difficulties are echoed by B. G. Ananiev whose "preliminary observations indicate that the main stimulus for [increased inner speaking] stems from those conditions and relationships that generate a logical obstacle or a moral contradiction" (my translation). B. G. Ananiev, *Psikhologiia chuvstvennogo poznaniia*, (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1960), p. 351.

[27] A. N. Sokolov, *Vnutrenniaia rech i myshleniie*, pp. 131-166. These electromyographic findings confirm Vygotsky's observations of egocentric speech in children engaged in problem-solving activities (cf. above).

Sokolov hypothesizes that the tonic state of speech muscle electroactivity is an indicator of condensed inner speech, associated for one with visual thinking: "... [when the situation] does not require the verbalization of all that is perceived; the internal speech functions in a highly generalized and fragmentary way, only directing the process of visual analysis..." When mental difficulties arise in visual analysis, speech muscle activity is increased, and Sokolov argues that "such an inclusion of [inner] speech into the processes of visual analysis and synthesis transforms them from an act of 'unconscious deductions' into a consciously directed and controlled process of logical thought."[29]

In general the tonic state of articulatory muscles tends to be associated with perception and other passive thought processes; however, "the tonic component remains a constantly active factor [during all forms of thinking, which excludes] any foundations for the theory of 'pure' thought or thought in 'pure meanings'..."[30] In fact, Sokolov adds that when the fingers of deaf-mutes were monitored electromyographically during various thought processes, the same kinesthetic twitching and general muscle tone were observed.[31] Furthermore, he cites data regarding "a marked hyperactivity of the speech musculature" in mentally ill patients during hallucination.[32]

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[28] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 89. This confirms a)Vygotsky's above-mentioned observations of egocentric speech in children, b)the self-regulative function of inner speech and c)its connection with egocentric speech.

[29] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 90

[30] A. N. Sokolov, "Speech-Motor Afferentiation and the Problem of the Brain Mechanism of Thinking," p. 53.

Sokolov also conducted experiments where speech kinesthesia was hindered--the subject's tongue would be immobilized for example--in order to determine the impact of such interferences with the thought process. He found that "slight squeezing of the tongue between the teeth [the subject was asked to do so - V.T.] created difficulties in reading and comprehending relatively complex texts and led to serious mistakes in writing."[33] When the physical hindrance to hidden articulation was removed, the subject's performance returned to normal. Furthermore, other types of hindrances--such as the requirement that the subject repeat out loud various phonemes or engage in vocalized counting--interfered with memorization and text comprehension tasks.[34]

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[31] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 87.

[32] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 88.

[33] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 85.

[34] N. I. Zhinkin found the same decrease in mental capacity when subjects were asked to tap the table as they tried to accomplish various counting tasks. N. I. Zhinkin, "O kodovykh perekhodakh vo vnutrennei rechi," *Voprosy iazykoznaniia,* 6 (1964), p. 32.

These findings suggest the indispensable role played by inner speech in the thinking process.

Sokolov points out that as a given type of inner speech hindrance was applied repeatedly, the subject's performance gradually returned to normal. He explains this form of hindrance automatization by inner speech reduction where "thought develops according to the principle of enthymemes... owing to this, verbalization becomes even more reduced..." As a result the subject can reduce his inner verbal code so much that inner speech units can be inserted in the breath pauses between interference vocalization, such as the above-mentioned counting out loud. Sokolov adds that while in some cases "[inner] speech actions... may be greatly contracted like a telegraphic code... in others [they] may be more extended, turning into an 'annotation of a statement or into an 'internal monologue'."[35] Since Sokolov mentions internal monologue, I would like to note that interestingly enough his description of the range of inner speech corresponds to the range of UDIM types in literature.

Sokolov concludes that more reduced inner speech corresponds to the tonic state, while more expanded inner speech is represented by the phasic state of the speech musculature.[36] The fact that during visual thinking inner speech tends to be reduced more than during abstract thought, implies that the presence of a visual support eliminates the need of certain mental operations. However, when the mind is "alone"--during purely abstract thought--inner speech becomes more expanded because reasoning remains the only tool available to the brain. In other words, the more abstract the thought, the fuller the syntax in inner speech. In general Sokolov sees inner speech as a series of reduced semantic complexes which acquire a fuller verbal expression during external communication.[37] This position is supported by Leontiev who uses the term "inner programming" to characterize this phenomenon.[38]

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[35] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 86.

[36] A. N. Sokolov, "Speech-Motor Afferentiation and the Problem of the Brain Mechanism of Thinking," pp. 52-53.

On the basis of these data we will assume that fictional UDIM does indeed have a counterpart in reality, which, however, does not mean that the fictional illusion of internal communication *imitates* real inner speech (cf. Chapter 1). In the next three sections I would like to consider the differences and similarities between actual and "feigned" self-communication with respect to discourse abbreviation patterns.

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[37] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 86

[38] A. A. Leontiev, "Inner Speech and the Processes of Grammatical Generation of Utterances," trans. M. Vale, *Soviet Psychology*, 2:3 (1969), p. 12.

Message Reduction in Inner Speech: Theme v. Rheme

The basic form of *reduction* in the linguistic process during inner speech was discussed originally by Vygotsky whose hypotheses and observations inspired most of the laboratory research mentioned so far. While observing the egocentric speech of children, Vygotsky found "that as egocentric speech develops, it shows a tendency toward an altogether specific form of abbreviation, namely: omitting the subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the predicate." Vygotsky explains subject group deletion through an analogy with certain phenomena that take place in external communication. When the subject of a given utterance is very well-known to the addresser and the addressee, it is often dropped from the message: "Let us imagine that several people are waiting for a bus. No one will say, on seeing the bus approach, 'The bus for which we are waiting is coming.' The sentence is likely to be abbreviated 'Coming'..."[39] Vygotsky adds that similar phenomena are observed in the speech of people who live together and therefore share the contextual knowledge of many of their utterances. As a result they frequently use reduced syntax.

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[39] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, p. 236. Note that Vygotsky's observations of reduction in egocentric speech agree with Uspensky's theory (cf. Chapter 1) regarding the *paradigmatic* nature of the addresser's code and with Uspensky's observation of maximal message reduction in aphasiacs and children, i.e., those who are the least likely to take the addressee's needs into account. Cf. Uspensky, "Problemy lingvisticheskoi tipologii v aspekte razlicheniia 'govoriashchego' (adresanta) i 'slushaiushchego' (adresata)," p. 2099.

Several decades after Vygotsky's death, his colleague A. R. Luria and L. S. Tzvetkova actually found a way to test in the laboratory the notion of predicate dominance in inner speech. They examined the speech patterns of patients suffering from dynamic aphasia, "a speech disorder, which occurs as a result of local injury to the posterior frontal region of the left cerebral hemisphere." It was discovered that the vast majority of patients with this disorder had "considerable difficulties in finding the names of actions," whereas the naming of objects did not present a problem.[40] Turning to Vygotsky's theory that inner speech is predicative in nature and represents a transitional stage between the conception of a thought and its expanded vocal manifestation, the two researchers argue that their patients' inability to produce complete sentences and name actions (usually predicates) has to do with the fact "that the predicative structure of their inner speech is defective."[41] This conclusion was supported by electromyographic evidence: when patients suffering from dynamic aphasia were asked to give a *mental* answer to a question, the electromuscular activity of the lower lip of these subjects remained no different from background electromyograms. When, however, the patients were guided in their inner speech by external supports, bursts of electromuscular activity were registered by the oscillograph. These findings suggest that during normal cerebral activity inner speech is indeed dominated by predicates at the expense of subjects; when a cerebral anomaly reverses this relationship, defective inner speech results.

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[40] A. R. Luria and L. S. Tsvetkova, "Neuropsychological Analysis of the Predicative Structure of Utterance," *Soviet Psychology,* 7:3 (Spring 1969), pp. 26-28. "Names of actions" usually correspond to predicates while "names of objects" are normally sentence subjects.

[41] A. R. Luria and L. S. Tsvetkova, pp. 28-29

Let us now address Vygotsky's notion of predicate dominance during message reduction in inner speech and turn to two basic concepts from functional linguistics which may be more helpful than purely grammatical categories: Theme and Rheme:

> Theme is that part of discourse which contains the least information and expresses something already known, as if to give a point of departure for the unfolding of the message and transmission of new information, e.g. 'We live in Moscow. In Moscow there are many higher educational institutions.' The opposite is Rheme.[42]

In the second sentence of this example "in Moscow" is the Theme because it is information carried over from "we live in Moscow," while "there are many higher educational institutions" is the Rheme because it is "the nucleus of the discourse (new information), i.e., the actual content of the message and therefore that which the addresser wishes to communicate to the addressee regarding--or based on--the Theme."[43]

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[42] O. S. Akhmanova, *Slovar lingvisticheskikh terminov* (Moscow: Izd-vo Sovetskaia entsyklopediia, 1966), p. 471. Cf. E. V. Paducheva's "dominated name" and "predicate," in "O strukture abzatsa," in Yu. M. Lotman ed. *Trudy po znakovym sistemam II* (Tartu, 1965), p. 287

As this approach suggests, depending on the context, any element in a given sentence can act as Theme or Rheme, and although most often Theme corresponds to the grammatical subject while Rheme is represented by the grammatical predicate, this is not (necessarily) always so.[44] Vygotsky himself stresses the difference between the grammatical subject and predicate as opposed to the *psychological* subject and predicate: "Suppose I notice that the clock has stopped and ask how this happened. The answer is 'The clock fell.' Grammatical and psychological subject coincide." In this case Vygotsky's grammatical subject "clock" happens to be the Theme of the message because it conveys old information which has already been introduced by a context: the fact of having seen the broken clock before hearing "the clock fell." The Rheme here is the grammatical predicate "fell" because it conveys new information about the Theme.

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[43] O. S. Akhmanova, p. 384. Also cf. C. J. Firbas, "On Defining the Theme in Functional Sentence Analysis," *Travaux linguistiques de Prague I,* 1964, pp. 267-280 and V. Mathesius, *O tak zvaném aktuálnim cleneni vetnêm, «Cestina a obecny jazykozpyt»* Praha, 1947.

[44] Cf. W. Chafe, "Beyond Bartlett: Narratives and Remembering," *Poetics,* 15 (1986), p. 143.

However, according to Vygotsky, the "subject and predicate are psychologically reversed... if I hear a crash in the next room and inquire what happened, and get the same answer ['The clock fell']..."[45] This is because "fell" is now the Theme, since it conveys information that I already know from the context: hearing the crash. I would like to know *what* fell, and therefore "the clock" is the Rheme. J. Wertsch also views Vygotsky's notion of psychological subject and predicate as Theme- and Rheme-like concepts:

> While it is true that the best translation of the term [Vygotsky] used in Russian (*predikativnost'*) is predicativity, he was actually concerned with notions that have subsequently been developed in functional linguistics, such as given and new information, topic and comment, and Theme and Rheme, rather than with syntactic or grammatical subject and predicate.[46]

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[45] L. S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, p. 220.

[46] J. V. Wertsch, "The Regulation of Human Action and the Given-New Organization of Private Speech," in G. Zivin ed. *The Development of Self-Regulation Through Private Speech* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 80. A. A. Leontiev--Vygotsky's student and associate--also points out that Vygotsky's understanding of "predicativeness" as the hallmark of inner speech is not so much a linguistic concept as a psychological one, and this psychological predicativeness in my opinion corresponds to *rheme*

Therefore, Vygotsky's notion of predicate dominance in message reduction during inner speech is in fact Rheme dominance.

Because Theme deletion--hence Rheme dominance--happens to be a typical discourse abbreviation device in UDIM texts, and because the Theme/Rheme concepts are understood in different ways by different linguists,[47] it is necessary at this point in the discussion to define these terms in relation to my goals and material. Since I intend to consider the Theme/Rheme relationship as it operates in fictional message abbreviation in UDIM, I will define Theme as *those elements of a sentence that can be dropped by the addresser and still be inferred or recovered by the addressee*. Rheme is the rest of the sentence. This is similar to W. Chafe's distinction of "given" v. "new," where the former is the equivalent of my use of the term Theme, while the latter corresponds to my understanding of Rheme: "Given (or old) information is that knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance. So-called new information is what the speaker assumes he is

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dominance. Cf. A. A. Leontiev, p. 13.

[47] Cf. for example W. Chafe, "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness, Subjects, Topics, and Point of View," in *Subject and Topic*, C. N. Li ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1976), pp. 27-55 and M. A. K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985).

introducing into the addressee's consciousness by what he says."[48]

Rheme Dominance in UDIM

Although discourse abbreviation in UDIM takes several forms (cf. Chapter 4), Theme deletion is one of the most prevalent. The following passage from E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* where the thinker mentally verbalizes his toilet, illustrates one form of Theme deletion as it typically takes place in UDIM. I have "reintroduced" a possible version of the deleted Theme elements in square brackets (boldface):

> [...] habillons-nous, et prenons une autre chemise. **[Je mets/jette]** ma jaquette, là sur le lit; **[je mets/jette]** mon gilet, aussi sur le lit; maintenant **[je vais]** dans le cabinet de toilette [...] **[je prends]** l'éponge [...] ah! **[je plonge]** la tête dans l'eau [...] **[je prends]** ma serviette; ouf! [...] **[il]** faut s'habiller [...] **[je mets]** une chemise blanche... **[j'engage]** les boutons des manches, du col **[dans leurs boutonnières]**; ah! **[j'ai oublié]** le linge frais; que je suis bête! dépêchons-nous; **[je vais/cours]** dans ma chambre [...] **[je noue]** ma cravate [...] **[je mets]** dans la poche, ma montre [...] j'oubliais de brosser un peu mes bottines; tant pis! non, **[je vais (leur) donner]** un simple coup de brosse; **[je prends]** ma brosse à habits [...][49]

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[48] W. Chafe, "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness, Subjects, Topics, and Point of View," p. 30. Also cf. W. Chafe, "Beyond Bartlett: Narratives and Remembering," p. 143.

All the missing Theme elements are implied by the general toilet context and can be considered recoverable on the basis of the reader's knowledge of the world: how and in what sequence a person normally washes up, dresses and brushes his/her clothes. Although the violation of Beaugrande's and Dressler's norm of cohesion (cf. Chapter 1) in this passage does distance the thinker's discourse from that of a conventional narrator and suggests addresser-dominance, the reader should have no trouble making up for the thinker's discourse abbreviation, i.e. recursive reading or any other major decoding effort is not really required on the reader's part. Therefore, it could be argued that this form of discourse abbreviation establishes a certain balance between the *quasi-mimetic* and the *informatory* goals of the UDIM genre.

When UDIM involves the deletion of Theme elements that cannot be recovered simply on the basis of the reader's world knowledge, the missing information is normally provided elsewhere in the text. And this reflects a key feature of "Themeness." As W. Chafe put it, "the most common linguistic basis for the speaker's assuming something to be in the addressee's consciousness is, of course, the prior mention of a referent."[50] For example in A.

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[49] E. Dujardin, *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* (Paris: Bibliothèque 10/18, 1968), pp. 64-5.

[50] W. Chafe, "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness,

Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* the thinker comments to himself about a female acquaintance: "Ja, wenn's noch die Adel' wär'... Nein, die Adel'! Mir scheint, seit zwei Jahren hab' ich an die nicht mehr gedacht... [...] Na, Gustl, hätt'st schon noch warten können—war doch die einzige, die dich gern gehabt hat...? (167-68)"[51] The missing Theme of the abbreviated sentence "war doch die einzige" is "Adel'," and its recovery requires a certain (however small) amount of recursive reading on the part of the reader. As in the above-cited passage from Dujardin, the readability of the text is not really affected by this instance of discourse abbreviation, since the distance between the sentence-fragment and its referent is very small, but communicative privacy is nevertheless suggested by contrast with conventional narrative where such syntax would be unlikely.

In V. Larbaud's "Amants, heureux amants...," on the other hand, there is an example of Theme deletion where the distance between an abbreviated sentence and its referent is quite considerable. As the thinker ponders the appearance of a girlfriend, he suddenly *associatively* recalls the way he had seduced her the night before: "Son petit air modeste; les yeux baissés sous le beau front bombé.

Subjects, Topics, and Point of View," p. 32.

[51] A. Schnitzler, *Meistererzählungen* (Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer Verlag, 1950), pp. 167-68.

Piglio di Madonnina. Les mains sont très belles. Pensé au vers: «O bella mano...» J'aurais dû les lui réciter. Et dire que sans la connaître, brutalement, sottement."[52] The Theme of "sans la connaître, brutalement, sottement" is the act of seduction, but it is mentioned three pages before. Therefore, its recovery by the reader would presumably require more recursive reading and mental effort than the reconstruction of "Adel'" in the above-mentioned passage from Schnitzler.

However, whether the distance between an abbreviated sentence and its missing referent is small or large, most UDIM texts make such Theme elements available at one point or another. And this is indicative of the fact that the macrocommunicative process normally has primacy over the microcommunicative process in UDIM. R. Humphrey refers to this as "suspended coherence." He argues that in UDIM no matter how incoherent a given text may be, the explanation of unclear elements is normally only delayed and not missing outright.[53] Humphrey argues that in order to counter the incoherence created by a monologist's thought association--which is often the basis of discourse progression in UDIM--authors try to make sure that each element introduced associatively into the monologist's mind can be linked with an explanatory context somewhere in the text. Therefore, coherence is not eliminated: it is merely suspended. While thought association is the source of most unclear Themeless sentences in UDIM, suspended coherence is a deleted Theme recovery device.

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[52] V. Larbaud, *Amants, heureux amants...* (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), pp. 132-133.

[53] R. Humphrey, pp. 66-72.

Thus, message abbreviation is characterized by Theme-dropping in both real inner speech and literary UDIM; however, in the former it presumably takes place with much more ease than it does in the latter, which points to a basic difference between the two. In real inner speech the Theme recovery potential is presumably 100% since the message is supposed to be received by an internal addressee who always knows the context of discourse. This explains Vygotsky's observations of egocentric speech predicativeness in preschoolers. In UDIM, however, the Theme recovery potential is naturally lower because the fictional internal communication is only an illusion, and in addition to the fictional internal addressee there is a real external addressee: the reader. And since the reader cannot be expected to know automatically all the contexts for every utterance, Theme deletion must be balanced against the requirements of the macrocommunicative process (cf. Chapter 1), i.e., comprehensibility.

A further distinction between message abbreviation in real inner speech and in literary UDIM can be made if we consider that two major types of contexts can be used as missing Theme recovery sources: the linguistic and the extralinguistic. As. W. Chafe points out,

> extralinguistically, the speaker may believe that both he and the addressee share the perception, and hence the consciousness of some object in the environment. If the speaker sees the addressee looking at a certain picture on his wall, for example, he might say out of the blue I bought it last week, where the idea of the picture is treated as a given and hence pronounced with low pitch and weak stress, as well as being pronominalized as "it."[54]

Chafe goes on to argue that the *linguistic* basis for givenness has to do with a previous verbalization of an element, which is later treated as a Theme and, in the context of our discussion, is therefore deletable. The point here is that extralinguistic givenness is much more likely to be present in real inner speech than in literary UDIM for the simple reason that a UDIM thinker can never share with the reader the *physical perception* of an object or the memory of something outside the text. This naturally limits the Theme dropping potential of UDIM where discourse abbreviation can rely mainly on linguistic clues. Such verbal contexts are not always easy or even possible to provide in UDIM without making the "mimesis" of thought appear cumbersome or artificial, i.e., similar to conventional narrative.

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[54] W. Chafe, "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness, Subjects, Topics, and Point of View," p. 32.

Left mainly with the linguistic basis for Theme deletion and recovery, literary UDIM has to balance two often antipodal elements--a)the illusion of disorganized and fragmented (abbreviated) private thought processes and b)the clarity/accessibility of *linguistic* clues facilitating the recovery of deleted Themes. This is part of the conflict between the quasi-mimetic and the informatory goals discussed in Chapter 1. If a given UDIM involves "disorganized" associative shifting from one idea to another and therefore *in medias res* beginnings of *fabula* segments, all the elements in a given sentence may be perceived by the reader as carriers of *new information* i.e., Rhemes. The more incoherent and randomly associative the UDIM message, the less likely is the reader to know the constantly changing contexts, and the more difficult it becomes for the author to eliminate what for the monologist are Themes without endangering the macrocommunicative process. On the other hand, the more sustained and organized the UDIM discourse, and the more constant the frames of reference (contexts), the easier it is to leave out Themes without harming the macrocommunicative process.

The result is a paradox. The disorganized stream of consciousness with its constantly changing topics and contexts seems so foreign to public communication and especially conventional narration that *by elimination* it appears to suggest internal communication more than any other device. This sort of incoherent UDIM makes Theme deletion--the very essence of real inner speech--"mimetically" necessary, yet extremely difficult if intelligibility for the reader is to be maintained. On the other hand, UDIM with a more sustained line of thought, whose organized structure seems closer to narrative practice, is more likely to provide the linguistic basis of givenness for easy Theme deletion and recovery.

As a final note on Theme recovery in UDIM, I would like to return to the above-cited passage from Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl*: “Ja, wenn's noch die Adel' wär'... Nein, die Adel'! Mir scheint, seit zwei Jahren hab' ich an die nicht mehr gedacht... [...] Na, Gustl, hätt'st schon noch warten können—war doch die einzige, die dich gern gehabt hat...? (167-68)” There are actually two Themeless sentences here “hätt'st schon noch warten können” and “war doch die einzige.” In addition to contextual Theme-recovery sources, *morphological* clues are also available in this case: the second person singular ending in “hätt'st” suggests that “du” is the missing Theme, while the feminine singular endings in “die einzige” make it easier to relate this phrase to a *female* referent. When translated into English (“could have waited” and “was still the only one”), these excerpts illustrate the advantage that more inflected languages have over less inflected ones when it comes to reconstructing discourse abbreviation based on Theme deletion. In German, Russian or French, for example, the scope of discourse abbreviation through Theme deletion can sometimes be greater than in English because inflections, through *agreement* with missing Theme elements, can make the reader's Theme recovery task that much easier even in the absence of easily accessible contextual clues. This inflection-related advantage also applies to other devices aimed at creating the illusion of self-communication (cf. Chapters 4 and 6). Therefore, languages, such as German or Russian, may actually make it easier to create the illusion of self-communication.

The "Realism" of UDIM

The theorists of interior monologue have devoted a considerable amount of attention to what is and is not *convincing or communicatively verisimilar* in UDIM texts. One of the biggest bones of contention regarding "mimesis" in literary UDIM is the verbalization of so-called *preverbal* phenomena. Because Dujardin's pioneer UDIM *Les Lauriers sont coupés* seems to have offended the "mimetic" sense of literary critics more than any other similar text, I would like to turn to some of these criticisms and compare them with experimental evidence regarding the verbalization of preverbal phenomena in inner speech.

Dujardin is usually accused of having his monologist think the kind of thoughts that are not "supposed" to take on a verbal form, registering automatically in the sensorimotor area of the brain. L. Edel, for example--in regard to a scene where Dujardin's thinker enters a restaurant and mentally verbalizes everything in his visual range--claims that

> it is not altogether convincing to have us believe that the preoccupied man would bring into the center of his consciousness the table, the hat on the peg, the removal of his gloves... In terms of fictional verisimilitude the thoughts--waiter, table, hat on peg, gloves--seem to be serving as the equivalents of stage directions in a play, and the hero figures as an actor, whose every move has been calculated. But the reality would be a simultaneous registering of the items tabulated by Dujardin in the hero's mind, and doubtless beyond the verbal level.[55]

L. E. Bowling sums up the criticism addressed to Dujardin for allowing his thinker to verbalize certain pieces of visual and motor information:

> ... there is always in the consciousness a vast amount of mental activity which our minds never translate into language, and any attempt on the part of the writer to make a character think this non-language material into language form (that is into interior monologue) sounds awkward and unreal.[56]

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[55] L. Edel, p. 60.

[56] L. E. Bowling, p. 355. Also cf. M. Friedman, *Stream of*

Such objections to the verbalization of preverbal thought would probably seem justified to most readers. There may be, nevertheless, some evidence that--whether Dujardin was aware of this or not, although I would assume the latter--a certain amount of "mimetic" validity may be attributed to the "questionable" passages in *Les Lauriers sont coupés.* In her research of egocentric speech and Vygotsky's theories, M. S. Saville-Troike observed preschoolers engaged in various activities in different circumstances. Here is an example of the egocentric speech patterns recorded by her, which may belie Edel's and Bowling's claims about what "really" happens during the human thought process. One child, while walking along, was heard chanting: "Walking, walking, walk. Walking, walking, walk."[57] So here we have the verbalization of a purely motor

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Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method, p. 153.

[57] M. L. Saville-Troike, "Private Speech: Evidence for Second Language Strategies During the 'Silent' Period," *Journal of Child Language,* 15 (1988), p. 584. Saville-Troike's findings suggest a number of correspondences between inner speech and literary UDIM. For example, her children demonstrated instances of word/concept association outside of any external context, i.e., during typical egocentric speech soliloquies: "Whose. Babe. Hi, babe." p. 583. As we shall see later this sort of purely associative thought is at the base of certain UDIM texts. Another typical UDIM phenomenon is obsessive repetition of words or phrases--a kind of mulling over of various thoughts--and it too finds its analogue in Saville-Troike's observations. She recorded one child soliloquizing: "Jelly bean, jelly bean. Jelly, jelly, jelly, jelly," and another: "Yucky. Yucky scoop. Scoop, scoop, yucky scoop. Yucky, yucky, yuck-

activity, and--given the link between egocentric speech and inner speech (cf. Vygotsky above)--it corresponds to such passages in Dujardin's novel as "Nous marchons, côte à côte."[58] Saville-Troike's observations are especially surprising in light of the fact that walking would *seem* to be the least likely activity to be verbally registered by the walker, since the processing of such purely motor information should be even more automatic than the processing of visual information.

As for the verbalization of visual information processing--one of the objections raised by Edel and Bowling with regard to Dujardin's thinker-- electromyographic data from the above-mentioned experiments by A. N. Sokolov indicate the constant presence of inner speech during "visual thinking." Although Sokolov does point out that such inner speech is highly reduced, as is indicated by the predominantly tonic state of the articulatory musculature during most visual thinking, it is nevertheless there. As Sokolov points out, "such an inclusion of speech into the processes of visual analysis and synthesis transforms them from an act of 'unconscious deductions' into a consciously directed and controlled process of logical thought" (cf. above).

A lack of correspondence thus appears to emerge between the

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yucky." p. 583.

[58] E. Dujardin, *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, p. 31.

critics' (and most readers') understanding of what is "fictionally verisimilar" in UDIM and certain assumptions that can be made on the basis of data from research on inner speech. However, the question of the verisimilitude of UDIM, or its "reality effect," has to do not with facts, i.e. with what *really* happens in inner speech, but with certain forms of discourse: especially the *avoidance* of discourse features typical of written narrative (cf. Chapter 1). Edel objects to Daniel's verbalization of his physical space because the description of one's environment presupposes an external addressee who is not there to see it, and yet wants to know about it, i.e., it would be typical of conventional narratorial descriptive discourse. Scientific evidence thus takes second place to communicative conventions, which is to be expected when we are dealing with a form of *literary* communication. And this is why Bowling's requirement that UDIM present "that part of mental activity which is nearest to the reality of human speech, that part which may be reasonably and convincingly rendered in the form of interior monologue" makes sense.[59] It is the words "reasonably and convincingly" that are most important here: what matters is the reader's expectations, and these expectations are based on a knowledge of various forms of public discourse. It is the desire *not to see* these forms of public discourse that determines what is or is not convincing in UDIM.

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[59] L. E. Bowling, p. 357.

Although both Edel and Bowling are on the right track in terms of formal mimetics (cf. Chapter 1), I must object to their attempt to make a link with the real mind and the real thought process in their respective criticisms of Dujardin's UDIM (cf. above). Their mistake in this respect is best summed up by C. D. King who argues that "since psychology is after all, a matter for psychologists... Bowling might have paid more attention to the literary form [he is] discussing and less to what really goes on in the mind."[60] Similarly, M. Raimond points out the need to restrict the criticism of the interior monologue technique to literary and artistic considerations:

> [...] c'est de façon abusive que la critique conférait au monologue intérieur le pouvoir d'investigation auquel prétendait l'écriture automatique. Car, dans un cas, il s'agit d'un homme réel, pour qui l'entreprise d'étudier le fonctionnement de la pensée, même si elle se solde par un échec, n'est pas absurde; au lieu que, dans l'autre, ce flot de conscience ininterrompu est tout entier forgé par l'auteur et prêté par lui à un personnage imaginaire [...] Il est évident que le romancier se contente de donner le *sentiment* d'un courant de conscience, non de le restituer effectivement, ce qui serait, esthétiquement et psychologiquement, un non-sens. (my italics - V. T.)[61]

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[60] C. D. King, "Édouard Dujardin, Inner Monologue and the Stream of Consciousness," *French Studies* 7 (1953), p. 125.

[61] M. Raimond, pp. 268-69.

Therefore, UDIM, being a unique literary genre as far as its relationship with the actual world is concerned, cannot be judged by conventional approaches that try to correlate a given fictional text with what happens "out there" in the real world. However, the indirect correspondences that exist between real inner speech and literary practice warrant further investigation, which I will attempt in the following chapters.

Introduction

Vsevolod M. Garshin's story "Four Days" ("Четыре дня") made the author famous when it was published in 1877. Intended as a strong anti-war statement and based on a true incident during the Russo-Turkish war (1877-78), "Four Days" is the interior monologue of a wounded soldier left for dead on an empty battlefield. His last name, Ivanov, which is traditionally considered to be the most common one in Russia, may suggest the idea of "everyman" in order to generalize the protagonist's terrible experience on the battlefield into a broad anti-war message. The protagonist finds himself pinned down next to the body of a Turkish soldier whom he killed just before being wounded. Forced to look at the corpse for a long time, Ivanov experiences terrible guilt, since he has never killed before. After four days of physical and mental agony, during which Ivanov reassesses his formerly idealistic attitude toward war and ends up condemning it as something far from glorious and noble, the protagonist is found by his regiment, and, unlike his real-life prototype, he survives.[1]

Throughout the text we do not leave the confines of the protagonist's mind; as a result, the intense, relentless focus on his mental and physical anguish created by the interior monologue technique enhances the "horrors of war" effect intended by the author. At the same time the war-related situation and setting provide motivation for the wounded man's interior monologue: immobilized by his wound, he becomes a prisoner of his own mind and is therefore forced by circumstances to think through his entire predicament and its causes. P. Varnai sums up this type of form-content symbiosis in this and other works by Garshin: "The writings of Garshin are representative of the 1880s (a transitional period between the utilitarian practices of the sixties and early seventies on the one hand and the great aesthetic revival of the end of the century on the other) in that they combine tradition with experimentation."[2]

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[1] P. Henry, *A Hamlet of his Time: Vsevolod Garshin, the Man, his Works, and his Milieu* (Oxford: Willem A. Meeuws, 1983), p. 47.

From the perspective of literary history the importance of Garshin's short story has to do not so much with its anti-war message as with the innovative nature of the technique used to convey that message. In "Four Days" Garshin was, to the best of my knowledge, the first to explore the potential of UDIM (unframed direct interior monologue). The idea of creating the illusion of inner discourse without narratorial mediation had been raised by Dostoevsky in 1876 in a short story entitled "A Gentle Creature"

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[2] P. Varnai, "Structural and Syntactic Devices in Garshin's Stories" *Russian Language Journal* 94/95 (1972), p. 61.

("Кроткая"). However, as D. Cohn argues, Dostoevsky's story, which is supposed to represent the stenographic record of thoughts going through the head of a man whose wife has just committed suicide, "still very largely conforms to the norms of traditional first-person narration"[3] and therefore does not constitute enough of a formal break with conventional narrative practice. In any case, regardless of what one thinks of "A Gentle Creature," Garshin was dealing with an unexplored genre, and, to quote L. Stenborg: "diese Novelle ist als einer der ersten Versuche des sog. inneren Monologs betrachtet worden."[4] And it is because Garshin's text initiated some of the devices later used by such masters of interior monologue as Joyce and Faulkner, that the form of "Four Days" merits a close analysis.

At the same time, it must be stressed that since Garshin's story was such a pioneering work and in my opinion represents the *birth* of UDIM as we know it today, it is by no means uniform in the way it seeks to represent an on-going thought process. Given the absence of a genre tradition in this area, it is quite understandable that Garshin's text seems to vacillate between **a)** a form required by the premise that we are eavesdropping on a private thought process and **b)** more traditional forms related to conventional first-person narrative. At times lapsing into a narratorial style, "Four Days" often appears to rest on the private and public communication premises simultaneously. This creates communicative ambiguity, which is indicative of the difficulties often associated with exploring a new literary genre. Therefore, my discussion will be an attempt to determine to what extent "Four Days" succeeds in creating the illusion of private communication.

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[3] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 180.

[4] L. Stenborg, *Studien zur Erzähltechnik in den Novellen V. M. Garshins, Studia Slavica Uppsaliensia, II* (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 1972), p. 127.

Now or Then?

In spite of the text's numerous narratorial features, which will be addressed below, Garshin introduced at least one major innovative device in "Four Days," which sets this story apart from conventional narration: the use of the *punctual present* in the main story-line. According to D. Cohn, this form of the present tense "synchronizes verbalization with action or experience"[5], and even though the illusion of absolute synchronization is not always achieved in Garshin's story, we have a clear sense that an attempt is being made to do so. Thus, in a number of instances Ivanov's verbalization and experience are close enough to create the sense that the action in "Four Days" is "here and now," which comes into sharp contrast with the inevitably *retrospective* stance of the conventional narrator. For example, in the following passage we have the distinct impression that the narrator's inner discourse renders his perceptual process as it occurs, i.e., *in actu*:

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[5] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 191.

> I am awake. Why do I see stars shining so brightly in the dark-blue Bulgarian sky? Am I not in the tent? [...] Above me there is a patch of sky where a big star is shining and a few little ones; around me there is something dark and tall. It's bushes. I am in the bushes: I haven't been found![6]

In order to assess the significance of Garshin's attempt to use the punctual present tense in his UDIM, let us return to the concept of *formal mimetics* raised in Chapter 1: the discourse of a conventional first-person narrator is modelled on various forms of what is frequently non-fictional communication. The implication here is that conventional personal narrative is normally based on a communicative situation where the addresser and the addressee are *different* individuals. This premise implies that narration has to be *retrospectively oriented*: its logical tense must be the past or sometimes the *evocative present.* The latter, unlike the punctual present, is a retrospectively-oriented tense used in order to give more vividness to events.[7] It would be illogical for a writing narrator to use the punctual present, which "synchronizes verbalization with action or experience" (cf. Cohn above), since s/he can write down his/her account of events only *after* they happen. And it would make even less sense for a speaking narrator to use the punctual present, since it would imply that s/he is relating events taking place right before his/her listener's eyes, which, unless the listener is blind, is a waste of effort. This is why M. J. Toolan points out that "narrative typically is a recounting of things spatiotemporally distant."[8]

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[6] Я проснулся. Почему я вижу звезды, которые так ярко светятся на черно-синем болгарском небе? Разве я не в палатке?[...] Надо мною – клочок черно-синего неба, на котором горит большая звезда и несколько маленьких, вокруг что-то темное и высокое. Это кусты. Я в кустах: меня не нашли! V. M. Garshin, *Rasskazy* (Moscow, 1975), p. 28. All subsequent translations from this edition are mine, and all page references in parentheses are to this edition. In some instances I have had to resort to somewhat awkward English in order to render the essential aspects of the self-communicative process in Russian.

It is only when the addresser and the addressee are the same person, as is the case in UDIM, that the punctual present becomes logically acceptable: the thinker is not *narrating* but *registering* his experience in the form of inner discourse or verbalization.[9] In this respect Cohn writes: "This employment of the present tense pinpoints the simultaneity of language and happening that distinguishes the new form [UDIM — V.T.] from 'the previous form of narrative' in the first person, where language always follows happening."[10] This is why Garshin's "Four Days" is so innovative: even though the thinker's style is narratorial in many ways, it represents an attempt at a fundamental break with *narrative as a communicative situation* because the author clearly seeks to eliminate retrospection from the main story-line by closing the temporal gap between story and discourse, i.e., between the protagonist's experience and its verbalization.[11]

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[7] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds,* pp. 190-203.

[8] M. J. Toolan, *Narrative: A Critical Linguistic Introduction* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 1-2.

[9] This implies that present-tense UDIM lacks the starting point of all first-person narrative: the epic situation, a term used by B. Romberg to designate the particulars of the narrative act itself and

In addition to placing Garshin's text within the realm of UDIM and distancing it from conventional first-person narrative, the use of the punctual present tense and the related attempt to synchronize discourse with experience play another important role in "Four Days." In a story where the protagonist's life is in grave

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its motivation. *Epopoiia*, the Greek origin of the term "epic," means "telling" or "narrating" in verse, and present-tense UDIM excludes *epopoiia*--along with the epic situation--by excluding the public communication protomodel so fundamental for *epopoiia* in particular and all narrative in general. Cf. B. Romberg, *Studies in the Narrative Technique of the First-Person Novel* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), p. 33.

[10] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 173.

[11] On the connection between this and Benveniste's concepts *histoire* and *discours* cf. D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds, pp.* 188-90.

danger--Ivanov is wounded and immobilized under the hot sun in the middle of nowhere--present-tense UDIM creates the kind of suspense that is virtually impossible to achieve in traditional personal and therefore retrospective narrative. In the latter the very fact of narration normally indicates that the hero has *survived* to tell the tale, and no matter how much internal focalization is used--for example, often suspense is heightened when the perspective of the experiencing self is adopted at the expense of the "what-next" knowledge of the narrating self--the reader still knows that "I was about to die" usually implies "but I didn't."[12] Present-tense UDIM inevitably excludes such a comforting guarantee. In Garshin's text we are given only the "here and now" perspective of the experiencing self because *there is no narrating self* to begin with and therefore no solace of a retrospective point of view.

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[12] The exception is a fictional narrative in the form of a diary--a relative of UDIM (cf. Chapter 1)--found by someone else after its author's death. The person who finds such a diary becomes a framing narrator who *presents* the second-order text. This is precisely the case in Garshin's other anti-war story, "The Coward," ("Трус") written two years after "Four Days" (in 1879). Most of the text consists of a diary kept by the protagonist who is about to be drafted. When he leaves for the Russo-Turkish War, the diary ends, and the story is finished by an impersonal narrator who first refers to the above-mentioned diary and then tells about its author's death in battle.

Therefore, when Garshin's protagonist thinks: "Yes I've been wounded in battle. Dangerously or not?",[13] we know that these wounds could be fatal--in most conventional personal narratives they cannot--and therefore we are keenly aware that this character may "just die on us."[14] This results in greater suspense and a keener sense of empathy: we can identify more easily with someone who does not know his/her future because we do not know ours. Perhaps this feature has the potential of making a story with an adventure communicated in present-tense UDIM more "adventurous" than the same story presented in the conventional retrospective narrative mode.

Given all that, I must once again stress the pioneering nature of Garshin's UDIM and the associated difficulty of working with a new fictional premise, since the punctual present is not used consistently throughout the thinker's verbalization of on-going experience. At times Ivanov lapses into a retrospective style by using what amounts to the evocative present and even the purely narratorial past. For example, here is the protagonist's first record of his initial physical sensations after regaining consciousness on the empty battlefield:

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[13] "Да, я ранен в бою. Опасно или нет?" (28).

[14] An example of a UDIM thinker dying and thereby ending the UDIM is found in A. Schnitzler's *Fräulein Else* where the heroine is contemplating suicide. These are the delirious protagonist's last words as she dies after having poisoned herself with an overdose of Veronal: "Ich fliege... ich träume... ich schliefe... ich träu... träu—ich flie..." A. Schnitzler, *Meistererzählungen*, p. 526.

> I have never been in such a strange position. I am lying, it seems, on my stomach and can see before me only a small piece of land. A few blades of grass, one of them with an ant crawling down head first, some sort of pieces of refuse from last year's grass: that is my whole world. And I see it with only one eye because the other one is closed shut by something hard, probably a branch, against which my head is resting. I feel very uncomfortable, and I want to (but can't for the life of me understand why I am unable to) move. This is how time passes. I hear the crackling of grasshoppers, the buzz of a bee. Nothing else. Finally I make an effort, free my right arm from under myself, and, leaning with both arms on the ground, try to get up on my knees.[15]

Until the clause "this is how time passes," we have the impression that Ivanov's mental discourse and his physical experience are *intended* by the author to appear simultaneous, which means that this is supposed to be the punctual present tense, and we are outside the realm of retrospective discourse: the thinker is not narrating but merely registering the external world. However, the moment "this is how time passes" appears, a *summary* effect (cf. below) is introduced, i.e., the present tense is now *evocative,* since such a statement implies that the thinker is looking back on events and summing up or taking stock of the situation. The end of the above-cited passage is even more narratorial, since the adverb "finally" in "finally I make an effort" implies that the thinker sees this particular action as the end of a series, and it is only in retrospect, i.e., in narrative, that one can classify the "units" of experience into sets and determine what element is the last.[16]

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[15] "Я никогда не находился в таком странном положении. Я лежу, кажется, на животе и вижу перед собою только маленький кусочек земли. Несколько травинок, муравей, ползущий с одной из них вниз головою, какие-то кусочки сора от прошлогодней травы — вот весь мой мир. И вижу я его только одним глазом, потому что другой зажат чем-то твердым, должно быть веткою, на которую опирается моя голова. Мне ужасно неловко, и я хочу, но решительно не понимаю, почему не могу шевельнуться. Так проходит время. Я слышу треск кузнечиков, жужжание пчелы. Больше нет ничего. Наконец я делаю усилие, освобождаю правую руку из-под себя и, упираясь обеими руками о землю, хочу встать на колени." (27-8)

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[16] As A. Danto points out, "any narrative is a structure imposed on events, grouping some of them together with others, and ruling some out as lacking relevance [...]" A. Danto, *Analytic Philosophy of History* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 132. In this respect, it could be argued that, when it comes to the verbalization of a thinker's on-going experience in UDIM, any *sentence* containing two or more similar elements in a *list* is suggestive of a retrospective position. Any two or more similar elements placed within the same sentence are there because in the opinion of the speaker they have more in common with each other than they do with other elements in other sentences. However, this type of syntactic classification requires access to upcoming "units" of experience, which is of course incompatible with the position of a UDIM thinker registering experience *in actu* and unaware of what

In some places Ivanov's discourse is even more ambiguous as to the thinker's temporal position with respect to the events in the main story-line. In the following passage the thinker goes from the illusion of "the simultaneity of language and happening" to narrative in the past tense and back again:

> The sun is up. Its huge disk, all crisscrossed and divided by the black branches of bushes, is red like blood. Today, it seems, it will be hot. My neighbor [reference to the nearby dead Turk killed by Ivanov - V.T.], what will become of you? You are horrible even now. Yes he was horrible. His hair had begun to fall out. His skin, naturally dark, was pale and yellow; his swollen face had stretched it to such an extent that it had snapped behind his ear. Worms were swarming there. His feet, laced tightly into his shoes, had swollen, and huge bubbles were showing through the hooks of the shoes. And his whole body had puffed out into a big mound. What will the sun do to him today? It's unbearable lying so close to him. I must crawl away no matter what it takes. But will I be able to do it?[17]

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is to come. This is why "I make an effort, free my right arm from under myself, and [...] try to get up" (cf. above) is not an altogether convincing syntactic construction.

[17] "Солнце взошло. Его огромный диск, весь персеченный и разделенный черными ветвями кустов, красен как кровь. Сегодня будет, кажется, жарко. Мой сосед — что станется с тобой? Ты и теперь ужасен. Да, он был ужасен. Его волосы начали выпадать. Его кожа, черная от природы, побледнела и пожелтела; раздутое лицо натянуло ее до того, что она лопнула за ухом. Там копошились черви. Ноги, затянутые в штиблеты, раздулись, и между крючками штиблет вылезли огромные пузыри. И весь он раздулся горою. Что сделает с

The use of the future tense in “today, it seems, it will be hot.” and “what will the sun do to him today?” suggests that the thinker is not looking back on this scene. And this illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience is even more evident from the punctual present tense in the reference to the sun: "Its huge disk [...] is red like blood” and the mental address to the dead Turk: “You are horrible even now.” However, the sudden shift into the narratorial past indicates that the author is still groping for the right technique in this unexplored genre, unsure of the means necessary to maintain the communicative illusion of UDIM.

As the text progresses, this vacillation between the retrospective and the non-retrospective position of Ivanov's discourse becomes more frequent and noticeable. Whereas initially the UDIM lapses from the punctual present mainly into the evocative present (with only occasional slips into the past tense), e.g., “I raise myself and sit up. This is done with difficulty when both legs are broken. A few times I have to give up in despair<-[*summary* effect — V.T.],"[18]

ним солнце сегодня? Лежать так близко к нему невыносимо. Я должен отползти во что бы то ни стало. Но смогу ли я?" (34-5)

[18] “Я приподнимаюсь и сажусь. Это делается трудно, когда обе ноги перебиты. Несколько раз приходится отчаиваться.”(28)

toward the end Ivanov sounds more and more like a narrator. For example, here is how we learn about the appearance of some soldiers near the spot where the thinker is lying:

> Totally exhausted and stupefied, I lay almost unconscious. Suddenly... Could it be a hallucination in my bewildered mind? I think that it is not. Yes, it is speech. The thud of hooves and human speech. I almost screamed but restrained myself. And what if it's the Turks? [...] And if it's our men? Oh damn bushes! Why have you grown into such a thick fence around me? [...] Oh damnation! Worn out, I fall face down and begin to sob. Can I recall the stupor, which overcame me after that horrible incident?[19]

After this last statement we seem to have definitely entered the realm of narrative, i.e., now Ivanov is looking back and reporting events after the fact. However, a few lines later, as the thinker looks at the decomposing Turk, we suddenly reenter the communicative situation of simultaneous discourse and experience:

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[19] "Совсем разбитый, одурманеный я лежал почти в беспамятстве. Вдруг... Не обман ли это расстроенного воображения? Мне кажется, что нет. Да, это – говор. Конский топот, людской говор. Я едва не закричал, но удержался. А что если это это Турки?[...] А если это наши? О проклятые кусты! Зачем вы обросли вокруг меня таким густым забором?[...] О проклятие! Я в изнеможении падаю лицом к земле и начинаю рыдать. Могу ли я припомнить то оцепенение, которое овладело мною после этого ужасного случая?" (35-6)

"He no longer had a face. It had slid off his bones. [...] «This is war,» I thought, «and here is its image.» And the sun keeps burning and scorching as before [...] Myriads of worms keep falling out of him. How they swarm!"[20]

The greatest amount of communicative ambiguity is created by the last sentence of the story. When Ivanov is rescued and loses a leg in the hospital, he says something that turns his whole UDIM on its head and contradicts the entire preceding present-tense account: "I can talk and tell them everything written here."[21] At this point "Four Days" becomes a *paradoxic* form of discourse, since initially it clearly strives to synchronize discourse and experience but ends up cancelling out the UDIM premise with the conventional retrospective position of a narrator. The fact that Ivanov's last statement is itself in the present tense underscores its contradictory implications. D. Cohn points out that

> if we view the story in retrospect from this conclusion, it now no longer appears as an autonomous monologue, but as a retrospective narrative cast entirely in an evocative present tense. In sum: a make-believe interior monologue, which

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[20] "Лица у него уже не было. Оно сползло с костей[...] «Это война, – подумал я, – вот ее изображение.» А солнце жжет и печет по-прежнему[...] Мириады червей падают из него. Как они копошатся!"(36-37)

[21] "Я могу говорить и рассказываю им все, что здесь написано." (38)

> gives away its sleight of hand only when its last sentence closes a sentence-thin frame of retrospection--*which was never opened* [my italics - V.T.][22]

However, this complete and overt "narrativization" of the text takes place only at the last moment. Until that point the reader is under the impression that this story is an attempt at creating a present-tense UDIM. And as a result, *two* texts are created: the text initially read by the reader and then a second *post-lecturam* text, which is reassessed after the baffling ending. If a reader, who has not yet finished "Four Days," is asked what genre this is, s/he is likely to answer: an early example of present-tense UDIM. And this would be quite understandable, given passages like this one: "My head is spinning; the trip to my neighbor [crawling over to the body of the Turk to get the dead man's flask - V.T.] has totally worn me out. And now this horrible smell. His skin has become so dark!"[23] That same reader will give a different reply after reading the last sentence of Garshin's story.

This, more than anything, illustrates the communicative ambiguity of Garshin's text and the difficulty of "inventing" a genre.

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[22] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 204.

[23] "Голова кружится; мое путешествие к соседу меня совершанно измучило. А тут еще этот ужасный запах. Как он почернел..."(32)

If we consider texts written later on, as the UDIM genre matured, e.g., E. Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupées,* or A. Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl,* there is no longer any hint of communicative ambiguity stemming from inconsistency in the thinker's temporal position with respect to the events in the main story-line.

Scene v. Summary

The "struggle" between the punctual present tense and its retrospectively-oriented counterparts--the evocative present and the past tense--is part of a larger theoretical problem inherent in the UDIM genre: *scene* v. *summary.* Norman Friedman was one of the first to raise the question of *summary* and *scene,* using these terms as antipodes:

> Summary narrative is a generalized account or report of a series of events covering some extended period and a variety of locales[...] [while] scene emerges as soon as the specific, continuous, and successive details of time, place, action, character, and dialogue begin to appear. [24]

The key concepts here are "specific" and "continuous" because only a narrator looking back on events is in a position to avoid continuity and specificity by summarizing, i.e., by accelerating or condensing experience and giving only a partial account. Because a UDIM thinker is merely registering his on-going experience, his verbalization of the "here and now" must be pure *scene,* since any hint of *summary* will destroy the illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience.

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[24] N. Friedman, "Point of View in Fiction," *PMLA.* (Dec. 1955), p. 1169. Clearly with respect to UDIM these terms are related to Friedman's dialogue category, since this genre consists of nothing but (inner) discourse.

In Garshin's story there is a number of *scenes* related to one of the most immediate elements of the "here and now": the process of sensory perception. These sensory perception *scenes* are quite impressive attempts to create the illusion that the thinker is seeing or hearing something *in actu* and not in retrospect. For example, when Ivanov regains consciousness for the first time and thinks "I am lying, it seems, on my stomach, and I can see in front of me only a small piece of land [...] [my eye] is closed shut by something hard, probably a branch [...],"[25] we have the impression that we are looking at unprocessed or "raw" sensory data, i.e., Ivanov, not looking back on this event, has not had time to process his perception and interpret it. The thinker's uncertainty as to what his position in space is ("it seems") and what is keeping one of his eyes shut ("something") means that his discourse and experience are indeed intended to sound simultaneous. If Ivanov were at this point acting like a conventional narrator who sees this and other parts of the story in retrospect, he would know exactly what happened to him, since a few lines later we learn that he manages to turn his head, determine his bearings and sit up. Thus, a narratorial version of "I am lying, it seems, on my stomach" could be something like "I was lying on my stomach."

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[25] "Я лежу, кажется, на животе и вижу перед собой только маленький кусочек земли[...] [мой глаз] зажат чем-то твердым, должно быть веткою[...]" (27)

The illusion that we are witnessing perception *in actu* is especially striking when Ivanov first verbalizes the perception of an unprocessed sensory stimulus from the external world and only subsequently identifies it right in front of our eyes. For example, here is a *scene* reflecting Ivanov's realization of why he has not been found by his regiment: “Above me there is a patch of dark-blue sky lit up by a big star and a few little ones, around me there is something dark and tall. It's bushes. I am in the bushes: I have not been found!”[26] The elimination of retrospection is achieved here by breaking down the visual process into two stages: **a)**first Ivanov perceives "something dark and tall," which is motivated by the fact that he is wounded and therefore disoriented, **b)** then his blurry vision comes into focus and he can identify the indistinct stimulus as "bushes." This "dissection" of sensory experience is precisely the "specific, continuous, and successive details" that constitute Friedman's idea of *scene* (cf. above). If Ivanov were looking back on this event, he would be more likely to say something like "above me were bushes." Thus, the use of the punctual present tense, coupled with this "imitation" of a thinker's perceptual process, creates a much more *scene*-like effect than anything possible even in figural narrative.

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[26] "Надо мною – клочок черно-синего неба, на котором горит большая звезда и несколько маленьких, вокруг что-то темное и высокое. Это кусты. Я в кустах: меня не нашли!"(28)

The protagonist's terrible physical condition and the resulting disorientation are used to motivate an even more elaborate *scene* where the perceptual process is broken down into three stages. Not only do we witness how the thinker registers a stimulus and then identifies it *in actu,* as in the last example, but we are also privy to the process of mental reasoning, which takes place in between and leads to this identification. In the following example, this type of *extended scene* is used to create suspense and stress Ivanov's delirium and suffering: "I can hear some sort of strange sound... As if someone were groaning. Yes, it's groaning. Is there someone lying near me, forgotten like me with broken legs or with a bullet in the stomach? No, the groaning is so close, and there is no one near me... My God: it's me!"[27] Because the protagonist is not looking back on this event, we share that much more in his false hope of finding a fellow-sufferer, and we are that much more shocked by his realization that he himself is the source of this "groaning." Such a dramatic effect would be diminished by the retrospective position of a narrator who, now safe and sound, is merely *recalling* a terrible incident.

Discussing the use of Ivanov's wound as motivation for breaking down his perceptual process into separate stages for the purpose of a *scene* effect, P. Henry points out that "this 'impressionistic' device[...] demonstrates the senselessness of war and portrays a bizarre and unreal world[...]"[28] In other words, the ultimate result of such sensory perception *scenes* in "Four Days" is defamiliarization (остранение),[29] since the thinker's sensory experience suddenly becomes something very *strange*, and the world appears unfamiliar and frightening. Consequently, war is no longer a cliché of glorious, clean and most of all clear action; instead, it is a strange and unintelligible experience, into which the reader is introduced *in actu* and from the worst possible position: that of a wounded soldier agonizing alone under the scorching sun.

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[27] "Какие-то странные звуки доходят до меня... Как будто бы кто-то стонет. Да, это – стон. Лежит ли около меня какой-нибудь такой же забытый, с перебитыми ногами или с пулей в животе? Нет, стоны так близко, а около меня, кажется никого нет... Боже мой, да ведь это – я сам!" (29)

[28] P. Henry, p. 44.

[29] This, according to V. Shklovsky's famous article, is a device used in literature to de-automatize our perception of very familiar and therefore often overlooked phenomena in order to make us notice them or see them from a different perspective. Cf. V. Shklovsky, "Iskusstvo kak priëm" in *Readings in Russian Poetics: Michigan Slavic Materials,* L. Matejka comp. (Ann Arbor: Dept. of

Framing

Even though Garshin uses more than once the above-mentioned sensory perception *scene* device, his avoidance of narratorial *summary* and retrospection is not consistent. For example, when the thinker notices the Turk's body for the first time, the illusion of sensory perception *in actu* is partially compromised by the narratorial "I see" and "visible": "[...] I see something dark and big, lying about five feet away from me. Here and there reflections of moonlight are visible on it. It's buttons or ammunition. It's a corpse or a wounded man."[30] Any sensation--be it visual, olfactory, auditory and especially the feeling of pain--is rendered less immediate, less dramatic and therefore less *scene*-like, if it is

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Slavic Languages and Literatures, 1971) pp. 1-17.

[30] "[...] я вижу что-то темное и большое, лежащее шагах в пяти от меня. Кое-где на нем видны блики от лунного света. Это – пуговицы или амуниция. Это – труп или раненый." (29)

introduced by "I see," "I smell," "I hear" or "I feel." Such an introductory statement is from the realm of a conventional narrator who is not verbally registering his perception as it occurs, but talking about it after the fact. Consequently, the framing phrase "I feel" in "I feel the roots of my hair moving on my head"[31] takes something away from the immediacy of perception in the present tense and reduces its *scene*-like quality. We have the impression that if Ivanov has time to *introduce* the verbalization of this horrible feeling with "I feel," the roots of his hair are no longer "moving" at the moment of discourse.

In order to illustrate how much the *scene* effect suffers from such "framed" verbalization of perception, I would like to take advantage of Garshin's inconsistencies and quote a passage where framed and unframed perception alternate: "But it's getting hot. The sun is burning. I open my eyes and see the same bushes, the same sky, but in daylight. And here is my neighbor. Yes, it's a Turk--a corpse. How huge he is! I recognize him: he is the one."[32]

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[31] "Я чувствую, как шевелятся корни волос на моей голове."(28)

[32] "Однако становится жарко. Солнце жжет. Я открываю глаза, вижу те же кусты, то же небо, только при дневном освещении. А вот и мой сосед. Да, это – турок, труп. Какой огромный! Я узнаю его, это тот самый." (30)

The first two sentences appear as immediate sensory perception registered by Ivanov's inner discourse *in actu* because they are unframed. His perception of the bushes and the sky, however, is more narratorial because of "see", especially when compared to the unframed and more *scene*-like "and here is my neighbor." The latter, in its turn, is much more spontaneous than the last sentence, which once again returns Ivanov's discourse into a more retrospective position because of "I recognize him." Such framed "recognition" on the one hand takes something away from the illusion that his discourse and experience are simultaneous, and on the other "I recognize him" appears redundant, since the recognition is already dramatized by "it's the one."

As with other devices, this type of vacillation between the narratorial and the non-narratorial, the immediate and the retrospective, can be observed in quite a number of instances. For example, the discovery by Ivanov that the dead Turk has a water flask is very spontaneous and indirect: "My God! Why, he must have some water in that huge flask!"[33] We appear to *see* the Turk's flask at the same moment as Ivanov does, and the exclamation "My God!" stresses the fact that this is taking place *in actu*, thereby helping us share in the immediacy of Ivanov's discovery. Just as immediate is the verbalization of Ivanov's sensations as he finally reaches the Turk and grabs the flask: "Finally, here he is. Here is the flask... it still contains some water: and how much! More than half the flask, it seems."[34] However, when Ivanov feels terrible pain in his broken legs, a much more narratorial mode of discourse is used: "I make a movement and feel terrible pain in my legs."[35] Because the thinker's sensation of pain is framed by the narratorial "feel" the intensity and immediacy of his anguish are diminished and "narrativized."

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[33] "Боже мой! Да у него в этой огромной фляге, наверно, есть вода!"(31)

In fact, it is especially when it comes to the verbalization of anguish and physical pain, that anything suggestive of a *summary*, such as the narratorial framing of sensations, is particularly detrimental to the illusion of simultaneity of discourse and experience. Because pain is such an overwhelming sensation, especially in the case of a seriously wounded person, as is Ivanov, anything suggesting *detachment* places the sufferer into a retrospective position. When Ivanov is crawling toward the flask on the Turk's body, every movement causes him unbearable anguish: "And I am crawling. My legs keep getting caught in the ground, and every movement causes me unbearable pain. I am screaming, screaming at the top of my lungs, but still keep crawling."[36] The fact that he can come up with an adjective to *describe* his pain means that at the moment of discourse the pain is unlikely to be that "unbearable" and appears to be recalled rather than experienced. Such detachment is suggestive of a retrospective position and therefore a *summary*, as opposed to a *scene*. As L. Stenborg puts it, "Man wird sich sagen müssen, daß es keine 'naturgetreue' Wiedergabe ist, wenn ein Verwundeter, von seinen Schmerzen gelähmt, seinen Gedanken literarisch künstlerische Form geben kann, wie es hier geschieht."[37] But especially *summary*-like in this passage is the fact that Ivanov's screams are *reported* and not *dramatized*: instead of actually screaming something as spontaneous and immediate as "Ah!" or "Oi," Ivanov merely *tells* us that he is screaming, which can be done only by a retrospective narrator. After all, logically, it is only

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[34] "Наконец вот и он. Вот фляга... в ней есть вода – и как много! Кажется больше полфляги."(31) The use of ellipses here may be a way of implying the passage of time that it takes Ivanov to open the flask and determine how much water is inside, i.e., this is a *scene*-creating device, which suggests that we are observing real time, as opposed to the condensed time of narratorial summary.

[35] "Я делаю движение и ощущаю мучительную боль в ногах."(28)

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[36] "И я ползу. Ноги цепляются за землю, и каждое движение вызывает нестерпимую боль. Я кричу, кричу с воплями, а все-таки ползу."(31)

[37] L. Stenborg, p. 128.

after the scream itself that one can say "screaming at the top of my lungs." The same can be said of "I feel despair and cry" or "exhausted, I fall to the ground face down and begin to sob"[38] where: firstly, Ivanov's despair and exhaustion are made less vivid and intense by the fact that they are simply *referred* to and not dramatized and secondly, his crying is summarized, i.e., described, as in the case of the above-mentioned "screaming at the top of my lungs," instead of actually taking place before our eyes.

Narratorial framing is also present in those parts of Ivanov's UDIM when he is not directly involved in sensory perception, i.e., when he remembers something or is engaged in a reasoning process. Shortly after regaining consciousness, Ivanov attempts to understand what has happened to him:

> There is a ringing in my ears. My head feels heavy. I vaguely understand that I am wounded in both legs. What is going on? Why have I not been picked up? Could the Turks have defeated us? I begin to recall what happened to me, at first vaguely, then more clearly, and arrive at the conclusion that we have not been defeated at all.[39]

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[38] "Я прихожу в отчаяние и плачу."(35) or "Я в изнеможении падаю лицом к земле и начинаю рыдать."(36)

[39] "В ушах звон. Голова отяжелела. Смутно понимаю я, что ранен в обе ноги. Что ж это такое? Отчего меня не подняли? Неужели турки разбили нас? Я начинаю припоминать бывшее со мной, сначала смутно, потом яснее, и прихожу к заключению, что мы вовсе не разбиты."(28)

The illusion of non-retrospection, resulting from spontaneity of sensation suggested by the unframed verbalization of the thinker's sensations in the first two sentences, is greatly compromised by the very narratorial "I vaguely understand that I am wounded." His discourse appears detached from the instant of "understanding" and this narratorial effect is compounded by the adverb "vaguely," since this uncertainty is not reflected by the very clear formulation of his state. Instead of being dramatized as a *scene*, Ivanov's uncertainty about his physical condition is reported in the form of a *summary*, which can happen only in retrospect. However, the next three questions restore the illusion of simultaneous discourse and experience: we clearly have the impression that they race through the thinker's head *in actu*. But then his discourse becomes once more similar to narrative because of another framed realization: "*arrive at the conclusion that* we have not been defeated at all."

The same inconsistency can be observed in Ivanov's verbalization of memories, which is sometimes framed and sometimes seems to be very immediate. For example, when the thinker recalls a particularly gruesome incident from his past, namely, the death of a small dog, his recollection is so framed that he appears to be telling a story as if there were an external addressee listening to him:

> [...] the end is near. Only in the papers a few lines will remain: our losses are minor--so many wounded and one killed. One private, like that dog... a whole picture flashes vividly through my mind. This was a long time ago [...] It was a small, cute dog; an omnibus car had run it over. It was dying, just as I am right now. Some caretaker elbowed his way into the crowd, grabbed the dog by the scruff of the neck and took it away.[40]

The purely associative transition from Ivanov's thoughts of a possible newspaper account of his death, as well as the future tense used to verbalize this hypothetical article ("*will* remain"), clearly indicate an attempt to place the thinker's discourse and experience into the same temporal plane. However, the framing phrase "a whole picture flashes vividly through my mind" actually ends up belying the adverb "vividly": this vividness appears reported and not experienced. The narratorial detachment inherent in such framing is especially evident if we compare the last passage with another one where Ivanov returns to the incident with the dog after saying a mental farewell to his family: "Farewell, mother, farewell, my fiancée, my love! Oh, how awful, how terrible! My heart feels heavy... Not his white dog again!"[41] The suddenness of this *unframed* recollection, and especially the fact that it is in the form of an exclamation, do in fact create the impression that the image of the little dog *flashes* through the thinker's mind simultaneously with his inner discourse, i.e., *in actu*. This is much more vivid and *scene*-like than the narratorial use of the actual adverb "vividly" in the above-mentioned "a whole picture flashes vividly through my mind."

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[40] "[...] скоро конец. Только в газетах останется несколько строк, что, мол, потери наши незначительны: ранено столько-то[...] убит один. Один рядовой, как та одна собачонка... целая картина ярко вспыхивает в моем воображении. Это было давно[...] Это была маленькая хорошенькая собачонка; вагон конножелезной дороги переехал ее. Она умирала, вот как теперь я. Какой-то дворник растолкал толпу, взял собачонку за шиворот и унес." (30)

Interior Dialogue

When the thinker hears some soldiers and exclaims to himself: "Oh damn bushes! Why have you grown into such a thick fence around me?" (cf. above), we have the impression that instead of being *told* about the bushes around the thinker, we learn this fact by *overhearing in actu* his frustration at being blocked by the bushes from his potential saviors. This is largely due to the fact that instead of constituting a simple report of his experience, Ivanov's exclamation is *dialogic.* Any form of dialogue--it does not really matter here whether a "reply" is given by the bushes, since we are still dealing with clearly *direct address*--by definition constitutes *pure scene,*[42] and given the use of the punctual present tense, this scene is being verbalized *in actu.* This means that *summary* (diegesis) is excluded by the mere presence of direct "conversational" form, i.e., no matter what is said within interior dialogue, the dialogue itself cannot ipso facto constitute *summary.* Therefore, dialogic discourse in UDIM reinforces the illusion of non-retrospection, i.e., of simultaneous verbalization and experience.

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[41] "Прощай, мать, прощай, моя невеста, моя любовь! Ах, как тяжко, как горько! Под сердце подходит что-то... Опять эта беленькая собачка!"(37)

Furthermore, the use of *interior dialogue* in UDIM has another advantage. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, conventional narrative, which is modelled on various forms of public communication, tends to observe Beaugrande's and Dressler's standards of cohesion, coherence and intentionality. Therefore, UDIM, which implies the absence of public communication, sounds more "realistic" if cohesion, coherence and intentionality are avoided as much as possible. Any indication that the thinker's discourse is taking into account an uninitiated addressee (the reader) risks compromising the illusion of self-communication. However, when *interior*

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[42] S. Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction,* p. 110.

monologue is replaced by *interior dialogue*, the need for "difficult" discourse is greatly diminished because dialogue by its nature implies differentiation between an addresser and an addressee. In UDIM interior dialogue suggests a temporary split in the thinker's mind, where discourse is no longer genuinely private, since something like a *conversation* is now taking place between *two* internal interlocutors. As J. Hawthorn points out,

> [...] interior dialogue is much more formal than is interior monologue--otherwise the 'characterization' of different 'speakers' would not be possible. We find in it none of the characteristic deletions and abridgements of interior monologue; the 'utterances' of interior dialogue could, generally, be transplanted into scenes of actual dialogue with little or no linguistic adaptation.[43]

In "Four Days" interior dialogue is used quite extensively, providing motivation for much of Ivanov's coherent, complete and explicit discourse and, at the same time, creating the *scene* effect aimed at synchronizing verbalization and experience. This dialogue takes a number of forms, which do not always imply an *explicit* internal interlocutor, but the absence of a clear "you" does not necessarily compromise the dialogic nature of the thinker's thought process.[44] As J. Faryno points out, the "interlocutors" in dialogue can be any set of antipodal positions:

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[43] J. Hawthorn, "Formal and Social Issues in the Study of Interior Dialogue: the Case of Jane Eyre" in *Narrative: From Malory to Motion Pictures*, J. Hawthorn ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), p. 87.

> ...the most widespread assumptions about dialogue as an unmediated exchange of opinions or information are related to merely one--but certainly not the only one--form of dialogue. This form is observed only under a certain number of special circumstances, namely, when two or more interlocutors confront each other... [However], the opponent does not necessarily have to be another person; instead, it could be a different system of values, a different form of linguistic behavior, a different set of concepts or a different consciousness.[45]

The point here is that as long as we have the impression that the thinker's thought, instead of developing smoothly, progresses in the form of propositions and *reactions* to these propositions, an interior dialogue is taking place. For example, as Ivanov tries to identify the Turk's body, both monologue and dialogue are present in his internal discourse: "If he were wounded, he would have come to after such a scream. It’s a corpse. One of us or a Turk? For Christ’s sake! As if it makes any difference.”[46] In the first two sentences his thought progresses in monologic form, i.e., one thought smoothly leads to another. However, the ending of this passage is in the form of a question and a *hostile* reaction to that question, i.e., it looks like an argument. Even though no clear "I" and "you" are given, the dialogic nature of this exchange reflects Faryno's above-mentioned idea that dialogue can be suggested by the presence of something like “a different system of values, a different form of linguistic behavior, a different set of concepts or a different consciousness.”

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[44] Cf. R. Barthes's statement that "on le sait, dans la communication linguistique, *je* et *tu* sont absolument présupposés l'un par l'autre..." R. Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits," *Communications* 8 (1966), p.18.

[45] J. Faryno, *Vvedeniie v literaturovedeniie: I* (Katowice, 1978), p. 288 (my translation).

The two *opposing positions,* as if belonging to two separate consciousnesses, implied by the above-cited brief internal exchange in Ivanov's UDIM, are especially clear from the thinker's thoughts on the possibility of committing suicide in order to avoid further suffering. In the following passage we have the impression that two different individuals, who can be called the *optimist* and the *pessimist,* are arguing and "bouncing" ideas off each other in order to arrive at a plan of action (cf. Chapter 5):

I recall that in «The Physiology of Everyday Life» there was a

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[46] “Если бы он был раненый, он очнулся бы от такого крика. Это труп. Наш или турок? Ах боже мой! Будто не все равно.”(29)

> story about a man who committed suicide by starving himself to death. He lived a very long time because he kept drinking. So what? If I do manage to survive for five or six days, what will that achieve? [...] Death will come sooner or later? Isn’t it better to end it right now? [...] So what is it going to be: ending it or waiting? Waiting for what? Rescue? Death? Waiting for the Turks to come and start to strip the skin from my wounded legs? No, I'd rather do it myself... No, it’s wrong to lose heart; I'll struggle to the end, until I can struggle no more. After all, if I am found, I'll be saved.[47]

The presence of "after all," a rhetorical phrase normally aimed at *persuading* an interlocutor, in “after all, if I am found, I'll be saved” stresses the dialogic nature of this passage where the optimist and the pessimist disagree with each other, refute each other's arguments and even mock each other's respective positions. Such "socratization" of the thinker's thought process makes it possible to avoid the straight-forward narratorial *exposition* of ideas and suggest self-communication. Thus, interior dialogue not only helps to motivate coherent and cohesive discourse in UDIM, but also reinforces the illusion of private communication by eliminating any possibility that the thinker is addressing a reader or any other public addressee, since he is clearly addressing himself in the form of "the other."

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[47] “Помнится в «Физиологии обыденной жизни»[...] рассказана история сомоубийцы, уморившего себя голодом. Он жил очень долго, потому что пил. Ну и что же? Если я и проживу дней пять-шесть, что будет из этого?[...] Все равно умирать[...] Не лучше ли кончить?[...] Так кончать или ждать? Чего? Избавления? Смерти? Ждать, пока придут турки и начнут сдирать кожу с моих раненых ног? Лучше уж самому... Нет, не нужно падать духом; буду бороться до конца, до последних сил. Ведь если меня найдут, я спасен.”(32)

The presence of two opposing positions in Ivanov's UDIM is motivated by the fact that the protagonist is suffering from a terrible sense of guilt at having just killed a human being: the Turk who is rotting a few feet away from him. His reassessment of such concepts as the enemy, military glory, patriotism, the legitimacy of war-time murder and war in general, at times takes the form of an internal polemic where a new ideological position appears to come into conflict with Ivanov's previously held idealistic notions (cf. below). In the following passage, for example, one "interlocutor" appears to *condemn* the other:

> Before me lies a man killed by me. Why did I kill him? [...] I did not want it to be like that. I wished no ill to anyone when I joined up. The thought that I too would have to kill people somehow eluded me. I only pictured myself exposing my chest to bullets! And so I went and exposed it. And then what? Fool, fool! And what about this miserable *fellah* [...] What is his guilt? And what is my guilt even if I did kill him? What is my guilt?[48]

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[48] "Передо мною лежит убитый мною человек. За что я

The form of this internal dialogic struggle taking place within the mind of a man who is trying to come to grips with a terrible realization corresponds to the third category in V. Rinberg's classification of interior dialogue types: "1) dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor, 2) dialogue with a present interlocutor, 3) polemic, i.e., «argument with oneself», 4) dialogue with the participation of voices from the past and 5) parallel dialogue..."[49] The first, second and fourth categories are also present in Ivanov's UDIM, and, as all instances of interior dialogue in "Four Days," they are used as devices aimed at dramatizing the thinker's *suffering*, i.e., creating the illusion that his anguish is experienced *in actu* instead of being recalled retrospectively.

A mix of "dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor" and "dialogue with a present interlocutor" is used in some instances where Ivanov mentally addresses either inanimate objects, his own feelings or the

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его убил?[...] Я не хотел этого. Я не хотел зла никому, когда шел драться. Мысль о том, что и мне придется убивать людей, как-то уходила от меня. Я представлял себе только, как *я* буду подставлять *свою* грудь под пули! И я пошел и подставил. Ну и что же? Глупец, глупец! а этот несчастный феллах[...] Чем же он виноват? И чем виноват я, хотя я и убил его? Чем я виноват?" (30-1)

[49] V. Rinberg, "Pro kompozitsiu vnutrishnioho dialugu u novelakh Vasylia Stefanika" *Movoznavstvo*, 18:4 (1984), p. 34 (my translation).

dead Turk. For example, instead of simply directly *reporting* that he is being tortured by memories of his past happiness, the anguish of reliving these recollections in the horrible context of the present is presented as a *scene* in dialogic form: “Oh, you memories, stop torturing me, leave me alone! [...] Oh my heart’s anguish, my heart’s anguish! You are worse than wounds.”[50] As in the case of the above-cited “Oh damn bushes! Why have you grown into such a thick fence around me?”, the private communication effect is especially convincing because the interior dialogue form is coupled with the use of exclamations and interrogatives instead of the declarative/reportorial language typical of conventional narrative (Cf. Chapter 5). And the thinker's discourse is distanced from narrative language in a similar way when, instead of *reporting* his thoughts about the dead Turk, Ivanov actually *addresses* him. “Your are saving me, my victim!”[51] flashes through his mind when the protagonist suddenly discovers a flask full of water on the Turk's body, and the same dialogic form is used to convey Ivanov's horror at the sight of the Turk's decomposing corpse: “My neighbor, what will become of you. You are horrible even now” (cf above).

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[50] “Вы, воспоминания, не мучьте меня, оставьте меня![...] Ах тоска, тоска! Ты хуже ран.” (30)

[51] “Ты спасаешь меня, моя жертва!”(31)

Because the above-cited examples of interior dialogue (illustrative of Rinberg's first and second categories) involve a form of direct address, i.e., a marked interlocutor, they are more dialogically explicit than the previously mentioned internal polemic (corresponding to Rinberg's third category). The presence of such a marked addressee further enhances all of the above-mentioned effects created by interior dialogue in UDIM. Even more dialogically explicit is a passage where Ivanov mentally addresses his mother and sister:

> Oh, my mother, my dear mother! You will tear out your grey tresses, bang your head against the wall and curse the day you bore me, you'll curse the whole world that has invented war for human suffering! But neither you nor Masha will likely hear anything about my anguish. Farewell, mother, farewell, my fiancée, my love![52]

This dialogic segment, which roughly corresponds to Rinberg's fourth category "dialogue with the participation of voices from the past" (cf. above), serves not only to dramatize the thinker's attempt to imagine what his mother will do when she learns of his death or to distance his final farewell to his loved ones from narrative language. Its dramatic and spontaneous quality also enhances what is, after all, the prime purpose of Garshin's text: the anti-war message. This is clearly a thinly veiled anti-war outburst on the part of the author. However, the use of interior dialogue form, i.e., the illusion of self-communication, introduces the semblance of a *spontaneous* emotional outcry, thereby somewhat reducing the "preaching" effect created by these philosophical comments about war and making them more palatable to the reader.

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[52] "Мать моя, дорогая моя! Вырвешь ты свои седые косы, ударишься головою об стену, проклянешь тот день, когда родила меня, весь мир проклянешь, что выдумал на страдание людям войну! Но вы с Машей, должно быть, и не услышите о моих муках. Прощай, мать, прощай, моя невеста, моя любовь!"(37)

Discourse Planning in UDIM

In accordance with the main premise of present-tense UDIM, the inner verbalization of on-going experience must eliminate any suggestion of a retrospective stance by eliminating all hints of *discourse planning.* If we consider communication in general, the amount of discourse planning is normally a positive function of the time span separating the discourse and its referent. The assumption here is that the more time a speaker has to consider the referent, assess its significance and establish links between its constituent parts, the more coherent, sophisticated, complex and polished will be the resulting verbalization.

This is in fact confirmed by empirical studies of real-life communication. A number of researchers, such as E. Ochs and B. Kroll,[53] have studied the differences between planned and relatively unplanned discourse by comparing written discourse on the one hand and spontaneous oral discourse on the other. They have found that planned messages, which normally correspond to written discourse, are more complex, explicit, syntactically complete and polished than relatively unplanned messages, which are usually found in *spontaneous* oral discourse. This difference is intuitively known by virtually all readers just from everyday experience. Thus, given that a UDIM thinker is supposed to be verbalizing *in actu*--and therefore, unlike a conventional narrator, cannot reconsider his discourse in retrospect--any sign of typical planned (and consequently written) discourse is bound to stand out as a violation of the UDIM illusion. In other words, the more unpolished and fragmented is the inner discourse of a thinker in UDIM, the greater the illusion of unplanned verbalization. As a result, passages, such as the following example from "Four Days" where the thinker finds himself in an army hospital after being found, look suspiciously too well-constructed and complex for non-retrospective and unprocessed discourse: "Above me stand doctors, nurses, and, apart from them, I can also see the familiar face of a famous professor from St. Petersburg bending down over my legs."[54] It is especially the use of the participle "bending (down)" ("наклонившегося") that makes this passage look planned, since in Russian participles are much more typical of written texts rather than spontaneous oral discourse.

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[53] Cf. B. Kroll "Ways communicators encode propositions in spoken and written English: A look at subordination and coordination" in *Discourse Across Space and Time, SCOPIL,* E. Keenan and T. Bennett eds. (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1977) and E. Ochs, "Planned and Unplanned Discourse" *Syntax and Semantics, vol. 12: Discourse and Syntax* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 51-80.

As this example illustrates, discourse planning or its absence are evident first of all from *sentence structure*. B. Kroll's observations indicate that

> subordination in sentence structure is a 'planned' activity not occurring in speech *or presumably in interior monologue*[...] [and] we would expect that communication which is planned and allows time for encoding information in more "difficult" structures will exhibit a greater degree of combined ideas than communication which is spontaneous and encoded under pressure of time, which does not allow the communicator to use those combining strategies which require major manipulations of word order and sentence structure (my italics).[55]

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[54] "Надо мною стоят доктора, сестры милосердия, и, кроме них, я вижу еще знакомое лицо знаменитого петербургского профессора, наклонившегося над моими ногами."(38)

If we juxtapose this assumption with certain instances of UDIM in "Four Days," we discover a number of utterances, which imply a somewhat ambiguous communicative situation, since they are clearly in the punctual present tense, and yet their complexity betrays a certain amount of discourse planning, which suggests a retrospective position. For example, the following passage clearly features the "more 'difficult' structures [that] exhibit a greater degree of combined ideas than communication which is spontaneous and encoded under pressure of time" (cf. Kroll above):

> I must turn my head and take a look. Now it is easier to do, because back then, when I, having regained consciousness, saw the blade of grass with the ant crawling down head first, I, trying to get up, fell not into my previous position, but turned over onto my back. That’s why I can see these stars.[56]

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[55] Quoted by R. Clines in *A Descriptive Analysis of Dialogue and Inner Speech in Selected Works of Fiction,* Unpublished PhD Thesis. (U. of Rhode Island, 1988), p. 32.

[56] “Нужно повернуть голову и посмотреть. Теперь это сделать удобнее, потому что еще тогда, когда я, очнувшись, видел травку и муравья, ползущего вниз головою, я, пытаясь подняться, упал не в прежнее положение, а повернулся на спину. Оттого-то мне и видны эти звезды.”(28)

Even though the future-oriented first sentence and the present-oriented last sentence seem to indicate that experience and its verbalization are simultaneous, this effect is undermined by the second sentence, which is a very sophisticated compound-complex construction with such an intricate set of interdependent clauses that the suggestion of spontaneity is seriously in question. The planned nature of the second sentence is indicated not only by clause subordination but also by suspended syntax where constructions are temporarily interrupted by the insertion of phrases and even clauses. To a large degree this phenomenon corresponds to what R. Clines calls a periodic sentence:

> [...] a periodic sentence is any sentence in which the completion of main clause subject and verb is postponed. Previous studies indicate that such a syntactic structure involves a greater level of 'planned' activity and is a more complex syntactic unit than its counterpart--a 'loose' sentence structure, where cumulative modifiers are added to the main clause after completion of the subject and verb.[57]

Such planned utterances create an especially ambiguous communicative situation when there is an attempt to clarify the relationship between the various segments of the thinker's discourse. In particular, it is the illusion of *private* communication that suffers when Ivanov wakes up and thinks: "I am lying eyes closed *although* I have awakened a long time ago. I do not feel like opening my eyes *because* I feel sunlight through my closed eyelids: *if* I open my eyes, *then* it will hurt them" (my italics).[58] The use of all these subordinating conjunctions (cf. Kroll above) allows for the possibility that Ivanov's discourse is intended not just for himself but also for an *external, uninitiated addressee* who might have difficulty establishing the relationship between "I open my eyes" and "it will hurt them" without "if" and "then." And although in a few instances Ivanov's UDIM is made to sound more private by the use of short and unconnected phrases, e.g., "I am lying totally exhausted. The sun is burning my face and hands. I have nothing to cover myself. If only the night would come soon,"[59] this "telegraphic" style is not prevalent enough to erase the discourse planning effect in most of the text.[60]

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[57] R. Clines, p. 37.

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[58] "Я лежу с закрытыми глазами, хотя уже давно проснулся. Мне не хочется открыть глаза, потому, что я чувствую сквозь закрытые веки солнечный свет: если я открою глаза, то он будет резать их."(29).

[59] "Я лежу в совершенном изнеможении. Солнце жжет мне лицо и руки. Накрыться нечем. Хоть бы ночь поскорее."(32)

[60] The complexity and length of sentences related to the thinker's on-going experience in Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, a UDIM written ten years after "Four Days," is already considerably reduced, resulting in much more "believable" syntax.

Explanatory Comments

The needs of a contextually uninitiated external addressee are acknowledged in an even more obvious way when Ivanov inserts *explanatory* parenthetical comments designed to clarify a potentially ambiguous element. For example, when the thinker considers his guilt in the carnage of war and specifically in the murder of the Turkish soldier, a parenthetical explanatory comment is introduced to account--as if to an external addressee--for the protagonist's knowledge that the dead man is not an ethnic Turk but an Arab peasant (*fellah*) drafted into the Turkish army: “And what about this miserable fellah (he is wearing an Egyptian uniform): he is even less guilty.”[61]

Similarly, when Ivanov comes back to the incident with the crushed dog (cf. above) after a short digression, he appears to be making sure that the reader does not get lost: “That day (when the accident with the little dog happened) I was happy.”[62] The use of

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The following fragmented verbalization of Dujardin's thinker dressing is indicative of the development of the genre: "... une chemise blanche; hâtons-nous; les boutons des manches, du col; ah! le linge frais; que je suis bête! dépêchons-nous; dans ma chambre; ma cravate; mes bretelles sont laides, je les ai affreusement choisies; mon gilet; dans la poche, ma montre, ma jaquette..." E. Dujardin, *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, p. 65.

[61] “А этот несчастный феллах (на нем египетский мундир) – он виноват еще меньше.”(31)

[62] “В тот день (когда случилось несчастье с собачкой) я

parentheses here results not only in a discourse planning effect because of clause subordination (cf. above), but also indicates an attempt to explain the deictic phrase "that day." Deixes or indexicals--pronouns or adverbs of time and place--are signs which require contextual knowledge on the part of the addressee to be deciphered. Because the addressee of UDIM is also the addresser, "their" knowledge of context is always equal. Therefore, one would not expect the referents of deictics to be explained--especially in such an overt way--in private communication. As soon as we encounter such an explanation, we have the impression that the addresser is now taking into account the needs of an *external* addressee who may not know the context and therefore the referent of a particular indexical sign.

Time Span

Apart from a few instances of external dialogue at the end of the text, Ivanov is alone for most of the story. His isolation is not only a way of motivating his interior monologue, but also gives the thinker a chance to *rethink* the morality of war, which, after all, is the main point of "Four Days." In this respect, the story's form acts as a pretext for the presentation of Garshin's favorite anti-

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был счастлив."(30)

militaristic theme:

> [...] the [typical] Garshinian hero... is forced to be introspective, because he is usually faced with a moral dilemma[...] In 'Four Days,' for example, the events leading up to the murder [of the Turk] and the murder itself are dispensed with in one page. The story's significance lies in Ivanov's reaction to the murder, in his ponderings on war and death[...][63]

The fact that Ivanov is not only alone but also *immobilized* by his injury and therefore forced by circumstances to spend four horrifying days right next to the decomposing corpse of someone whom he has killed is undoubtedly an effective means of forcing the protagonist to come to terms with his guilt.[64] Constantly reminded by the body next to him that he is a murderer, and unceasingly tortured by his physical anguish, Garshin's protagonist seems unable to think of anything but his current situation and its antecedents.

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[63] E. Yarwood, *Vsevolod Garshin* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981), p. 87.

[64] As D. Cohn points out, the restriction of a monologist in a small physical space is a very convenient device because "the perfect adherence to unity of place [...] creates the condition for a monologue in which the mind is its own place: self-centered and therefore self-generative to a degree which can hardly be surpassed." *Transparent Minds*, p. 222. Also cf. Yarwood, *Vsevolod Garshin*, p. 88.

However, this relentless focus on the present moment creates a problem: time span. When it comes to the disclosure of *in actu* experience, according to the UDIM "eavesdropping" premise, events cannot be skipped or summarized since gaps and event summary are the prerogative of a narrator who, from his *retrospective* position, can manipulate information and condense it. A thinker can only verbally register all current experience, which is why the action in the main story-line of Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* and Larbaud's *Amants heureux amants...* spans only a certain number of hours.[65] If an author intends to write a short text and yet wants the events of the story to cover more time than the period actually registered by the mind of his protagonist, s/he must resort to devices that would motivate such expansion.

In "Four Days" this problem is solved by having an injured thinker who keeps falling in and out of consciousness. This allows the author to skip long periods of time, which are indicated in the text by blank spaces and by the thinker's verbalization of his black-outs and reawakenings: "Darkness once again, once again there is nothing. [blank] I am awake." or "My thoughts are becoming confused, and I sink into oblivion. [blank] I've been asleep for a long time [...]”[66] Consequently, even though the actual text of the story is quite short, Ivanov's anguish is prolonged and intensified, since he ends up spending four horrible days near death. This, in turn, increases suspense by augmenting our fear for the thinker's life: the *longer* he lies there untreated in the boiling sun, the greater is the likelihood of his eventual death. Furthermore, because Ivanov is lying next to the corpse of a man killed in war, the anti-war message of the story is enhanced by the above mentioned prolongation device, since the four days in the sun cause the Turk's body to decompose gradually before the horrified protagonist's eyes. The graphic description of the decomposition process, along with all the associated guilt and fear in Ivanov's mind, show the horror of war in its full "glory": “He has melted completely. Myriads of worms keep falling out of him. How they swarm! When he is eaten, and only his bones and uniform are left, then it’ll be my turn. And I’ll be like that too.”[67] Ivanov's extended anguish, the reader's uneasy suspense--made all the more vivid by the "here and now" premise of the text--and the maximized shock effect generated by the intermittent graphic descriptions of the decomposing Turk made war appear so unpleasant to Garshin's contemporaries and demystified its "glorious" reputation so much that "Four Days" was withdrawn by the Ministry of Public Education from schools and public libraries for being anti-patriotic.[68]

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[65] Cf. M. Raimond, p. 283.

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[66] “Опять мрак, опять ничего нет. [blank] Я проснулся."(28) "Мысли путаются, и я забываюсь. [blank] Я спал долго[...]”(32)

[67] “Он совсем расплылся. Мириады червей падают из него. Как они копошатся! Когда он будет съеден и от него останутся одни кости и мундир, тогда – моя очередь. И я буду таким же.”(37)

However, just as with many other UDIM devices, time prolongation is used inconsistently in this story. There is no attempt to dramatize the actual black-out and awakening *process*, since "my thoughts are becoming confused, and I sink into oblivion. [blank] I've been asleep for a long time [...]"(32) fails to convey the loss of consciousness and its recovery as a *scene*: the thinker sounds too composed and alert, i.e., too much like a narrator looking back on the experience. In order to see how the UDIM genre developed after Garshin in this respect, let us compare this to the dramatization of awakening in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and in *Leutnant Gustl* respectively. Here is how Dujardin's thinker wakes up after a brief dream and realizes that he is still in the company of his friend Léa: "Ah!!! mille épouvantements!!! quoi?... on me pousse, on m'arrache, on me tue... Rien... un rien... la chambre... Léa... Sapristi... m'étais-je endormi?..." (94). Schnitzler's protagonist, who has fallen asleep on a park bench, awakens even more dramatically: "Was ist denn?--He, Johann, bringen S'mir ein Glass frisches Wasser... Was ist?... Wo... Ja, träume ich denn?... Mein Schädel... o, Donnerwetter... Fischamend... Ich bring' die Augen nicht auf!--Ich bin ja angezogen!--Wo sitz' ich denn?--Heiliger Himmel, eingeschlafen bin ich!" (166). It is this dramatized confusion of semiconscious states that is missing in "Four Days." As a final note, it ought to be mentioned that, just as in Garshin's story, in "Leutnant Gustl" the thinker's sleep is used to extend the time period covered by the story: the protagonist's "nap," which moves the story a few hours ahead in order to make the development of events more believable, is motivated by the fact that Gustl ends up on a park bench in the middle of the night, feels understandably tired and therefore dozes off.

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[68] P. Henry, p. 52.

Conclusion

My analysis of illusion-making devices in Garshin's "Four Days" has yielded a picture of communicative ambiguity. In some instances the text clearly seeks to create the impression that *story* and *discourse* are simultaneous. This results in a *scene*-like effect and distances Ivanov's monologue from narratorial language. However, Garshin did not yet appear to be comfortable with the new form, which caused his thinker's UDIM to slip into retrospectively-oriented discourse, i.e., narrative and therefore *summary*. Those anti-narrative effects, which are successful in "Four Days," are attributable primarily not to various forms of violation of Beaugrande's and Dressler's standards of cohesion, coherence and intentionality--as will be the case in later examples of UDIM--but rather to certain manipulations of the *scene* and *summary* concepts, on the one hand, and on the other, to an attempt to synchronize discourse with experience.

The inconsistencies and ambiguities of the communicative situation posited by the text should by no means diminish the author's accomplishment, for he seems to have made a genuine attempt to make us *share* the experience of a dying soldier instead of merely letting us read about it. By seeking to synchronize discourse with experience in "Four Days" the author essentially tries to move the reader as far away as possible from the artificiality of reading and as close as possible to the genuineness of living. In this connection, it is noteworthy to cite R. Pascal's comments regarding

> Sartre's critique of the traditional form of the novel, the chief falsity of which lies in the narrator (personal or impersonal), who writes from the standpoint of the outcome of the events

> related, and who thereby profoundly distorts the nature of real experience. The whole pattern of a story, the coherence of its events, is built on this false premise of retrospection, for it is only in retrospect that we can recognize events to be significant or irrelevant and contingent. The nature of living, which Sartre powerfully illustrates from the experience of participating in the Resistance during the war, is quite opposite to that of fiction, since when acting we never know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere [....][69]

"Four Days" is really the first attempt to recreate the "nature of living" as opposed to "that of fiction." By striving to avoid "this false premise of retrospection" and to create the illusion that Ivanov is "acting" and not narrating, the author appears to be trying to makes us feel--however inconsistently--that, just like the terrified protagonist, we too do not "know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere" (cf. Pascal above). *Ecce bellum,* i.e., war not as it is *described* but as it is *lived,* and it is not about glory and motherland, but about bodies rotting and being eaten by worms--right now, and not back then. Given the public reaction at the time of this story's publication (cf. above), Garshin's innovative technique must have achieved its purpose. And whatever we may feel today about the shock value of "Four Days," at the very least we can recognize the potential of present-tense UDIM to make discourse come to life.

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[69] Pascal, R. "Narrative Fictions and Reality: A Comment on Frank Kermode's *The Sense of an Ending,*" *Novel,* 11 (1977), p. 40.

Introduction

In 1887, a decade after the first publication of Garshin's "Four Days," a short novel entitled *Les Lauriers sont coupés* appeared in a Parisian symbolist journal *Revue Indépendante*. The journal's editor and author of the novel was Édouard Dujardin, and his text was one of the earliest examples of present-tense UDIM. Although Garshin's "Four Days" had been translated into French and published in the *Revue Bleue* under the title "Après la Bataille" in 1884,[1] Dujardin claimed decades later in his theoretical work entitled *Le Monologue intérieur: son apparition, ses origines, sa place dans l'œuvre de James Joyce* to have been the first to use this technique.[2] However, whether or not Dujardin had read Garshin's story between 1884 and 1887 or heard of it in the years before 1931, when he asserted his primacy in the introduction of UDIM, his inventor's status had already been guaranteed by a most curious twist of fate.

In 1903, quite by accident, James Joyce came across a copy of

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[1] E. Yarwood, *Vsevolod Garshin*, p. 110.

[2] Cf. epigraph in Chapter 1. In spite of its title, this theoretical work barely mentions Joyce and serves mainly as the justification of Dujardin's own technique. However, even in this respect many critics have reproached the author of *Les Lauriers sont coupés* with not following his own precepts because the novel is often in contradiction with the ideas advanced in *Le Monologue intérieur*. cf. L. E. Bowling, "What is the Stream of Consciousness Technique?"

Les Lauriers sont coupés in a Parisian railway book kiosk. In 1922 Joyce told his friend and translator Valéry Larbaud that his inspiration had come from reading Dujardin: "Dans *Les Lauriers sont coupés*... le lecteur se trouve installé, dès les premières lignes, dans la pensée du personnage principal, et c'est le déroulement ininterrompu de cette pensée qui, se substituant complètement à la forme usuelle du récit, nous apprend ce que fait ce personnage et ce qui lui arrive..."[3] Larbaud read Dujardin's text, which had been virtually forgotten by that time, and decided to "resurrect" it. He succeeded not only in having *Les Lauriers sont coupés* republished in 1924 but also in making Dujardin a minor celebrity by associating him with Joyce and the genesis of *Ulysses*.[4] By making the link between Dujardin and Joyce--and especially by reporting Joyce's above-mentioned remark regarding *Les Lauriers sont coupés*--in the introduction to the definitive edition of the novel (Albert Messein, 1925), Larbaud ensured Dujardin's place in literary history regardless of the literary merits of the aging scholar's novel or the accuracy of his claim to be the inventor of UDIM.

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[3] V. Larbaud, introd. in E. Dujardin, *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* p. 9.

[4] K. M. McKilligan, *Édouard Dujardin: Les Lauriers sont coupés and the Interior Monologue* (Hull: The University of Hull Publications, 1977), pp. 19-21.

Unlike Garshin and his short stories, Dujardin and his *Les Lauriers sont coupés* are known today mainly to literary specialists. In fact the 1987 edition of *Le Petit Robert 2,* the French dictionary of proper names, does not even mention Dujardin or his work, while, interestingly enough, the foreigner Garshin is cited along with "Four Days." The reasons for this have probably little to do with the form of the two texts--neither of which is considered as the most accomplished example of UDIM--and everything to do with their subject matter. Dujardin, who was a scholar, a member of the symbolist movement and a close friend of several of its famous representatives, was mainly interested in art and its various forms. Unlike Garshin, who had used the UDIM form in order to intensify his anti-war message, Dujardin wrote a novel about nothing. As C. D. King observes, "the intentions of Dujardin were new; he consciously used the form for the whole of his story, as an end in itself. The matter of his book is, very largely, the way it is expressed..."[5] Stressing Dujardin's symbolist aesthetics, M. Friedman points out that "he [the protagonist of the novel] suffers from the boredom and indecisiveness of a typical symbolist hero [...] But the most interesting aspect of *Les Lauriers sont coupés* is Dujardin's discovery of a 'form' to express these symptoms."[6]

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[5] C. D. King, "Édouard Dujardin, Inner Monologue and the Stream of Consciousness," pp. 122-23.

In contrast to such "trifling" concerns, Garshin's UDIM form achieves the author's specific goal of shocking the reader and making war appear as repulsive as possible. Dujardin's UDIM form does nothing but promote itself because the events of the novel appear merely as a pretext for using interior monologue. In fact Dujardin consciously sought "une action banale" for his literary experimentation,[7] and he most certainly succeeded: there is no life-and-death struggle, gripping suspense or interesting intrigue in Dujardin's text, which raises no universal questions or deep philosophical concerns. As M. Raimond puts it,

> Pour noter à peu près tout ce qui traverse l'esprit d'un homme à certains moments, il paraissait préférable de choisir des circonstances fort peu dramatiques, qui, loin d'accaparer l'esprit du héros, puissent le laisser disponible. Dujardin avait bien compris que le domaine d'élection du monologue intérieur est cet état de vacuité mentale, de rêverie libre, et il s'était efforcé de saisir, chez son héros, pendant une soirée banale, «toutes les nuances de l'esprit»...[8]

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[6] M. Friedman, "The Symbolist Novel: Huysmans to Malraux" in *Modernism,* M. Bradbury and J. MacFarlane eds. (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1976), p. 455.

[7] K. M. McKilligan, p. 52.

[8] M. Raimond, p. 267. Of course Raimond's statement does not apply to every example of UDIM, since in Garshin's "Four Days" and in Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* the action is far from "banale" and involves a life-and-death struggle, gripping suspense and various major thematic concerns related to morality etc.

Les Lauriers sont coupés "chronicles" a few hours in the life of a ridiculous Parisian dandy, Daniel Prince, who spends his time and money in pursuit of a devious cocotte, Léa D'Arsay. Having temporarily convinced himself that he is interested in a platonic relationship with Léa, Daniel showers her with a great deal of money supposedly for the mere privilege of being in her company. As the UDIM progresses, it becomes very clear why Daniel has spent so much cash on this rather unpleasant woman: his platonic goals are simply a case of self-deceit, since more than anything else he wants to seduce her. The novel ends with Daniel's failure to achieve his very "unplatonic" goal, after which he decides that his affair has become far too costly in view of its meagre "carnal returns." At this point Dujardin's novel ends, leaving all but the formalistically-minded readers rather cold.

Sensorimotor Discourse *v.* Internal Reflection

The thinker's on-going experience in Dujardin's novel, just as in Garshin's story, is presented in the punctual present tense, which, as argued in the previous chapter, is already a non-narratorial phenomenon suggestive of self-communication. However, unlike Garshin's text with its unmotivated lapses into the narratorial past, *Les Lauriers sont coupés* is a considerably more convincing and consistent attempt to prevent the thinker's UDIM from appearing retrospectively-oriented. This consistency already makes Dujardin's novel a more "realistic" example of the genre than its Russian predecessor.

At the same time, Dujardin's novel features much more *sensorimotor discourse,* i.e., the verbalization of on-going perception and action, than does Garshin's text. Sensorimotor discourse is very difficult to motivate, which is why Dujardin has been so severely criticized for his representation of so-called *preverbal* phenomena (cf. Chapter 2). Especially difficult to achieve is the believable verbalization of the thinker's own movements, or, as D. Cohn puts it, "forced to describe the actions they perform while they perform them, [monologists] tend to sound like gymnastics teachers vocally demonstrating an exercise."[9] This is why some authors, such as Joyce in *Ulysses,* have resorted to FDIM (framed direct interior monologue) where a framing narrator communicates much of the thinker's sensorimotor experience, leaving the character to concentrate on *internal reflection.* Consequently, because of the thinker's extensive sensorimotor discourse, *Les Lauriers sont coupés* is a perfect demonstration of all the difficulties involved in motivating the presentation of immediate external physical experience.[10]

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[9] D. Cohn, *Transparent minds,* p. 222.

The magnitude of this problem is illustrated by the fact that virtually all the practitioners of UDIM after Dujardin tried to "minimize the damage" by presenting as little sensorimotor discourse as possible. Thus, in A. Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl,* in the "Penelope" chapter of *Ulysses* and in V. Larbaud's *Amants, heureux amants...* the thinker's internal reflection far outweighs the verbalization of immediate physical experience, which, in the latter two texts, is reduced to a bare minimum. In Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* and in Simon's *La Route des Flandres,* the two authors go so far as to eliminate altogether the present moment--and therefore the need for sensorimotor discourse--from the monologues of their respective thinkers, which consist of nothing but recall. However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, such "memory monologues" are beyond the scope of my discussion.

In spite of all the problems created by extensive sensorimotor discourse, Dujardin goes further than Garshin toward creating the illusion of eavesdropping on a thinking mind, thereby compensating considerably for the above-mentioned "action banale" characterizing *Les Lauriers sont coupés.* By devoting a considerable amount of conscious technical effort to making his thinker's mental discourse sound private and spontaneous, Dujardin indicates a definite awareness of the formal differences between

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[10] cf. D. Cohn, *Transparent minds,* pp. 234-37

addresser-dominated and addressee-dominated discourse (cf. Chapter 1): an awareness that was demonstrated by Garshin to a considerably lesser extent.

Whereas Garshin strives to suggest self-communication by devoting most of his technical effort to the elimination of retrospection in his thinker's discourse, Dujardin attempts to suggest communicative privacy in a more direct manner. Whether consciously or intuitively, Dujardin appears to have been influenced by the only observable model of private communication: real spontaneous oral discourse. And this may explain why Dujardin's text frequently parallels what is known and/or assumed by psychologists regarding real inner speech to a much greater extent than does "Four Days."

Private Communication

When the addresser-addressee relationship in written discourse is compared to that in real spontaneous dialogue, it becomes obvious that oral interlocutors are normally in a much more private "club" than are a writer and a reader. This is because oral interlocutors are likely to have much more in common from the communicative point of view. They tend to share so much more contextual, situational and background information, that they can often rely on relatively little verbal material to communicate a considerable amount of information. This is why sentences in dialogic discourse are frequently unfinished or consist of fragments with referents deleted or in pronoun form. Furthermore, the verbal material that *is* used often does not have to be and indeed cannot be organized or polished as well as it is in written discourse. First of all, the participants in a spontaneous dialogue do not have the time to revise their discourse, which makes for constructions that are inevitably less well-formed than those in written communication. And secondly, the oral addresser can feel quite comfortable when producing an effort-saving unpolished and abbreviated message, because s/he can be stopped by the addressee any time and asked to explain anything that is unclear. The writer, on the other hand, does not have this advantage and cannot take risks; therefore, s/he tries to be as explicit as possible.

According to Vygotsky, in inner speech, which is obviously even more private than dialogic communication, all the communicative privacy features of external dialogue are present in a greatly concentrated form. As a result the study of spontaneous oral speech can enrich our understanding of inner speech. First Vygotsky demonstrates why dialogue is so much more private than written discourse:

> Dialogue always implies that the other interlocutor knows the point of the matter, which, as we have seen, allows for a whole series of abbreviations in oral speech and creates, under certain circumstances, purely predicative discourse. Dialogue always implies the visual perception of the other interlocutor, his facial expressions and gestures, as well as the acoustic perception of the entire intonational side of discourse.[11] Both of these taken together give the addressee the ability to catch the addresser's meaning from mere hints [...] It is quite understandable that [...] a common knowledge of the subject and the direct communication of information through intonation, which facilitate the abbreviation of oral speech, are absolutely impossible in written discourse. And that is why in written discourse we have to use many words in order to express an idea that would be communicated much more laconically in oral speech [...]

Then Vygotsky points out that for purely pragmatic reasons, dialogic discourse cannot be as carefully planned as written discourse, which means that the former tends to be rather rough and even awkward, while the latter is more likely to be better constructed and more polished:

> The speed of oral speech does not facilitate the unfolding of discourse as a complex act of will, i.e., with reflection, motivational conflict, selection etc. Instead, the speed of oral communication is much more likely to cause discourse to unfold as a simple act of will and with habitual elements [...] [Therefore], dialogic interaction involves immediate and even

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[11] In this respect it would be interesting to compare ordinary dialogue with dialogue over the telephone where no visual contact is present.

> haphazard self-expression. Dialogue is speech consisting of responses: it is a chain of reactions. Written discourse [...] is a priori related to conscious and intentional activity [...] [and] facilitates the unfolding of discourse in the framework of complex activity, and from this stems the use of rough drafts [...]

Finally, Vygotsky makes the connection between the often rough, abbreviated and unplanned form of dialogic communication on the one hand and inner speech on the other:

> The commonality of apperception in self-communication is total, whole and absolute [...] [and] that which in oral speech appears as a more or less vague tendency is manifested in inner speech in pure form pushed to the limit as maximal syntactic simplification, absolute concentration of thought [...] 12

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[12] L. S. Vygotsky, *Sobraniie sochinenii, t. 2: Myshleniie i rech* (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1982), pp. 338-43 (my translation: all subsequent translations from this edition are mine). Cf. Sokolov who argues for a direct genetic link between inner and outer speech: “Inner speech comes from outer speech and constitutes its psychological transformation, in which the most important role is played not so much by its "soundlessness" as by its more fundamental psychological characteristics, and most of all by **a)** its extreme dependence on contexts, **b)** its generality and **c)** its verbal fragmentedness resulting from **a** and **b**. Let us also note that all these typical characteristics of inner speech are observed under certain circumstances in outer conversational speech, e.g., in the presence of shared context knowledge, as has been demonstrated with many literary examples by Vygotsky. All this implies that inner speech cannot be isolated from outer speech and cannot be viewed as a separate phenomenon.” A. N. Sokolov, *Vnutreniaia rech i myshleniie,* p. 55 (my translation).

Thus, by borrowing two key elements from private oral discourse--abbreviation and a rough or unpolished form indicative of spontaneous/unplanned discourse--in order to create the illusion of private communication, Dujardin actually ended up approximating some of the processes that presumably take place during that most private communicative process of all: real inner speech (cf. Chapter 2). At the same time, because UDIM is only an illusion of private communication and in fact constitutes the very communicative act that it supposedly tries not to imitate--writing--Dujardin's text does not and often cannot go as far as does real inner speech in its self-communicative tendencies because it constantly seeks to accommodate an addressee who is not really "in on it": the reader. This dualistic trend is illustrated by the similarities and differences between Daniel's discourse on the one hand and what is known or assumed regarding real inner speech on the other.

Elements of Real Spontaneous Oral Discourse in Dujardin's UDIM: Abbreviation

In order to explore the links between the typical features of real spontaneous oral discourse and Dujardin's illusion of private communication, let us begin by returning to the question of planned (written) and unplanned (spontaneous oral) discourse, which we raised in Chapter 3. In E. Ochs's discussion of spontaneous oral discourse v. planned written discourse the key point has to do with the role of context and syntax in the establishment of links between discourse elements:

> [...] along a continuum of use, reliance on context to communicate information falls toward the unplanned pole, and reliance on syntax falls toward the planned pole [...] In using context, the communicator does not make the semantic relation between the propositions explicit. For example, if the communicator produces the sequence *I don't like that house. It looks strange.*, he does not specify the links between these assessments... Our observations of discourse indicate that context is an alternative to syntax and that planned and unplanned discourse differ in their utilization of the two alternatives. Syntax makes the semantic link explicit, for example, *I don't like that house,* because *it looks strange.* It is relied upon more heavily in planned versus relatively unplanned discourse [...]"[13]

As we saw in the previous chapter, the "planned look" of much of Garshin's discourse stems from his reliance on syntax, i.e., virtually all the formal links between discourse elements that characterize planned (written) discourse are present in Ivanov's account of his *in actu* experience. Dujardin, on the other hand, clearly makes an effort in many instances to rely on context, thereby incorporating the most important feature of private communication into his thinker's discourse.[14]

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[13] E. Ochs, p. 62, 66.

According to Ochs, one of the key characteristics of this reliance on context in spontaneous discourse is the tendency to delete formal links between referents (Theme elements) and propositions or comments about these referents (Rheme elements).[15] She refers to this as "the principle of nextness" and illustrates it with the following example from a conversation recorded between two students discussing classes at a university: "Oh I g'ta tell ya one course... The mo- the modern art the twentieth century art, there's about eight books."[16] No formal link, such as "as for" is established between the referent ("the twentieth century art") and the proposition ("there's about eight books"). Instead they are just "glued" together, and the speaker is assuming that this "nextness" is enough of a clue for making the appropriate link.[17] Ochs refers to this pattern as "Ref+Prop constructions" and points out that such constructions are very infrequent in written and therefore planned discourse.

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[14] Reliance on context, which merely implies instead of explicating links between elements, is clearly part of the addresser's realm (cf. Chapter 2) and therefore more appropriate for UDIM. Reliance on syntax, which pinpoints relationships between elements and acts as a guide through the logical structure of an utterance, favors the addressee's tendency and is therefore more evocative of external communication. Clearly the context is better known to the addresser than to the addressee, and syntax is merely a means of compensating the addressee for his/her disadvantage. Therefore, such syntactic explicators as subordinate conjunctions, e.g., "because," are an external addressee-oriented device. Consequently, Garshin's widespread use of subordinating conjunctions not only suggests discourse planning, but also belies the private nature of UDIM.

[15] The terms Referent and Proposition or Topic and Proposition or Topic and Comment are often used in functional grammar instead of Theme and Rheme when the new v. old information opposition is not at issue. Cf. W.L. Chafe's "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness, Subjects, Topics and Point of View," pp. 25-55.

Because in Ref+Prop constructions neither of the major elements of a sentence (Theme or Rheme) is eliminated, and only secondary (link) elements are deleted, it is a minimal form of discourse abbreviation, but it is abbreviation none the less and a feature of private communication, since that which is explicitly verbalized in more formal discourse ends up in only implicit form in this type of spontaneous speech. The Ref+Prop construction is found in a number of places in *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, and this discourse abbreviation pattern is especially prevalent in perception-related UDIM. For example, this is part of Daniel's dining experience in a restaurant: "Un peu rude, ma serviette; neuve peut-être." (42) The referent or Theme element "ma serviette" is not deleted altogether, as it might be in real inner speech, since the reader would not know to what the proposition or Rheme element "un peu rude" refers.

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[16] E. Ochs, pp. 63-4.

[17] Furthermore, another formal link, not mentioned by Ochs, is missing from this utterance: "about" in "I g'ta tell ya one course."

Instead, a sense of unplanned rudimentary discourse is created by the elimination of the link between the referent and the proposition: in this case it is probably the copula "être."[18] An added sense of "realistic" spontaneity is created by reversing the usual order of referent and proposition in order to indicate that the sensation of roughness is what flashes in Daniel's mind first, whereas its source is identified only afterwards.

Additional examples of the Ref+Prop device can be found, among others, in the same restaurant scene when Daniel evaluates the chicken brought to him by the waiter: "... bonne mine, le poulet." (43) or when he glances at a man sitting at another table: "un monsieur maigre, aux favoris longs, quelle gravité!" (39). A similar Ref+Prop construction is used to abbreviate and therefore give the appearance of unplanned discourse to Daniel's appraisal of a woman on the street: "... une très jeune, fêle, aux yeux éhontés, et quelles lèvres!" (86). And, as Daniel looks out of his window onto a Parisian cityscape, he thinks in the following disjointed fashion: "... presque lugubre, ce silence..." (63) His assessment of a friend with whom he is conversing is another example of this manifestation of the principle of nextness: "Certes, un excellent ami, Lucien Chavainne, mais si rétif aux affaires de sentiment." (33) The Ref+Prop construction is also found in a few examples of Daniel's internal reflection, e.g., when he is choosing a place for a secret rendez-vous: "Le Louvre, le Louvre, pas très high-life, mais encore le plus commode..." (42) In all these Ref+Prop constructions, without deleting any truly essential information from Daniel's discourse, Dujardin creates the illusion of private communication by suggesting discourse abbreviation and the unpolished nature of spontaneous oral discourse, thereby balancing the quasi-mimetic and the informatory goals of UDIM.

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[18] M. A. K. Halliday points out that the copula verb "to be" "is outside the Theme-Rheme structure." M. A. K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), p. 42.

In some instances, referents (Theme elements) are actually deleted from Daniel's discourse, which, according to Ochs, is one of the main features characterizing real spontaneous speech: "...we find predications in which the major argument is deleted in the current utterance. To locate the relevant referent, the listener must turn back to the discourse history or to the situation at hand." The referent deletion tendency is illustrated by the following example from Ochs's study:

Two girls
B: Y'have any cla- y'have a class with Billy this term/
A: Yeah he's in my Abnormal class
B: Oh yeah//how
A: Abnormal Psych.
→ B: Still not married
A: ((loud)) Oh no definitely not//(no)[19]

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[19] E. Ochs, pp. 62-3. cf. A-R. de Beaugrande and W. U. Dressler, pp. 67-69.

"Billy," the implicit grammatical subject of "Still not married," is deleted because B is relying on the context of her utterance, i.e., the prior mention of Billy, to communicate it to A. Referent deletion is more indicative of spontaneity and lack of discourse planning than the Ref+Prop construction because it involves a greater reliance on context. Here we have the strongest empirical link yet between real spontaneous oral discourse and real inner speech: both forms of private communication tend to eliminate Theme elements, as is indicated by Ochs's above-mentioned data and by Vygotsky's observations of the egocentric speech of preschoolers (cf. Chapter 2).

Let us compare Ochs's example about the unmarried Billy to the assessment of another unmarried referent in Daniel's UDIM: "Voilà une assez jolie femme; ni brune ni blonde; ma foi, air choisi; elle doit être grande; c'est la femme de cet homme chauve qui me tourne le dos; sa maîtresse plutôt; elle n'a pas trop les façons d'une femme légitime; assez jolie, certes." (40)[20] Pointing out that "deletions, such as these, do not appear in more planned, more formal discourse," Ochs observes that in truly spontaneous discourse "it does not seem to matter what grammatical status the previous NP [referent] holds."[21] In other words, the grammatical structure of the phrase with the referent does not necessarily have to be transferred to the phrase where this referent is deleted, which is indicative of the unplanned and therefore typically unpolished or awkward nature of spontaneous oral discourse. And this is precisely the case with "air choisi" in the passage cited above. The same can be said about the following example of referent deletion from Dujardin's text: "Une femme devant nous; grande, svelte... un fort profil de rousse, oui; une mine très éveillée; des yeux peints de noir..." (34) Whereas the Rheme elements "grande, svelte" can be grammatically attached to the deleted Theme "une femme devant nous," the rest of the passage cannot, which means that even more information is actually eliminated from such cases of grammatically uncoordinated referent deletion in Daniel's discourse. Once again Daniel's reliance on context rather than syntax (formal grammatical links between sentence elements) parallels the private communication patterns of spontaneous oral discourse and by extension presumably real inner speech.

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[20] Each independent unit of thought is separated in Dujardin's text by a semicolon.

Here are some other examples of grammatically coordinated as well as uncoordinated referent deletion in Daniel UDIM: "La loge du concierge; vide constamment; bizzare maison" (31), "... encore des gens qui entrent; tous hommes; un qui semble embarrassé;

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[21] E. Ochs, p. 64.

l'étonnant pardessus clair.." (41), "... un peu rude, ma serviette; neuve peut-être"(42), "Au poulet; c'est une aile; pas trop dure aujourd'hui..." (43), "Ah! Paul Hénart; toujours correct; et toujours sa canne de fin jonc..." (52), "... elle n'est point vieille, la chère, et si mignonne; dix-neuf ans, vingt peut-être..." (36).

As these examples indicate, in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* the missing referent is usually located right next to or very close to the sentence fragment constituting the proposition about that referent. What is more, referents are virtually never deleted altogether, since they are inevitably mentioned at least once before their subsequent elimination. As a result we never have the least bit of trouble understanding what Daniel's referentless propositions are about. This is indicative of a very clear tendency in Dujardin's text: the quasi-mimetic goal is never pursued at the expense of the informatory goal of UDIM. In this respect *Les Lauriers sont coupés* is no different from "Four Days." Dujardin seems unwilling to make our reading process any more difficult than it would be with respect to conventional narrative, and his concern for the reader's ability to understand easily every single thought going through the thinker's mind tends to undermine the very privacy effect suggested by the author's use of features characterizing spontaneous dialogic discourse. Although the notion of eavesdropping on completely private inner discourse would naturally imply that certain referents should be difficult or even impossible to recover, discourse abbreviation in this text is "imitated" with such care for the reader's needs that we do not achieve the sense of really being excluded from the communicative act and therefore forced to play the detective who reconstructs the events from clues left *inadvertently* on the scene. In terms of Beaugrande's and Dressler's standards of textuality, the standard of intentionality is never violated in Dujardin's text (cf. Chapter 1).

This illustrates a major difference between the effect produced by Dujardin's text and real inner speech. As Vygotsky puts it, "... even if we could record [inner speech] onto a phonograph, it would appear abbreviated, fragmented, unconnected, unrecognizable and incomprehensible in comparison to external speech."[22] And although it would have been unreasonable to create a totally incomprehensible text, given the reader's needs, later practitioners of the UDIM genre, such as Larbaud and Joyce, have demonstrated that the reader can tolerate much more ambiguity, stemming from such devices as ellipsis, than Dujardin might have thought.

Unpolished Discourse

In addition to the actual elimination of information from Daniel's discourse in order to suggest communicative privacy, Dujardin uses devices imitating awkwardness and therefore suggestive of spontaneous oral discourse as it is described by Ochs. Sometimes in conjunction with discourse abbreviation--especially of the Ref+Prop type--Dujardin resorts to constructions that look far too poorly and hastily formulated to be anything but spontaneous. This too is indicative of the difference between Dujardin's and Garshin's respective UDIM texts: whereas Dujardin purposely "ruins" his thinker's discourse in order to create the private communication effect, Garshin uses a perfect style, which is normally associated with formal writing and therefore planned public discourse, such as conventional narrative. Compare, for example the "unorthodox" word order in a very "awkward" statement, such as "... du corsage les boutons tremblottent..." (92) from Daniel's UDIM to virtually any one of Ivanov's polished phrases.

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[22] L. S. Vygotsky, *Sobraniie sochinenii,* p. 332.

One of these awkward-making devices is the use of a co-referential or "copy" pronoun. This is a modified form of the Ref+Prop construction and is described by Ochs as a typical feature of spontaneous dialogic discourse. Here is an example from Ochs's observations of real dialogue: "They cleaned me out. And my father oh he's//he's fit to be tied."[23] The copy pronoun constitutes an awkward attempt to indicate a link between the initial referent "my father" and the proposition "is fit to be tied," and according to

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[23] E. Ochs, p. 65.

Ochs, such constructions are related to the Ref+Prop type because "the initial referent appears to be part of a separate utterance..."[24] We find the same "awkwardness" indicative of unplanned, unpolished and therefore spontaneous discourse in various parts of Daniel's monologue. For example: "et jamais je n'ai eu l'occasion, ces paroles, de les dire" (77). Compare this to the following instance of real spontaneous oral French discourse documented by S. Laberge and G. Sankoff: "Le gars il peut avoir un char, une maison..." or "La famille, je les reconnais presque tous..."[25] The use of the copy pronoun can be viewed as a mid-point device between actual discourse abbreviation and complete and expanded syntax, or, as Ochs puts it, "these constructions... stand somewhere between single subject-predicate constructions and discourse. They share properties of both."[26]

In Dujardin's text we find not only such instances of copy pronoun but also cases where this "awkward" effect is created by nouns copying pronouns within the same sentence. For example, this is how Daniel formulates his regret at having given too much money to Léa without getting much in return: "... cela commence à être lourd, tout cet argent." (80). A pronoun followed by a copy noun is also used to make unpolished Daniel's gustatory experience: "... cela se déguste, cette fraîcheur..." (45). Other examples include purely abstract musings, such as "Dans les champs purs, mieux que je ne les aime, les champs, je t'aime, amie... (85) or more concrete reactions to the outside world: "Je lui ai confié, à ce brave ami, mon histoire amoureuse." (30) There are even examples of both copy noun and copy pronoun use within the same sentence, yielding truly unpolished constructions indeed: "En sortant, elle disait, Léa, elle disait à sa femme de chambre..." (99) This particular instance of redundancy is similar to the following example of real spontaneous oral French discourse recorded by Laberge and Sankoff: "Qu'on le veuille ou non, la fille qui sort avec son jeune homme, en tous cas, elle sort, elle sur son côté."[27] or this instance recorded by Lambrecht: "... ce lycée, on m'a dit qu'il était pas terminé."[28]

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[24] E. Ochs, p. 66.

[25] S. Laberge and G. Sankoff, "Anything you can do" in *Syntax and Semantics Vol. 12: Discourse and Syntax*, T. Givón ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 435 and 437 respectively.

[26] E. Ochs, p. 66.

Whether pronouns repeat copy nouns, or nouns copy pronouns, the key element in this awkward-making device is message modification taking place right before our eyes: it is as if the thinker changed his mind, syntactically, in mid-sentence. This *in*

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[27] S. Laberge and G. Sankoff, p. 435.

[28] K. Lambrecht, "SVO Sentences in French Discourse," in *Coherence and Grounding in Discourse*, Russel S. Tomlin ed. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1987), p. 231.

actu message modification, which is found mainly in real spontaneous oral discourse, naturally excludes discourse planning and suggests the unplanned and haphazard nature of private communication, as it is described by Vygotsky (cf. above).[29]

Repetition

Repetition for the purpose of mid-stream message repair is quite frequent in Daniel's discourse, which echoes patterns characteristic of real spontaneous oral discourse and thereby suggests communicative privacy. As Ochs points out,

> in most cases, repetition and word replacement within a speech act reflect trouble spots in the communication... the use of repetition and word replacement for the purpose of improving or correcting some dimension of the communication indicates that planning is going on in the course of the speech act itself.[30]

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[29] Lambrecht provides the following example of message midstream modification/repair in real spontaneous oral French discourse: "... tu comprends, les élèves qu'on trouve en sixième *ont* pour la plupart... *auront* leur douze ans revolus dans l'année..." p. 243.

[30] E. Ochs, pp. 70-1. Cf. R.-A. de Beaugrande's and W. U. Dressler's statement that repetition is "common in spontaneous speaking, where restatement results from short planning time and rapid loss of the surface text [...] When there are more resources and time available for text production, recurrence [repetition] is customarily kept within limits. If unduly frequent, it lowers

In Dujardin's text the same message repair pattern seems to be repeated over and over again: Daniel mentally verbalizes a word or a phrase, realizes that something must be added and repeats that word/phrase with the new information. For example: "...sur les trottoirs une limpidité, la lumière *des becs de gaz, des triples becs de gaz*; peu de monde dehors; là-bas *l'Opéra, le foyer tout enflammé de l'Opéra...*" (47, my italics). This stresses the spontaneity and therefore privacy of Daniel's thought: instead of retrospectively processing the visual information in this passage and producing a tighter, more narratorial version, Daniel indicates that this is not the planned discourse of narration but rather the unpolished code of on-going private communication. We have the impression that after an initial thought appears in the thinker's mind, it is refined: as if Daniel first sees the gas lamps and then, after concentrating on them, he realizes that they come in threes, or his mind initially registers the presence of the Opera House in his visual field and a second later he zeroes in on the lights coming from the Opera House. Thus, instead of retrospective narrative, we are watching a thought process unroll *in actu*.

This last example of repetition for the purpose of adding previously omitted information follows a pattern found in the

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informativity [...]" p. 54.

following instance of real spontaneous oral discourse quoted by Ochs: "Well (.2) we ( ) came um *we stayed across the street* from our house. I used ta live in Florida an' *we stayed across the street* 'cuz my mom was in the hospital an' we were really small."[31] and by Macaulay: "And he grew up and when he was *in his teens his middle teens*... But this feller went one day and he got a lot of *this ah roots this nettle root*."[32] In the following example of real spontaneous oral French discourse as recorded by Hölker we find the same kind of repetition for the purpose of message modification: "Et dans les jours qui ont précédé ce malaise, vous étiez en bonne santé?/Oui, ça allait... Pas fatigué, *j'avais..., j'avais un peu la grippe, quoi, j'avais une bonne grippe, je, j'avais* pris des aspirines..."[33] Dujardin's UDIM features many examples of this type of repetition: "des voitures, des voitures et de fiers chevaux", "le dehors est frais... le dehors est frais, presque froid"(63), "les toits, les toits noircis" (61), "Au long immobile du Palais-Royal, au long du Palais nous allons" (36), "à présent des filles, trois filles qui..." (86), "voici le consommé, le consommé fumant" (40).

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[31] E. Ochs, p. 71. (my italics)

[32] M. I. Macaulay, *Processing Varieties in English: An Examination of Oral and Written Speech across Genres* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990), pp. 185-6 (my italics).

[33] K. Hölker, "Con and Co: Continuity and Marquers in Oral Discourse," in *Text and Discourse Connectedness* M.-F. Conte et al. eds. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1989), p. 86 (my italics).

Often repetition patterns in Daniel's discourse correspond to Ochs's observation that "repetition may... be simply part of the speaker's attempt to think out an idea."[34] This tendency to "mull over" a word or a phrase in order to concentrate on it is exemplified in Daniel's consideration of an appropriate place for a rendez-vous: "Le Louvre, le Louvre, pas très high-life, mais encore le plus commode..." (42). This is similar to the following two examples of repetition in spontaneous dialogue recorded by Ochs: "And my father oh *he's//he's* fit to be tied" and "So: I sor:ta rushed myself. And I went down (1.1) *this this* uh (cliff)..."[35]

Repetition for the purpose of concentration is especially evident in Daniel's thoughts about his plan of action at Léa's house: "... j'ai beaucoup de choses à lui dire, beaucoup de choses qu'il faut que je lui dise..." (87) Similarly, Daniel repeats an imaginary line directed at Léa, dwelling on it as if he were practicing for future use: "Voulez-vous me permettre de vous faciliter votre départ?... Cela est bien... Voulez-vous me permettre de vous faciliter votre départ?" (49) However, often Daniel repeats phrases for less constructive reasons: "... je serai tout à l'heure à la maison; et maintenant on ne voit personne. Bientôt je serai à la maison..." (47),

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[34] E. Ochs, p. 70.

[35] E. Ochs, pp. 65 and 71 respectively (my italics).

".. à quoi rêvez-vous? à rien; à quoi rêvez-vous? je ne sais; à quoi rêvez-vous? je ne puis..." (108) or "... un très ancien, très honnête, très cordial ami; très convenable; gentleman... très honnête, très cordial." (53). These last examples are especially indicative of the private communication effect achieved by Dujardin through the use of repetition: the more redundant and seemingly purposeless is the repetition, the less it evokes discourse planning, written discourse and especially written narration.

The question of repetition in UDIM is also related to the phenomenon of child language; as Ochs points out, "repetition is a highly versatile device, and it is among the earliest behaviors emergent in the speech of the language-acquiring child."[36] Pointing out that spontaneous oral discourse often involves the regression to children's communicative strategies, which are in turn borrowed by UDIM authors, Ochs observes: "We find that adult speech behavior takes on many of the characteristics of child language, where the communication is spontaneous and relatively unpredictable... Similarly, stream-of-consciousness writing, casual letter-writing, and so on display this reliance...."[37] Ochs points out, for example, that children tend to repeat words and phrases for their own sake, as if taking pleasure in doing so.

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[36] E. Ochs, p. 70.

[37] E. Ochs, p. 53.

This type of repetition is especially important for our purposes because it appears to be directly related to real inner speech, as is suggested by Kohlberg et al. who studied inner speech by observing the egocentric speech of preschoolers in order to follow up Vygotsky's premises:

> In contrast to collective monologue, other categories of private speech described by Piaget have little obvious connections to confusions of perspective. One such category is "repetition and echolalia," in which words and sounds are repeated and varied for their own sake.
>
> *Episode 2: Repetition and Echolalia*
>
> *(Solitary play. Observer at desk at other side of the room.)* A fally, a fally, a poopy all over the house. A tomato poopy all over the house.
>
> While there is some scatological symbolic-expressive value to such comments, it is unlikely that they reflect any desire to communicate with the auditor...[38]

M. Saville-Troike's observations of children's egocentric speech yielded the same results: "(46) S1: Jelly bean, jelly bean. Jelly, jelly, jelly, jelly. (47) S2: "Yucky. Yucky scoop. Scoop scoop yucky scoop. Yucky yucky yuck-yucky."[39]

And it is this type of "child language" repetition patterns that we find in Daniel's discourse when he engages in idle musing, thinking about things of no importance whatsoever. For example, in the restaurant scene various random thoughts pass through the thinker's mind: "Le vin, le jeu,--le vin, le jeu, les belles,--voilà, voilà... le jeu... le vin, le jeu,--le vin, le jeu, les belles... Vive le vin, l'amour et le tabac... L'amour et le taba-c..." (44). Similarly, Daniel allows a musical memory to take his mind off on a tangent consisting of random repetition: "... n'être jamais entré chez Tortoni; ça vous manque... sur l'air de la Dame Blanche; ça vous manque, ça vous manque."(45)

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[38] L. Kohlberg et al., p. 694.

[39] M. Saville-Troike, p. 583.

In Saville-Troike's and Kohlberg's examples (cf. above), repetition for the sake of sound patterns plays a prominent role, and according to Ochs, this is sometimes borrowed by adults (in modified form) in spontaneous discourse:

> phonological repetition is a very early feature of children's discourse.. Children at times seem to select items on the basis of their phonological similarity rather than on the basis of their appropriateness to the message conveyed... We see here that this kind of behavior does not in fact disappear. Adults as well appear to select their words at least in part on phonological grounds (i.e., phonological similarity). Schegloff (personal communication) refers to this phenomenon as "sound touch-offs" in adult speech. That is, the sound of one item in the discourse may "touch-off" the articulation of other items sharing those sound patterns... [40]

Such sound touch-offs are found in pure form in Daniel's after-dinner musings: "... *l'amour et le tabac*... Il y a encore *le tabac*; ça j'admets... Voilà, voilà, le refrain de *bivouac*... Faut-il prononcer *taba-c* et *bivoua-c*, ou *taba* et *bivoua*? Mendès, boulevard des Capucines, disait domp-t-er; il faut dire dom-ter. *L'amour et le taba-c*... le refrain du *bivoua-c*..." (44) The concentration on the *phonic* nature of these words suggests that Daniel's thought does indeed possess *verbal* form, i.e., this UDIM is not merely a linguistic representation of some sort of formless thought processes, but a kind of *transcription* of the inner speech activity.

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[40] E. Ochs, p. 74.

The presence of such seemingly purposeless repetition and sound play in Dujardin's text indicates a major difference between *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and Garshin's story. Because in the latter, UDIM is used as a means rather than an end, and because the purpose of "Four Days" is to deliver a strong ideological message, idle musings of the sort that go through Daniel's head in the restaurant would be completely out of place in the mind of Ivanov. Every thought going through Ivanov's mind is crucial with respect to the *fabula* on the one hand and the overall message of the story on the other. In contrast to Garshin, Dujardin was preoccupied with formal experimentation, and, having chosen an "action banale," left his pen free to explore the potential of the newly discovered genre. Daniel can afford to think about this and that, while having a pleasant dinner in a Parisian café, whereas Ivanov cannot, since his life, as well as his entire *Weltanschauung*, are at stake. Thus, we find thought association patterns in Dujardin's text whose sole purpose seems to be the demonstration of the thought association phenomenon per se: "... j'avais pourtant mes gros souliers jaunes de la place de la Bourse... Il faudrait tâcher d'apprendre les affaires de la Bourse..." (41) This illustrates the advantage of Dujardin's "action banale" when it comes to the illusion of self-communication, since idle rambling and irrelevant digressions are much more typical of oral, unplanned discourse and by extension communicative privacy than written discourse.

Nominal Phrases in Daniel's UDIM

Much of Daniel's perceptual record is rendered by groups of nominal phrases. This form of discourse abbreviation accounts for a considerable percentage of the thinker's UDIM and, without placing any great Theme-recovery demands upon the reader, compensates for many of the difficulties and problems associated with the creation of the self-communication illusion in sensorimotor discourse (cf. above). Here is a typical example, where Daniel verbalizes a street scene as he walks toward Léa's house where he hopes finally to seduce her:

> ...de vieilles maisons, des murs en chaux; sur le trottoir, des enfants, des gamins, assis par terre, taciturnes; et la rue du

> Rocher, et, ainsi, les boulevards; là, des clartés, à droite, à gauche; et, obliquement, à gauche, une voiture parmi les arbres; un groupe d'ouvriers; la corne du tramway chargé de gens, deux chiens derrière; dans les maisons, des fenêtres éclairées; ce café en face, ses rideaux blancs lumineux; le tapage auprès de moi, d'un omnibus; une jeune fille avec un vêtement bleu sombre, un visage rose; la foule; le boulevard;" (84)

This discourse abbreviation pattern is normally not found in conventional narrative; in fact, the only mode of observable verbal expression where it appears with any frequency is real spontaneous oral discourse.

In the oral communication situation where the interlocutors share the same sensory context, an addresser, wishing to indicate nothing more than the presence of a sensory stimulus in his/her perceptual field, can simply point to an object and name it (or just name it without even pointing if s/he thinks that the addressee is already looking in the right direction). Thus, just saying "a car!" can constitute a complete communicative act in real spontaneous oral discourse, e.g., when the addresser wants to warn the addressee while the latter is crossing the street.

In the dialogic discourse patterns of children, which, as has been pointed out earlier, appear in the spontaneous oral discourse of adults, this type of abbreviation is very typical:

> The single-word utterance can be related to situational speech, which is characterized by the fact that '...it does not reflect verbally the entire message, which can be understood by the addressee only in view of gestures, facial expressions, intonation...' [...] It has been noted long ago that in the early stages of speech development facial expressions and gestures acquire the status of syntactic categories [i.e. Topics or Theme elements - V.T.].[41]

Ochs and Schieffelin provide the following examples of this type of discourse abbreviation from children's discourse: "Allison IV, 22 months / a. Allison (looks in box, finding calf): cow / b. Mother: A cow! (340)... a. Allison (pointing at TV monitor, seeing herself): Baby Allison / Mother: Do you see Baby Allison."[42]

As far as the addressee is concerned, in Dujardin's text, in real spontaneous dialogue between adults and in Allison's dialogic speech the nominal phrase about the object of the speaker's perception constitutes a clear Rheme or Proposition element while the Theme or Topic element is the deleted reference to the *perceptual act,* which can be easily recovered by the addressee from the sensory context; thus, given this shared sensory context, we have a complete statement. In this connection Ochs and Schieffelin point out:

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[41] Yu. A. Sorokin et al. *Teoreticheskiie i prikladnyie problemy rechevogo obshcheniia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp. 224-26 (my translation). In this connection R. Jakobson argues that the gradual appearance of sentences with a subject and a predicate frees the child from the "here and now," making it possible to verbalize events unconnected with the speaker's immediate physical circumstances. R. Jakobson, *Izbrannyie raboty*, p. 316.

[42] E. Ochs Keenan and B. B. Schieffelin, "Topic as a Discourse Notion: a Study of Topic in the Conversation of Children and Adults (1)," in *Subject and Topic*, C. N. Li ed. (New York: Academic Press,1976), p. 346.

> What constitutes the discourse topic may only be reconstructable on the basis of observing what the child is doing, where the child is looking, and so on... For instance... it is critical to take into account Allison's pointing at the monitor, seeing herself, in interpreting her utterance, "Baby Allison/"... We can think of "Baby Allison/" as new information being added to the discourse topic 'something is there (where I am pointing).' If we or her mother did not know that Allison was pointing, we would not be able to reconstruct the discourse in this way.[43]

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[43] E. Ochs Keenan and B. B. Schieffelin, "Topic as a Discourse Notion: a Study of Topic in the Conversation of Children and Adults (1)," in *Subject and Topic,* C. N. Li ed. (New York: Academic Press,1976), p. 346. This is supported by E. Levy who points out that "observations of young children's speech point toward roots of endophoric reference in dialogue. When children in the one-word stage participate in dialogue, for example, their utterances tend to denote that which cannot be presupposed on the basis of other participants' remarks; in other words, their single-word utterances tend to mark new information." E. Levy, "Monologue as Development of the Text-Forming Function of Language" in *Narratives from the Crib,* K. Nelson ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 124.

T. Akhutina points to the link between syntactic patterns in children's speech and those of the inner speech of adults: "... the primary form of organization in children's speech is Theme-Rheme organization... It appears at the single-word utterance stage when

The idea that such a nominal phrase as "Baby Allison/" constitutes new information and therefore a psychological predicate (cf. Vygotsky in Ch. 2) or a Rheme element is echoed by Vygotsky's follower and associate A. A. Leontiev in his discussion of nominal phrases in inner speech:

> The substantiveness of internal speech does not contradict its predicativeness; these characteristics belong to different plans. 'Night. Stars' [noch', zvezdy], are, of course, nominative propositions; but viewed psychologically we actually have here something on the order of '(it is) night,' '(there are) stars,' or 'night has fallen (and not the day),' 'The stars are visible' (The moon is not visible).'[44]

Conventional narrators do not normally drop "I saw" or "I heard"

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the child expresses the most informative part of the information, the part most significant to him/her, and leaves the rest implicit... It is quite natural to assume that such semantic organization does not disappear when the child acquires new forms of syntactic construction; instead it goes 'underground' and becomes a later form of text organization... These specific forms of organizing a whole, conditioned by the cultural development of child speech, maintain an inner link with initial Theme-Rheme forms of organization of children's utterances." T. Akhutina, "Iedenitsy rechevogo obshcheniia, vnutreniaia rech, porozhdeniie rechevogo vyskazyvaniia," in *Issldedovaniie rechevogo myshleniia v psikholingvistike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), pp. 106-7 (my translation).

[44] A. A. Leontiev, "Inner Speech and the Process of Grammatical Generation of Utterances," p. 13.

when the object of their perception is a Rheme element because they do not share a sensory context with their addressees and therefore cannot rely on the visual Theme elements described above. This is why an isolated nominal phrase in conventional narrative may create the impression that information has been left out. In the following passage from Maupassant's "La Peur" the narrator is careful to avoid any confusion by explicitly referring to the perceptual act whenever the object of his perception is a Rheme element:

> Les ténèbres étaient profondes. *Je ne voyais* rien devant moi, ni autour de moi, et toute la branchure des arbres entrechoqués emplissait la nuit d'une rumeur incessante. Enfin, *j'aperçus* une lumière, et bientôt mon compagnon heurtait une porte. Des cris aigus de femmes nous répondirent [...] *Je distinguai* dans les coins sombres deux femmes à genoux, le visage caché contre le mur.[45]

Another illustration of this verbal completeness tendency in the description of perception in conventional narrative is found in the *Book of Revelation* from *The New Testament* where the perception of sensory stimuli constitutes the core of St. John's narrative: "And I saw as it were a sea of glass mingled with fire...

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[45] G. de Maupassant, "La Peur," in *Contes et nouvelles* (Moscow: Progress, 1976), p. 113 (my italics).

"(15: 2), "And I saw a great white throne... (20:11)."

This typical feature of conventional narrative is one more element distinguishing Dujardin's and Garshin's respective texts. Unlike Dujardin, Garshin renders his thinker's perception without avoiding the narratorial "I see" and "I hear" (cf. Chapter 3): "I am lying, it seems, on my stomach, and *I can see* before me only a small piece of land." (27), "*I hear* the crackling of grasshoppers, the buzz of a bee." (28) "I open my eyes and *see*, the same bushes, the same sky, but in daylight." (30, my italics)[46] Therefore, Dujardin's nominal phrases represent a simple but important step in the development of the UDIM genre.

Perception *v.* Introspection

One of the most noticeable parallels between Dujardin's UDIM and experimental data on inner speech has to do with the difference between perceptually assisted and perceptually unassisted discourse. The former tends to be more abbreviated while the latter more expanded in Daniel's UDIM. Daniel's internal reflection tends to be more complete, syntactically complex and in general much more similar to external communication than its perception-related counterpart. This stylistic difference is absent from Garshin's text where perception and reasoning are equally characterized for the most part by complete syntax, complex and polished sentences, periodic constructions and a general sense of explicitness rather than implicitness. Let us consider two passages that exemplify this stylistic trend in Dujardin's text: the beginning of chapter 5 and that of chapter 6.

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[46] Cf. Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 begins with a series of thoughts totally unrelated to Daniel's *in actu* experience:

> Puisque je n'ai rien à faire, examinons un peu, mais sérieusement, comment je dois agir ce soir chez Léa; évidemment, demeurer avec elle jusqu'à minuit ou une heure, puis m'en aller; ce qui est nécessaire, c'est qu'elle comprenne la raison de ma conduite; ah! que c'est difficile à expliquer!... admettons qu'elle consente; alors je lui dirai que, sans doute, il vaut mieux que je la quitte; pourquoi resterai-je... (67)

And this is how chapter 6 begins, as Daniel finds himself out in the street, walking toward Léa's house:

> La rue noire, et la double ligne montante, décroissante, du gaz; la rue sans passants; le pavé sonore, blanc sous la blancheur du ciel clair et de la lune; au fond, la lune dans le ciel; le quartier allongé de la lune blanche, blanc; et de chaque côté, les éternelles maisons; muettes, grandes, en hautes fenêtres noircies, en portes fermées de fer, les maisons;(83)

The expanded and coherent style in the first passage is less suggestive of private communication than the abbreviated form of the second passage, which features a number of elements related to real spontaneous oral discourse. Here Daniel is not reasoning, planning or recalling; instead he is registering experience *in actu*. Communicative privacy is suggested by such elements of spontaneous oral discourse as nominal phrases indicative of perceived objects, as well as reliance on context rather than syntax to establish links between elements.

The tendency toward discourse abbreviation in Dujardin's perception-related UDIM and discourse expansion in his UDIM related to reasoning corresponds to the results of A. N. Sokolov's experimental findings with regard to the form of real inner speech. As outlined in chapter 2, Sokolov's electromyograph recorded a marked increase in electromuscular activity when the subjects were engaged in thought unrelated to external sensory experience, e.g., working out purely abstract problems. However, when visual stimuli were introduced--the subjects were asked to solve problems involving physical objects before them etc.--Sokolov's electromyograph recorded a distinct decrease in electromuscular activity. His conclusion was that the more abstract is the thinking task, the more expanded is the inner speech; and conversely, the more the thinking task is linked with external sensory stimuli, the more abbreviated is the inner speech. Sokolov explains the abbreviation of inner speech during thought related to sensory stimulation in terms of economy of effort: "In these conditions the verbalization of all that is perceived would not only be superfluous, but would also greatly retard man's thinking activity by reducing to a verbal code everything which is clearly and distinctly perceived even without such coding."[47]

The same economy of effort is responsible for a similar tendency in real spontaneous oral discourse, which once again may be the link between Dujardin's UDIM and real inner speech patterns. As we pointed out in our discussion of nominal phrases in Daniel's UDIM, perceptually assisted discourse is likely to feature non-verbal Theme elements, which would make it more abbreviated than perceptually unassisted discourse. As W. Chafe points out,

> extralinguistically, the speaker may believe that both he and the addressee share the perception, and hence the consciousness of some object in the environment. If the speaker sees the addressee looking at a certain picture on his wall, for example, he might say out of the blue I bought it last week, where the idea of the picture is treated as a given and hence pronounced with low pitch and weak stress, as well as being pronominalized as it.[48]

E. Ochs and B. Schieffelin provide a recorded example of such abbreviated discourse, illustrating how much more difficult and less likely such abbreviation is in the absence of a perceptual support:

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[47] A. N. Sokolov, "Internal Speech and Thought," p. 90.

[48] Cf. W. L. Chafe, "Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definitiveness, Subjects, Topics and Point of View," p. 31.

> "a. Bambi: It's coming out fast. (shaking salt on food) / b. Elinor: What's coming out fast? / c. Bambi: The salt." In this exchange, Bambi assumes that Elinor is attending to her actions and is able to locate in the environment the referent of 'it.' Elinor, however, has not been attending to Bambi's actions and cannot identify that referent. Further, Elinor had no clues from prior discourse; Bambi did not precede the utterance with talk about salt, e.g., "Pass me the salt.' "[49]

Because spontaneous oral discourse is a form of private communication and therefore potentially addresser-dominated (cf. Chapter 2), it strives toward economy of effort in the same way as does real inner speech. This economy of effort can be realized in the presence of perceptual contexts by the use of pronouns and various forms of abbreviation more easily than in perceptually unassisted discourse. Therefore, just like inner speech, perceptually *unassisted* spontaneous oral discourse cannot help but be more expanded. And this difference may explain why Daniel's perceptually-assisted discourse tends to be more abbreviated than his inner reflection, given the role played by the oral discourse model in Dujardin's attempt to create the illusion of communicative privacy.

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[49] E. Ochs Keenan and B. B. Schieffelin, p. 337.

Dialogue and the Dialogue-Framing Message

Dialogue between characters is a key indirect means of relating information to the reader in UDIM. The convenience of indirect information disclosure through *external dialogue* in UDIM is that its form need not be significantly different from that of dialogue in more conventional prose. This is motivated by the fact that dialogue is not generated by the thinker's mind; instead, the present-tense monologist simply acts as a faithful tape recorder or eavesdropping device, reproducing dialogue exactly as s/he hears it. Thus, dialogue can take some of the difficulty out of the macrocommunicative process (between the author and the reader) without compromising the UDIM illusion generated by the microcommunicative process.

The accurate reflection of dialogue by a UDIM thinker's mind raises a very curious question related to formal mimetics (cf. Chapter 1). Because a present-tense UDIM thinker functions as a human tape recorder, his/her reproduction of dialogue is actually more motivated than that of a conventional personal narrator. This is implied by M. Glowinski's discussion of direct quotation in personal narration:

> ...in the first-person novel there occur quotations which are supposed to be literal (their presence requires motivation)...

> Paradoxically, quotations which in themselves are a sign of formal mimetics become an instrument for questioning mimetics as an element in the general composition of a given work. Extended quotations in the first-person novel bring the "I" who is speaking close to an omniscient narrator and consequently introduce substantial complications. I say complications because a reader of this type of novel is always aware of the fact that in the course of reading, he associates with the narrator, whose knowledge is of necessity limited.[50]

Glowinski is addressing here a very simple question: how can a conventional personal narrator--who is always looking back on events and whose knowledge/memory is naturally limited--reproduce dialogue in its original form? Unless we are explicitly told that this narrator was using some kind of a recording device during a given dialogue--which is almost never the case--direct quotations in conventional personal narrative cannot be motivated, given the natural limitations of human memory.

This problem is raised in A. Gide's highly metafictional *Les Faux-monnayeurs* where one of the narrators, Édouard, is very much aware of the communicative process in fictional narrative; this is quite appropriate, since Édouard is himself an author. Here is what Édouard writes in his diary where he has just quoted a long speech by another character (Laura): "Je transcris tout cela aussitôt, ayant éprouvé combien il est difficile par la suite de retrouver la justesse de ton d'un dialogue."[51] Even though, unlike most narrators, Édouard strives to justify his direct quotation, the dialogue recorded by him "aussitôt" is far too long to remain in his memory in its original form even for a short while, which is why all he can hope to achieve is the preservation of the original "ton." The problem of motivating direct quotation in personal narrative is thematized even more directly when Édouard quotes a statement by old Azaïs: " '[Les fleurs] me parlent à leur façon et savent raconter la gloire du Seigneur mieux que les hommes' (ou quelque chose de cette farine)."[52]

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[50] M. Glowinski, "On the First-Person Novel," p. 109.

In real oral spontaneous oral communication the status of Édouard's "farine"--quoted direct speech within real spontaneous oral discourse--is no less paradoxic than its fictional counterpart. To quote D. Tannen, "'reported speech' is not reported at all but creatively constructed by a current speaker in a current situation."[53] In literary texts the "creative" nature of this "construction" is suggested by the fact that fictional dialogue tends to manifest far more features of discourse planning than real spontaneous dialogue (cf. discussion above), i.e., it is more coherent, polished etc. In this respect, M. Toolan talks of the average reader's incorrect view that

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[51] A. Gide, *Les Faux-monnayeurs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p. 104.

[52] A. Gide, pp. 105-4. In other words, Édouard is actually admitting here that his use of quotation marks is an empty convention.

[53] D. Tannen, *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 105.

> fictional dialogue [...] is the most complete and mimetic representation of real dialogue, that reading direct speech dialogue 'amounts to the same thing' as being a witness to actual spoken interaction, so that to talk of the 'pace' of such written-up scenes--as if they could go faster or slower--barely makes sense to us: obviously, scenes go at just the pace of the actual interaction. Well of course the point is that what has become obvious to us is not an inescapable feature of fictional dialogue, but a convention and an effect. The fictional direct speech representation of any dialogue can go faster or slower, and we neglect the artifice in fictional dialogue, the ways in which it is non-naturalistic, is not a full transcription, at our peril.[54]

All this means that retrospectively-oriented direct quotation in literature and in real spontaneous oral communication is not really *direct.* It is in fact an artistic paraphrase, i.e., a kind of mimetic illusion.

However, unlike any retrospectively-oriented *reporter* of dialogue, the thinker in present-tense UDIM is witnessing dialogue *in actu* instead of recalling it later, which constitutes sufficient motivation for the word-for-word reproduction of speech.

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[54] M. Toolan, p. 58.

Paradoxically, this means that UDIM--which is the least "mimetic" of all fictional prose genres, since it does not really "imitate" thought (cf. Chapter 1)--is the most mimetically accurate and authentic genre of all when it comes to the reproduction of external dialogue because it is the only genre that can always provide sufficient motivation for direct quotation. Thus, dialogue in present-tense UDIM is virtually the only form of quoted discourse that has truly "earned" its quotation marks.

It has often been pointed out that quoted discourse is an anomaly in narrative, since it is an element of drama, i.e., part of a fundamentally different basic genre As Stanzel points out, "the dialogue scene is... a foreign body in the narrative genre, because in the novel a long quotation in direct speech must be regarded as an avoidance of mediacy..."[55] However, since UDIM is supposed to be one long quotation and therefore not a narrative genre to begin with, and since the avoidance of mediacy is precisely the illusion sought by UDIM, the dialogue scene is in its natural element next to the thoughts of a UDIM thinker.

Verba Dicendi and UDIM Dialogue

We have just seen that the registering of external dialogue is not a problem with respect to the UDIM illusion. Dialogue-framing discourse (the context of dialogue), however, cannot appear in its conventional narratorial form in UDIM without endangering the illusion of self-communication. The key element of dialogue-framing discourse is speaker identification, and in conventional written narrative it is carried out by *verba dicendi*--he said, she said etc.--in order to indicate the speaker to a reader unable to "see" or "hear" the interlocutors or the narrator. This is another manifestation of the explicitness typical of written discourse mentioned by Vygotsky (cf. above): discourse where the communicative process rests exclusively on a verbal basis because all other channels of communication are absent. The use of *verba dicendi* in conventional narrative is especially prevalent with respect to the identification of the first speaker in a two-way verbal exchange. Thereafter, *verba dicendi* can be and often are dispensed with because the simple alternation of speakers is frequently sufficient to determine who is who.

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[55] F. K. Stanzel, p. 65.

If we consider the dialogue-framing discourse of the thinker in Garshin's "Four Days," we discover that it is no different from what one would expect in conventional narrative. The following are dialogue segments registered by Ivanov when he is found by his regiment and taken away on a stretcher:

> I shudder and immediately come to. From out of the bushes I can see the blue eyes of Yakovlev, our lance-corporal.

> "Shovels!" he screams. [...] "Sto-o-op! Do-o-own! Orderlies, fourth shift, move out! Get a hold of the stretcher! Li-i-ift!" That's Petr Ivanich giving orders [...] "Petr Ivanich," I whisper. "What is it, my friend?"[56]

Similarly, in much of Daniel's dialogue-framing discourse in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* the speakers are identified in a way that is typical of conventional narrative: " 'Et bien, et votre passion?' Me demande-t-il; je vais lui dire. 'Toujours à peu près de même.' (31) Or consider the following narratorial identification of Léa: "Bien sûr? demande-t-elle encore." (96) In such instances only the sustained use of the present tense reminds us that the *verba dicendi* are not directed at an external addressee. However, the result is communicative ambivalence because the use of *verba dicendi* is firmly grounded in external written communication and by extension in conventional narrative discourse.

Nevertheless, unlike Garshin, Dujardin was concerned with the role of dialogue-framing discourse in the creation of the private communication illusion, and in a number of places Daniel's dialogue-framing discourse does indicate communicative privacy. This is achieved by the elimination of *verba dicendi* identifying the first speaker in two-way exchanges, and, as with other devices used by Dujardin, this phenomenon has its counterpart in real spontaneous oral discourse.

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[56] "Я вздрагиваю и разом прихожу в себя. Из кустов глядят на меня добрые голубые глаза Яковлева, нашего ефрейтора. 'Лопаты! кричит он. [...] 'Сто-о-ой! О-опуск-а-й! Санитары, четвертая смена, марш! За носилки! Берись, поды-ма-ай!' Это командует Петр Иванович, наш лазаретный офицер [...] 'Петр Иваныч!' шепчу я. 'Что, голубчик?' " Garshin, pp. 37-8.

In oral communication a speaker reporting direct speech can identify each interlocutor not only by verbal means, i.e., *verba dicendi*, but also by non-verbal means: intonation, facial and other gestures etc. These non-verbal means make it possible for the addresser to save his/her effort and time by dispensing with *verba dicendi* in those instances where this would be impossible in written discourse. This clearly illustrates **a)**the communicative privacy of spontaneous oral communication when the latter is compared to its written counterpart and **b)**the dominance of the addresser's tendency on the verbal level in oral communication. Here is an example of direct quotation in real spontaneous oral discourse as recorded by D. Tannen. The speaker is describing the arrival of three people, one of whom is injured, in the emergency department of a local hospital:

> They come bustin' through the door, blood is everywhere. It's on the walls, on the floor, everywhere. [Sobbing] "It's okay Billy, we're gonna make it /?/." [Normal voice] "What the hell's wrong with you." W-we-we look at him. He's covered with blood yknow?.... "What the hell's wrong with you guys.

> You don't know anything about first aid? Hold on to his arm." [Innocent voice] "We rai:sed it above his hea::d." "Oh yeah." shh shh [sound of whizzing motion] So they're whimmin' his arm around. [Upset voice] "Come here Billy! No come here Billy!" Two guys yankin' him from both sides. [Sobbing] "Am I gonna die?"... "How old are you?" "Nineteen." "Shit. Can't call his parents." [Hysterically pleading voice] "Don't tell my parents."[57]

Although in approximating this private communication effect Dujardin could not rely on all the non-verbal speaker-identification markers used by the narrator from Tann[illegible]'s example, he could strive for the same private communication effect by using various indirect means to compensate for the absent *verba dicendi.* To begin with, quite frequently, the content/context of a dialogue-initiating remark in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* can be relied upon as an indirect means of speaker identification. Here is an example, where the thinker has seen an attractive woman in the street while walking with his friend Chavainne and does not want to pass her too quickly: "Nous sommes près d'elle. La superbe fille. *'N'allons pas si vite.'* " (35, Daniel's external discourse italicized by me) Although this is the first remark after a pause in the dialogue between the two friends, the author uses no *verba dicendi* and relies exclusively on the context to identify the speaker. Similarly, when Daniel fails to pay the driver immediately after getting out of the carriage with Léa, the context of the following dialogue-initiating remark is sufficient to let us know that the speaker is Léa: " 'Eh bien, vous ne payez pas le cocher?' " Our extratextual knowledge that "it's the man who pays" is reinforced by Daniel's subsequent *mental* reaction to Léa's remark: "Je ne paie pas le cocher; c'est vrai; pardon..." (110).

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[57] D. Tannen, pp. 119-20.

Another simple means of avoiding *verba dicendi* in Daniel's dialogue-framing discourse involves naming the interlocutor in a dialogue-initiating remark, thereby indicating the speaker by the process of elimination. Here is how Daniel is awakened from his reverie in the restaurant scene: " 'Monsieur a fini...' 'Oui. Apportez-moi le poulet'." (42) The restaurant context and our extratextual knowledge of restaurant service conventions make it very easy for us to identify the first speaker as the waiter, rendering the use of *verba dicendi* unnecessary.[58] Similarly, during his conversation with Hénart, Daniel identifies himself as the dialogue-initiating speaker in the following simple and yet indirect fashion: " 'Mon cher Hénart, si je me rappelle bien...' " (54)

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[58] Compare this dialogue with a similar one in Joyce's *Ulysses*: "They chose a small table near the window opposite a long-faced man whose beard and gaze hung intently down a chessboard... 'I'll take a mélange, Haines said to the waitress.' " J. Joyce, *Ulysses* (New york: Modern Library, 1961), p. 248 Because this particular restaurant scene is not presented in the form of interior monologue, *verba dicendi* are used in a conventional narratorial manner.

Perhaps the most interesting and subtle means of indirect speaker identification in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* is the use of inflections related to gender differences as speaker markers within dialogue itself. As we mentioned in Ch. 2, inflected languages have a naturally greater potential for message abbreviation because inflections often repeat the information conveyed by other parts of the sentence, thereby making the latter redundant and potentially easy to dispense with. Inflections are thus perfect for relating information indirectly, and in UDIM dialogue the use of inflections is one of the most indirect ways of indicating to the reader who is speaking. As usual, inflections are the most beneficial speaker identifiers in the case of *dialogue-initiating* remarks. In French UDIM, dialogue inflections can work in this way, for example, when the two interlocutors are of different genders, and in Dujardin's text this situation arises in the last three chapters where Daniel is making his final pathetic attempt to seduce Léa.

Here is an example where Daniel's inner discourse in the form of a *mental* address is interrupted by a single *externally verbalized* remark, which identifies the thinker as the speaker by elimination: "... oh! le bel air mélancolique que vous avez, mademoiselle; les blanches et rosées fossettes de vos joues... '*Ma pauvre chère amie, comme je voudrais que vous soyez contente!*' J'amène ses bras à moi, sur mon cou sa tête, sa chevelure; autour de sa taille mes bras..." (95, Daniel's external discourse italicized by me) The feminine endings in "ma," "chère," "amie" and "contente" illustrate the advantage of French over English when it comes to this method of creating the UDIM illusion. Similarly, we know that Léa is the speaker in spite of the missing direct speaker identification when Daniel's inner discourse is interrupted by: " 'Attendez-moi un peu, mon ami.' " (96) or: " 'Eh bien, mon cher, que faites-vous là? vous vous ennuyez beaucoup?' " (116). The translation of "ami" and "cher" by the androgynous "friend" and "dear" would be inadequate to help the reader identify the speakers.

The importance of this type of morphological compensation for the private communication effect created by the elimination of *verba dicendi* is illustrated when Daniel has finally given up his lecherous plans and is about to take leave of Léa. We can use the feminine ending in "amie" to identify the hapless lover as the speaker when we read: " 'Bonsoir, mon amie.' " but just down the page the absence of *verba dicendi* is not compensated by such morphological means: "'Au revoir.' 'Au revoir.' " (122). It is impossible to tell who is the initiator of this dialogue segment, and the respective identities of the speakers remain unknown. This is naturally unimportant in this case, but this and the above-mentioned examples illustrate how powerful a tool inflections can be in the indirect presentation of UDIM dialogue: Dujardin does not use this morphological method to its fullest, but its potential is obvious even from what we see in *Les Lauriers sont coupés.*

In at least one instance Dujardin eliminates *verba dicendi* in dialogue without providing or relying on any immediate means of communicative compensation. This occurs when two male interlocutors--Daniel and Hénart--suddenly bump into each other in the street:

> "Bonjour." "Bonjour. Vous rentrez chez vous?" "Oui. Vous vous portez bien?... Vous allez de ce côté?" "Oui; je vous accompagnerai jusqu'à Saint-Augustin." "Très bien. Et quoi de nouveau?" "Rien, rien encore." Je me réjouis de le revoir; un très ancien, très honnête, très cordial ami; très convenable; gentleman; j'aurais en lui de la confiance; très honnête; très cordial. Nous marchons au long du boulevard. Il est bien de sa personne, sans affectations. Où allait-il? Je le lui demande. "Vous n'allez point par ce chemin chez vous?"(53)

Only after reading the last remark do we know that the initiator of this dialogue was Daniel, since only one of them was going home (cf. above), and it was obviously not Hénart. However, all this reconstruction of "who is who" is retrospective, and it therefore requires considerable recursive reading, which makes the information (*fabula*) recovery process that much more difficult. Thus, for a considerable period of time the reader feels truly excluded from what appears to be private communication, i.e., for a time Dujardin's quasi-mimetic goal displaces the informatory goal. In a way this is quite understandable, especially in light of Dujardin's experimental goals, because according to the UDIM premise of eavesdropping on a private thought process, we should expect not to understand certain things at all. However, as already mentioned before, Dujardin does not seek to make the reader's task difficult in any major way, which makes this example a rare exception in *Les Lauriers sont coupés.*

Abbreviation v. Expansion

Having considered the similarity between devices used by Dujardin in order to create the private communication illusion on the one hand and elements of real spontaneous oral discourse on the other, we may conclude that private communication is not necessarily always more compact than such forms of public communication as writing. The presence of repetition, message repair, copy pronouns and copy nouns in spontaneous oral discourse contradicts Vygotsky's claim that dialogue--and by extension inner speech--always requires fewer words than written discourse (cf. above). As E. Ochs observes,

> the use of repetition and other hesitation phenomena, word

> replacement and other forms of afterthought and repair lead to lengthy formulations of particular social acts. We find that, in relatively unplanned discourse, the expression of social acts tends to take up more discourse "space"... than in planned discourse. That is the same social act verbalized in planned discourse will be more compact than the unplanned version.[59]

On the other hand, Ochs's own above-mentioned examples of the Ref+Prop constructions, the Referent deletion tendencies and nominal phrases indicate that discourse abbreviation also characterizes spontaneous oral and therefore unplanned, private discourse. This means that both Vygotsky and Ochs are partially right: certain elements of spontaneous oral discourse are less wordy and some are more wordy than writing.

By incorporating both discourse abbreviation and expansion tendencies of real spontaneous discourse into his thinker's inner speech, Dujardin strives to distance his text from narrative writing and discourse planning, thereby stressing the spontaneous and private nature of Daniel's UDIM. Ochs sums up the link between such literary texts as *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and elements of spontaneous oral discourse:

> There are cases in which a speaker or a writer will intentionally produce discourse that appears unplanned. For example, a novelist trying to recreate a casual situational

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[59] E. Ochs, p. 72.

> context will use many of the features (e.g., left-dislocation, deletion, hesitations) of unplanned discourse in his story. In fact we regard a novelist highly if she or he is able successfully to reproduce such verbal spontaneity."[60]

Conclusion

Much of what has been written about Dujardin's innovative text tends to be rather negative.[61] Critics justifiably like to point out the inconsistencies and the violations of the UDIM premise in *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. This is why I have chosen to concentrate instead on Dujardin's achievements, which centre around the rendering of Daniel's sensorimotor experience *in actu*. C. D. King adopts the most fair and conciliatory tone in his discussion of the novel, when he points out that "Dujardin's book is modest, but rich in potential..."[62] This rich potential was in fact realized by Joyce who perfected and expanded Dujardin's innovations, as well as by other authors, such as Schnitzler and (indirectly) Larbaud (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). As M. Friedman points out: "The germ of nearly all the techniques used after him, in the modern novel, is found in *Les Lauriers sont coupés*..."[63]

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[60] E. Ochs, p. 77.

[61] L. E. Bowling, pp. 349-365.

[62] C. D. King, "Édouard Dujardin and the Genesis of the Inner Monologue," *French Studies* 9 (1955), p. 113.

[63] M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: a Study in Literary Method*, p. 158.

However, the difference between Joyce's and Dujardin's text, apart from the technical level, has to do with the fact that Joyce, unlike his French predecessor, had something to say. Dujardin was concerned exclusively with the "how" of interior monologue, totally ignoring the "what." Thus, Dujardin's text can be viewed as a quasi-incomplete sign: a signifier virtually bereft of a literarily *significant* signified. At the same time, given that Dujardin was a symbolist, M. Friedman does not view this necessarily as a defect: "[...]Dujardin must be given enormous credit for suggesting a way of writing a novel which had less to do with the development of event and character than with the accumulation of image and symbolic *device*." (my italics)[64] And yet, whether or not one appreciates the symbolist merits of *Les Lauriers sont coupés* or its experimental nature, I would suggest that even though Garshin's "Four Days" is less innovative and technically less interesting than Dujardin's novel, its overall impact is incomparably greater. We can almost conclude that a work, such as *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* is less a form of literature than a form of stylized literary theory.

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[64] M. Friedman, "The Symbolist Novel: Huysmans to Malraux," p. 455.

Introduction

In 1900, thirteen years after the publication of Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* Arthur Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* appeared in the Christmas supplement of the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse.*[1] It is a technically impressive present-tense UDIM coming from the mind of Gustl, an Austrian army lieutenant who becomes involved in a quarrel with a baker at a concert. Having decided that challenging the baker to a duel is impossible because the military code of behavior does not allow duels with civilians, Gustl comes to the incredible realization that he must commit suicide in order to avoid losing his officer's honor. The chivalric notion of military honor and the superiority of the military class over the civilians is an idée fixe in Gustl's mind, and, as K. Laermann points out, it is historically accurate:

> Tel était le cas en Autriche vers 1900, dans la mesure où l'on concédait à l'armée et au corps des officiers en particulier un droit qui lui accordait un statut spécial équivalant à un accroissement de son pouvoir dans la société.... Celui qui vit selon ce code de l'honneur vit dangereusement. Car il doit être toujours prêt à assumer des risques. Mais les choses tournent mal pour lui lorsqu'il se voit confronté à des membres d'autres groupes sociaux et qu'il ne peut s'imposer

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[1] T. W. and B. W. Alexander, "Schnitzler's 'Leutnant Gustl' and Dujardin's 'Les Lauriers sont coupés'," *Modern Austrian Literature,* 2 (1969), p. 7.

> par rapport à eux... parce que ceux-ci ne peuvent donner satisfaction par les armes... Schnitzler a critiqué la substance fragile de ce code de l'honneur... dans *Sous-lieutenant Gustl*...[2]

Most of the UDIM, which covers one night, consists of Gustl's inner struggle regarding the painful decision to kill himself. His thought progresses in a purely associative manner, and as a result the agonizing lieutenant not only inadvertently exposes the ridiculously outdated code of honor in the Austro-Hungarian military, but also frequently digresses from his main point of concern, giving us glimpses of his chauvinistic and narrow-minded opinions, his amoral and selfish behavior, his childhood memories and ultimately, in microcosm, the anachronistic "medieval" mentality of the ruling classes in the declining Habsburg empire. Finally, having firmly decided on suicide, Gustl finds out in the morning that the baker has suddenly died of a stroke. We leave the lieutenant's UDIM when, triumphant, he is having breakfast and already looking forward to a duel arranged prior to the incident with the baker, demonstrating that this experience has taught him absolutely nothing: "... na wart', mein Lieber, wart', mein Lieber! Ich bin grad' gut aufgelegt... Dich hau' ich zu Krenfleisch!"[3]

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[2] K. Laermann, "Spiel im Morgengrauen" in *Arthur Schnitzler: actes du colloque* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983), pp. 38-9. F. Kuna, on the other hand, stresses the Freudian implication of "Leutnant Gustl" and points out that "the story's importance lies not so much in its outspoken social criticism, exploring as it does the clichés and sickness of a conventional mind, as in its adaptation of psycho-analytical methods--as Freud had outlined in *Studies in Hysteria* (1895) and *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899)--for literary purposes." F. Kuna, "Vienna and Prague: 1890-1928" in *Modernism*, M. Bradbury and J. MacFarlane eds. (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1976), p. 126.

Schnitzler's text is similar to Garshin's UDIM in that both are bitter anti-militarist statements directed at a declining empire characterized by outdated social structures and ideologies. However, whereas "Four Days" delivers its message by such direct means as the naturalistic presentation of the horrors of war, as well as a moral conflict in the thinker's mind, *Leutnant Gustl* makes its impact via the much less direct route of satiric irony and author-thinker distance. In spite of these two different approaches, the two texts elicited similar reactions from the authorities of the two respective authoritarian societies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Garshin's text was withdrawn by the Ministry of Public Education from schools and public libraries for being anti-patriotic.[4] The publication of *Leutnant Gustl* cost Schnitzler his commission as a reserve officer, and, as T. W. and B. W. Alexander point out, "part of the action of the military against Schnitzler was based on the fact that he failed to challenge the author of a denunciatory article in the *Reichswehr* to a duel."[5] This last detail was an indication that Schnitzler's fictional lieutenant represented quite accurately the mentality satirized in the story, and the reception of the Russian and Austrian UDIM's was simply an extra-literary confirmation of the point being made by both texts.

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[3] A. Schnitzler, *Meistererzählungen* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1950), p. 176 (All subsequent page numbers will refer to this edition).

[4] Cf. P. Henry, p. 52

The UDIM form is turned into a potent tool of satire and implicit authorial irony in *Leutnant Gustl* because the self-communication premise implies a potential for maximal honesty of opinion. T. Yacobi sums up the UDIM thinker's position:

> The monologist... is locked into the privacy of his or her own mind and totally unaware of being exposed to outside reception, scrutiny or judgement. This unknowing exposure to view, itself ironic, carries the mediation-gap to a limit rich in possibilities of further irony by self-exposure. The monologist is the most vulnerable of fictional reflectors when and because he thinks himself safest: he has nobody to provide for or to guard against, and nothing to hide or wrap up.[6]

Unimpeded by any externally-oriented concerns about the impression that he may make, i.e., unafraid of being judged as antisocial, the lieutenant exposes in spite of himself the baseness of his own mentality and that of his class — the military. The spontaneity and directness of his inadvertent "self-flagellation" would be more difficult to achieve and/or motivate in conventional narrative. For example, this totally frank anti-Semitic thought flashes through and quickly disappears from Gustl's mind as he prepares to leave the concert hall just before the confrontation with the baker: "Die da ist nett... Wie sie mich anschaut!... O ha, mein Fräulein, ich möcht' schon!... O, die Nase!—Jüdin... Noch eine... Es ist doch fabelhaft, da sind auch die Hälfte Juden... nicht einmal ein Oratorium kann man mehr in Ruhe genießen..."(154) To quote B. Surowska, UDIM is used by Schnitzler for the "Demaskierung einer Situation und der Natur eines Menschen, der selber nichts begreift bzw. nichts begreifen will."[7]

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[5] T. W. and B. W. Alexander, p. 8

[6] T. Yacobi, "Narrative Structure and Fictional Mediation," *Poetics Today,* 8:2 (1987), p. 338.

It is important to note that the success of the satiric/ironic effect is dependent on what W. Booth refers to as "moral distance" between the narrator ("thinker" in this case) on the one hand and the author/reader on the other, i.e., the author's implicit condemnation of his/her character is supposed to be shared by the reader.[8] Schnitzler's above-mentioned punishment by some powerful "readers" in the Austrian military for writing this text illustrates what happens when the moral distance between the author and his/her thinker does not correspond to that between the thinker and the reader.

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[7] B. Surowska, "Schnitzlers innerer Monolog in Verhältnis zu Dujardin und Dostojewski" in *Theatrum Europaeum* Richard Brinkmann ed. (München: Fink, 1982), p. 553.

[8] W. C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: The

The spontaneous honesty with which Gustl verbalizes the prejudices of his class is paralleled by his naively serious attitude toward the quixotic code of honor characterizing the Austrian military at the turn of the century. For example, the Lieutenant's decision to commit suicide after being insulted by the baker is followed by the following digression:

> Es gibt ja Leut', die's leichter nähmen... Gott, was gibt's für Menschen!... Dem Ringeimer hat ein Fleischselcher, wie er ihn mit seiner Frau erwischt hat, eine Ohrfeige gegeben, und er hat quittiert und sitzt irgendwo auf'm Land und hat geheiratet... Daß es Weiber gibt, die so einen Menschen heiraten!... — Meiner Seel', ich gäb' ihm nicht de Hand, wenn er wieder nach Wien käm'... Also, hast's gehört, Gustl: — aus, aus, abgeschlossen mit dem Leben! Punktum und Streusand drauf!... (159)

Thus, Schnitzler's thinker with his incredible notions of honor is clearly a ridiculous figure in spite of himself, and with respect to

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University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 156. One of the most famous examples of an author counting on a moral distance between his readers and his narrator for an ironic effect is Swift's *A Modest Proposal.*

his decision to end his life because a baker has called him "dummer Bub" (155) M. Vanhelleputte points out that "Gustls Überreizheit ist ihrer Ursache so wenig angemessen, daß sie ihn in den Augen des aufmerksamen Lesers ganz lächerlich macht."[9] Discussing the wider implications of Schnitzler's satire, Vanhelleputte goes on to say that

> bei näherem Zusehen erweisen sich Schnitzlers Ironisierung des Duells und seine Betonung der allzu menschlichen Aspekte der Todesangst eines Offiziers in Friedenszeiten als bloße Teilaspekte einer allgemeinen moralischen Herabsetzung der politisch einflußreichsten Kräfte im Wien seiner Zeit, nämlich der tonangebenden militärischen, antisemitischen und antisozialistischen Kreise.[10]

Consequently, Gustl is a typically *satiric* character in that he represents not just himself, but a specific extrafictional social group being criticized by the author. At the same time he is a classically *comic* character in the Bergsonian sense of the term with respect to his decision to commit suicide. In his *Le Rire* Bergson argues that in comedy humor is derived from observing rigid or mechanical behavior that ignores its objective circumstances. The comically rigid character resembles a marionette in his/her inflexibility and yet retains all of his/her human characteristics: a contrast, which makes him/her an outcast, an oddball and object of ridicule. This inability to adapt, to deviate from a fixed program of behavior, such as a military code of honor, no matter how inappropriate this behavior might be, elicits the laughter response in the observer (reader or audience):

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[9] M. Vanhelleputte, "Der Leutnant und der Tod. Betrachtungen zu einem Schnitzlerischen Thema," in *Littérature et culture allemandes*, R. Goffin, M. Vanhelleputte and M. Weyembergh-Boussart eds. (Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1985), pp. 220-21.

[10] M. Vanhelleputte, pp. 228-29. Also cf. K. Laermann, pp. 38-39.

> Est comique le personnage qui suit automatiquement son chemin sans se soucier de prendre contact avec les autres. Le rire est là pour corriger sa distraction et pour le tirer de son rêve... Telle doit être la fonction du rire. Toujours un peu humiliant pour celui qui en est l'objet, le rire est véritablement une espèce de brimade sociale.[11]

However, since Gustl is unaware of being observed, no "brimade sociale" for his rigid and antisocial mind-set can play the role of behavioral corrector, which compounds the comic effect, since the thinker persists in his marionette-like reasoning process with absolute honesty until the very end.

Dujardin's Daniel Prince also inadvertently exposes himself and becomes an object of ridicule through author/reader v. narrator (thinker) distance. However, satire, which can often give a great boost to the overall humorous effect of a story, is not a major factor in Dujardin's UDIM. If there are any satiric elements in Daniel's character, they are quite vague, and it would be difficult to argue that the object of Dujardin's ridicule is anyone but his foppish thinker.[12]

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[11] H. Bergson, *Le Rire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1940), pp. 102-3.

Another important difference between the two texts has to do with the choice of subject matter. The story behind Prince's UDIM is so banal that it can hardly compare with the gripping suspense produced by the life-and-death choice in Gustl's situation. As B. Surowska points out,

> Während jedoch die Geschichte Dujardins ziemlich monoton erscheint, füllt Schnitzler die seine mit sprudelndem Leben. Er beschäftigt sich nicht mit so banalen Problemen wie die erfüllte oder nicht erfüllte sinnliche Begierde eines jungen Mannes an einem Frühlingstag. Dujardin bereitet uns von Anfang an auf keinen ernstzunehmenden Konflikt vor. [...] Für Schnitzlers Stoff paßt die Form des inneren Monologs viel besser, da er im Gustl und später in Fräulen Else tiefe seelische Konflikte und innere Dramen zu gestalten hat.[13]

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[12] As M. H. Abrams points out, "[satire] differs from the comic in that comedy evokes laughter mainly as an end in itself, while satire "derides"; that is, it uses laughter as a weapon, and against a butt existing outside the work itself." *A Glossary of Literary Terms,* 4h ed. (New York: Holt Rinehart, 1981), p. 167.

[13] B. Surowska, p. 553.

Furthermore, as pointed out in the beginning of Chapter 3, the advantage of present-tense UDIM in the presence of mortal danger to the thinker, i.e., the "tiefe seelische Konflikte und innere Dramen" mentioned by Surowska, is maximal potential for suspense: while the death of a retrospectively-oriented conventional personal narrator is usually ruled out by the narrative act itself, no such guarantee is offered by the here-and-now discourse of a UDIM thinker who confronts his fate right before our eyes.

Finally, even though Dujardin was ultimately preoccupied only with the UDIM form, his use of devices aimed at the UDIM illusion is considerably less consistent than Schnitzler's technique. As a result, the reader is far more convinced of eavesdropping on Gustl's thoughts than on those of Daniel Prince. Although Schnitzler saw these differences between his own UDIM and that of his French colleague, he did not neglect to acknowledge his "formal" debt to Dujardin in a 1901 letter to G. Brandes: "Ich freue mich, daß Sie die Novelle von Lieutnant Gustl amüsiert hat... Mir... wurde der erste Anlaß zu der Form durch eine Geschichte von Dujardin gegeben, betitelt *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. Nur daß dieser Autor für seine Form nicht den rechten Stoff zu finden wußte."[14] And indeed, formally, the French and German DIM's have much in common, especially because virtually all the devices related to spontaneous oral communication present in Dujardin's text have their counterparts in Schnitzler's story and serve the same role as in *Les Lauriers sont coupés*: creating the illusion of private communication (cf. Ch. 4).

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[14] Quoted by B. Surowska, p. 552. Dujardin, on the other hand, ignored Schnitzler in subsequent discussions of DIM just as he never mentioned Garshin (Surowska, p. 552).

Spontaneous Oral Discourse Elements in Gustl's UDIM: Syntactic Dimension

Reliance on context at the expense of syntax--resulting in discourse abbreviation, structural "awkwardness" and the impression that the standard of narratorial cohesion is being violated--can be felt virtually everywhere in Schnitzler's UDIM. Ref+Prop constructions (cf. Chapter 4) abound: "Ein braver Kerl, der Kopetzky!" (149) or "... doch kein leerer Wahn, das Frühstücken!" (174) We find numerous instances of copy noun and copy pronoun use: "Weil sie mitsingt, hat *er* auch das Billett gehabt, *der Kopetzky...*" (149, my italics) or "... *die Maretti* neulich in der 'Madame Sans-Gêne'—siebenunddreißig Jahr ist *sie,* und sieht aus..."(151, my italics) or "ich könnt' schwören: der Libitzky und der Wermutek und *der schäbige Stellvertreter, der* hat sie auch g'habt... Aber *die Frau Mannheimer...* ja, *das* wär' was anders..." (163, my italics)

Theme or Referent dropping--another typical manifestation of reliance on context rather than syntax and a characteristic element of documented oral spontaneous discourse--is very widespread: "Was guckt mich denn der Kerl dort immer an? Mir scheint, der merkt daß ich mich langweil' und nicht herg'hör'... Ich möcht' Ihnen raten, ein etwas weniger freches Gesicht zu machen, sonst stell'ich Sie mir nachher im Foyer!—[missing Theme]->Schaut schon weg!..." (150). Very often Gustl drops Theme elements consisting of grammatical "dummy" subjects, such as "es": "Gibt ja überhaupt nichts anderes... gibt nichts anderes..." (157) or more important parts of speech, such as adverbs: "Das da hinter mir, das muß das zweite Kaffeehaus sein... bin ich im vorigen Sommer auch einmal gewesen..." (162) or pronouns: "Und dann hat sie mir einmal eine Ansichtskarte aus Belgrad geschickt... auch eine schöne Gegend!" (150) Especially common in Gustl's discourse is the elimination of the first person pronoun as sentence subject: "... ich muß grad' geträumt haben und steh' auf und zieh' den Säbel, der neben mir liegt... muß gut ausg'schaut haben" (165) or "Muß auf die Uhr schau'n..." (167) or "Möcht' in die Kirche hineingeh'n" (170).

Verba dicendi are never present in any of the exchanges that take place throughout Gustl's UDIM: "... Wo ist der Kellner? He! Da kommt er aus der Küche... 'Habe die Ehre, Herr Leutnant!' 'Guten Morgen' 'So früh heute, Herr Leutnant?' 'Ah, lassen S' nur—ich hab' nicht viel Zeit, ich kann mit'm Mantel dasitzen.' 'Was befehlen Herr Leutnant?' " (174) And Repetition is found throughout the text, this element of spontaneous oral discourse being especially prominent because the thinker is quite reasonably expected to *dwell* on the subject of his upcoming death:

> Wär' so das Gescheiteste!... Das gescheiteste? Das Gescheiteste?—Gibt ja überhaupt nichts anderes... gibt nichts anderes... Ja, es wär' doch das Vernünftigste... schon wegen morgen... Ja, natürlich—wegen morgen.... Unsinn! Unsinn! Kein Mensch weiß was, kein Mensch weiß was... Dummer Bub—Dummer Bub" (157) or: "sterben muß ich, darum ist es alles eins—sterben muß ich..." (165).

Repetition is most appropriate in the following example where we witness Gustl's jubilation at the news of the baker's stroke: "Tot ist er—tot ist er!... Also tot ist er—tot ist er!" (175). This device, as it is used by Dujardin and Schnitzler, is a discourse feature that is especially atypical of written discourse and conventional narration where, as Beaugrande points out, it lowers informativity (cf. Chapters 1 and 4).

Nominal phrases are very frequently used to convey the thinker's visual experience, which sometimes interrupts his flow of internal reflection:

> "... der Franziski ist der einzige im Regiment, der stärker als ich... *Die Aspenbrücke...* Wie weit renn' ich denn noch?" (159) "Na, alles mögliche wird er sich denken; aber daß der herr Leutnant im Prater übernachtet hat, das, meiner Seel' das nicht... *Ah, die Vierundvierziger*! zur Schießstätte marschieren s'..." (169) "*Orgel—Gesang—hm!* was ist denn das?" (171) "...so? doch besser im Freien... *Licht*..." (171, my italics)

As these last few examples illustrate, in addition to the thinker's reliance on nominal phrases for the self-communication of sensory information, another element of spontaneous oral discourse foreign to written narration is frequently observed in Gustl's monologue: unfinished syntactic constructions--a device which is virtually absent from Dujardin's text but one which is very much indicative of unplanned and unpolished verbalization. Here is an example of this phenomenon in real oral interaction recorded by K. Lambrecht (also note the use of the copy pronoun): "...mais quand on l'a vu, alors la famille de Bill... évidemment, son frère (T), il fait deux cent et quelques pounds."[15] Macaulay's research also provides several examples of unfinished constructions in real spontaneous oral discourse, e.g., "But they you'd see them everybody was ah these storekeepers if there's policemen I never knew any policemen here but there might have been at one time told the people to keep back off because the cattle 'ud be along."[16]

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[15] K. Lambrecht, p. 239.

Gustl's chaotic thoughts constantly interrupt each other as he struggles to come to grips with his plight or simply digresses about this and that. For example, before the incident with the baker who grabbed the lieutenant's sword and dishonored him, as Gustl's mind operates in a kind of "associative drift" (see below), the following syntactically unfinished construction stresses the structurelessness of the thinker's discourse, i.e., its non-narratorial and internally communicative nature: "Überhaupt, daß sie noch immer so viel Juden zu Offizieren machen--da pfeif' ich auf'n ganzen Antisemitismus! Neulich in der Gesellschaft, wo die G'schicht' mit dem Doktor passiert ist bei den Mannheimers... die Mannheimer selber sollen ja auch Juden sein, getauft natürlich..."(150) The reference to the lieutenant's quarrel with the doctor is interrupted associatively, and the thinker's associative stream does not bring him back to the incident until two pages later. Now "die G'schicht' mit dem Doktor" is finally revealed as Gustl mentally rages against the above-mentioned physician who dared to suggest "daß nicht alle Ihre Kameraden zum Militär gegangen sind, ausschließlich um das Vaterland zu verteidigen!»" Gustl's outrage is so strong that for an instant it leaves him "mentally speechless," which is suggested by the following unfinished syntactic construction: "So eine Frechheit! Gewiß ein Sozialist! Die Rechtsverdreher sind doch heutzutag' alle Sozialisten! Eine Bande..." (152)

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[16] M. I. Macaulay, p. 192.

A similar type of unfinished syntactic construction, which could be suggestive of "mental speechlessness," marks Gustl's anguish over the incident with the baker: "Nein, ich muß den Verstand verloren gehabt haben, sonst hätt' ich mit der anderen Hand... Aber da hätt' er [the baker — V.T.] ja meinen Säbel herausgezogen..." (156). In the same way an unfinished syntactic construction indicates Gustl's inability to bring himself to verbalize the link between the baker's action and his own inevitable suicide: "Merkwürdig, ich kann mir's gar nicht vorstellen, daß der Kerl, der immer da hinten sitzt an der Wand, derselbe sein soll, der mich..." (173) And as Gustl imagines what will occur after his suicide, an unfinished construction is once again used to stress the lieutenant's horror, which seems to prevent him from finishing his frightening thought: "Weiter ist ja nichts zu überlegen. Im Zimmer schieß ich mich tot, und dann is basta! Montag is die Leich'..." (163). Thus, whether for the purpose of creating a "mental speechlessness" effect with respect to unpleasant thoughts or simply indicating the disorganized (internally-communicative) nature of his protagonist's thoughts, which interrupt each other in an associative drift, Schnitzler frequently relies on syntactically unfinished constructions suggestive of private communication and the violation of narratorial cohesion.

Another syntactic device, which is virtually absent from Dujardin's text but is used very frequently by Schnitzler in this text for the private communication effect, is the violation of neutral word order. Typical written discourse and especially conventional *narrative* are characterized by neutral or unmarked word order for the most part, whereas marked word order is more common in spontaneous oral speech--especially when it is emotionally charged. When it comes to main clause syntax, German is an SVO language, i.e., its typical unmarked word order is Subject-Verb-Object:[17] a sequence which is often changed in spontaneous oral discourse. Here is an example from real interaction recorded in a cafeteria by W. Herrman: "Gulaschsuppe *nehm'* ich *heut*!" (my italics)[18]

And the ordering of inner speech elements is thought to be even more different from formal grammar by E. Tarasov and N. Ufimtseva who distinguish "the grammar of thought" from the traditional notion of grammar. Citing the work of K. Goldstein, they write:

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[17] D. Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 98.

[18] W. Herrmann, "Standardsituationen: Thesen und Beispiele," in *Sprachtheorie und Pragmatik: Akten des 10. Linguistischen Kolloquiums, Tübingen, 1975, Band I*, H. Weber and H. Weydt eds. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1976) p. 198.

> ... [Goldstein] assumes that thought is patterned in the form of a sentence. However, the order of thought sequence in such a sentence is in no way similar to that in the sentences of a given language; at least there is no one-to-one correspondence between the various parts of a thought pattern and the words of a sentence pronounced out loud.[19]

Therefore, communicative privacy, whether observable, as in the case of spontaneous oral discourse, or hidden, as in the case of inner speech, appears to be associated with the violation of *unmarked* (formal) word order.

Gustl's use of *marked* word order, suggestive of private communication, is very widespread in the text. In the following passage, where Gustl recalls his first sexual experience, the marked word order distances this reminiscence from narratorial syntax:

> Aber ewig diese Menscher... und so jung hab' ich ang'fangen--ein Bub war ich ja noch, wie ich damals den ersten Urlaub gehabt hab' und in Graz bei den Eltern zu Haus war... der Riedl

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[19] E. Tarasov and N. Ufimtseva, "Znakovyie oposredovateli myshleniia" in *Issldedovaniie rechevogo myshleniia v psikholingvistike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 62 (my translation).

> war auch dabei--eine Böhmin ist es gewesen... die muß doppelt so alt gewesen sein wie ich--in der Früh bin ich erst nach Haus gekommen... (163)

Here are some other examples from the Lieutenant's UDIM: " Lang' war ich schon nicht in der Oper." (149), "Reserveleutnant soll er auch sein!" (150), "Kein Wort Deutsch hat sie verstanden, aber das war auch nich notwending..." (151), "Wo ist denn das hübsche Mädel? Ah, dort... am Geländer steht sie..." (154), "... wie in einem Schraubstock ist mein Hals" (167), "Zu fad ist es mir geworden" (167). In all these cases the most important element, i.e., the thought uppermost in Gustl's mind, is placed in initial position, which--as part of the private communication effect--suggests an unplanned, unpolished thought process. The implication is that the thinker has not organized his discourse, as he would for external communication, and we witness each discourse element in the order in which it appears in Gustl's mind.

Such changes from neutral to marked word order are referred to by B. Uspensky as "functional sentence perspective, that is a correlation between what is given and what is new" where the positioning of syntactic elements reflects the Theme-Rheme relationship in the mind of the speaker (thinker in our case).[20] In the above-cited excerpts with marked word order the first element (word or phrase) acts as a Rheme, and its privileged position reflects its importance, relative to the rest of the sentence (Theme), in the thinker's mind. This contributes to the creation of the illusion of the "mimesis" of private thought characterized by grammar for the self rather than conventional narratorial grammar for a public addressee. In this connection it is especially interesting to note T. Akhutina's discussion of real inner speech:

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[20] B. Uspensky, *A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form,* trans. V.

> The child [at the two-word utterance stage] uses the first word to indicate information that is most important to him/her, while the second word is used for less important information. It is quite natural to assume that such semantic organization does not disappear when the child acquires new forms of syntactic construction; instead it goes 'underground' and becomes a later form of text organization.[21]

Therefore, in light of these assumptions from psychology, the prominence of Rheme elements in Gustl's marked word order as part of Schnitzler's "mimesis" of self-communication on the one hand, and Vygotsky's discussion of Rheme dominance in real inner speech (Chapter 2) on the other, are probably indicative of a basic characteristic of private communication: be it in real thought,

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Zavarin and S. Wittig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 18.

[21] T. Akhutina, p. 107 (my translation).

spontaneous oral discourse or literary "recreation" of inner discourse.

Gustl's Discourse Abbreviation: Morphological Dimension

Vygotsky's research and theories concern discourse abbreviation and modification during inner speech mainly in terms of syntax, e.g., predicative speech or Theme-dropping. Similarly, most of the research cited in Ch. 4 regarding the abbreviation trends in real spontaneous oral discourse has to do with syntactic phenomena: the essence of E. Ochs's premise concerns the relationship between syntax and context in oral interaction. And it is mainly these syntactic phenomena that we find in Dujardin's UDIM as it attempts to create the illusion of private communication and appears to violate Beaugrande's and Dressler's standard of cohesion with respect to conventional narrative (cf. Chapters 1 and 4). Schnitzler goes a step further and introduces discourse abbreviation on the morphological level as well, making Gustl's verbalization sound that much more private. For example, this is how Gustl reacts to the baker's insult (the catalyst for the rest of the story): "Was hat er *g'sagt*? Mir scheint, ich *träum'*! *Red't* er wirklich zu mir? Ich *sollt'* was antworten..." (155 my italics)

This sort of morphological abbreviation process, occurring consistently throughout Gustl's entire UDIM, is quite typical of the private communication situation characterizing real spontaneous oral German speech--especially in certain dialects--and, conversely, is very unlikely to occur in written narrative discourse. Here is part of a dialogue between two German students recorded by W. Herrmann in a Bayreuth cafeteria: " K: Ja, ich *hätt'* gern (zeigt auf die Speisekarte) "Kasseler Rippenspeer... K: (zu G2, der an einem anderen Tisch sitzt) Was *is'n* das (zeigt auf den neben G2 liegenden Hut) *für'n* Suppentopf, he!... / G1: (zu K) Ä — Gulaschsuppe *nehm'* ich *heut'*!" (my italics)[22]

Thus, in accordance with the premises outlined in Chapter 4, the presence of this phenomenon in Gustl's UDIM reinforces the private communication effect sought by the author. From the very beginning Gustl's inner discourse manifests this type of morphological abbreviation, as can be seen from many of the passages already cited above. Here are the thoughts of the boorish protagonist who, completely bored by the performance at the concert, tries to convince himself that he likes it:

Bravo, bravo! Jetzt wird's doch bald aus sein?—Ja, jetzt steht

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[22] W. Herrmann, p. 198. Also cf. H. Brinkmann, "Reduktion in gesprochener und geschriebener Rede," in *Gesprochene Sprache, Jahrbuch 1972* (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1974), pp. 144-62.

> die ganze G'sellschaft da droben auf... [missing Theme]->sieht sehr gut aus—imposant!—[nominal phrase]->Orgel auch?... Orgel hab' ich sehr gern... So, das laß' ich mir g'fall'n—sehr schön! Es ist wirklich wahr, man sollt' öfter in Konzerte gehen... Wunderschön ist's g'wesen, werd' ich dem Kopetzky sagen... Werd' ich ihn heut' im Kaffeehaus treffen?... Heiß wird's! Noch immer nicht aus?" (150-51)

As the UDIM opens at the concert, it soon becomes clear that Gustl is an ardent dueller and is far more interested in contemplating his upcoming duel with the Doctor than listening to the music. In order to demonstrate Gustl's stupidity, namely, the fact that his harrowing brush with death teaches the lieutenant nothing about the ridiculous code of honor in the military, Schnitzler presents his protagonist's mental threats against the Doctor on the first and on the last pages of the text. The circle is thus closed with the end returning to the beginning. In both cases morphological abbreviation is found in almost every other word: "Warten S' nur, Herr Doktor, Ihnen wird's vergeh'n, solche Bemerkungen zu machen!" (149) and: "... na wart', mein Lieber, wart', mein Lieber<-[repetition]! Ich bin grad' gut aufgelegt... Dich hau' ich zu Krenfleisch!" (176).

Immediately noticeable in the morphological abbreviation patterns of Gustl's UDIM is the fact that in virtually all cases vowels and not consonants are eliminated. In this respect it is interesting to note that here too the spontaneous oral discourse model--which is characterized by the same vowel reduction tendency--may provide a possible connection with inner speech research. The Soviet psychologist B. G. Ananiev observed young children learning to write and, looking at their mistakes, noted that vowels were much more likely than consonants to be left out. This tendency, which is a well known fact in reading/writing research, is observed during what C. Weaver refers to as the early phonemic stage. Weaver has recorded the following examples of vowel-reduction by five-year-olds and first-graders: "RCRBKD [Our car broke down]... MBEWWMLNT [My Baby was with me last night]... TR WS A BT A FL HS [There was a beautiful house]."[23] Ananiev sees this as one of the fundamental discourse abbreviation characteristics of inner speech: "... the dephonation of inner speech occurs to a certain extent as a result of vowel reduction... and therefore, in the process of such a silent--but nevertheless discursive--activity that is writing initial omissions of vowels are unavoidable."[24] Writing, apart from sign languages, is *the only truly observable form of*

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[23] C. Weaver, *Reading Process and Practice: From Psycholinguistics to Whole Language* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books, 1988), pp. 185-87.

[24] B. G. Ananiev, pp. 364-65 (my translation). Cf. R. Jakobson, *Izbrannyie Raboty,* p. 50.

silent discourse, and preschoolers who have not yet learned completely the difference between private and public communication may give us a glimpse of certain characteristics of inner speech, such as vowel dropping. Later on in the child's development, as Weaver points out, during what she calls the *letter-name stage* "vowel sounds are represented as well as consonant sounds."[25] If we follow Ananiev's reasoning, we must assume that as children gain more control over their writing ability, and as they differentiate more and more between private and public communication, they transfer less and less their vowel reduction tendency from inner speech onto paper.

These vowel-reduction tendencies in Schnitzler's text, in children's writing and possibly in inner speech are probably related to the fact that German, English and most Indo-European languages are consonant-based, and, as J. Renaud points out, "dans la plupart des langues alphabétiques indo-européennes, les voyelles ont un rôle secondaire dans l'indication de la signification d'un mot[...]"[26]

Self-Guiding Interior Dialogue as a Plot Development Mechanism in Gustl's UDIM

One of the most striking features of Gustl's UDIM is that much (if not most) of it is in the form of *interior dialogue,* which means that a significant proportion of Gustl's thought develops *as the result* of an internal conversation. And given that the main focus of the text is Gustl's thought progression, i.e., each thought constitutes a mental "event," interior dialogue acts as an important mechanism of plot development in *Leutnant Gustl.* The lieutenant's private dialogue involves questions and answers, actual dramatization of interlocutors, self-address, internal polemic, mentally addressing other characters (present or absent) and other phenomena, which have already been discussed in Chapter 3 and which correspond to Rinberg's scheme of interior dialogue types. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the presence of this dialogic form motivates discursive explicitness and clarity, since dialogue evokes social and therefore external-like communicative positions: addresser and addressee constructs. At the same time the dialogic trend in Gustl's UDIM corresponds to some theoretical and experimental investigations conducted by Soviet and Western psychologists in the area of inner speech.

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[25] C. Weaver, p. 187.

[26] J. Renaud, "Le Cerveau des japonais serait différent," *Science et vie,* 1985, p. 65.

In his theoretical considerations of inner speech L. A. Radzikhovskii returns to some of Vygotsky's most basic premises about language and thought:

> Every mental function or mental process was originally formed in the consciousness of an individual, in the context of

> that individual's dialogue with other people... Thus, it follows from Vygotsky's formula that any mental function is structured as a dialogue (although, of course, it is not a copy of an external dialogue)... The most interesting description of dialogic consciousness, one that elucidates latent dialogic phenomena, is to be found not in the scientific literature, but in literature itself, in F. M. Dostoevsky. Of course, one cannot say that his descriptions are rigorously accurate scientifically, but they can be regarded as meaningful hypotheses that must be translated into the language of science and protested. Of the many phenomena Dostoevsky describes, let us take just one, the clash of motives.... From the standpoint of psychology, the following variants are possible: one motive wins out, and the other "disappears"; a third motive appears; or the person... is unable to choose between A and not-A.... It is simply that in one case the decision comes quickly ("instantaneously"), and in the other, it comes about slowly--it is preceded by a protracted struggle, by prolonged vacillations."[27]

This "protracted struggle" over "A and not-A" (the prospect of suicide) is essentially what takes place in Gustl's UDIM, and its dialogic nature is unmistakable. Throughout his UDIM Gustl considers his situation in terms of two clearly opposite positions, which can be called simply: the optimist who keeps arguing against suicide and the pessimist who opposes his counterpart's "dishonorable" position.[28] And these "interlocutors" clearly *clash* and *argue* as the lieutenant tries to determine his course of action. Here are his thoughts soon after the incident with the baker:

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[27] L. A. Radzikhovskii, "Dialogue as a Unit of Analysis of Consciousness," *Soviet Psychology* (May/June, 1991), pp. 12-13. Essentially, this is a summary of M. Bakhtin's famous polyphony theory, which was based initially on Dostoevsky's work. cf. M. Bakhtin, *Problemy poetiki Dostoievskogo* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979). Also cf. J. Dore, "Monologue as Reenvoicement of Dialogue" in *Narratives from the Crib.* K. Nelson ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 231 and R. Jakobson, *Izbrannyie Raboty,* p. 316.

> Er [the baker — V.T.] kann jedem Menschen erzählen, daß er mir das g'sagt hat!... Nein, nein, das wird er ja nicht tun, sonst hätt' er auch nicht so leise geredet... er hat auch nur wollen, daß ich es allein hör'!... Aber wer garantiert mir, daß er's nicht doch erzählt, heut' oder morgen, seiner Frau, seiner Tochter, seinen Bekannten im Kaffeehaus... (156) Was soll denn gescheh'n?... Nichts, nichts—es hat ja niemand was gehört... in dem Moment weiß niemand was... Wenn ich jetzt zu ihm in die Wohnung ginge und ihn beschwören möchte, daß er's niemanden erzählt?...—Ah, lieber gleich eine Kugel vor den Kopf, als so was!... Wär' so das Gescheiteste!... Das Gescheiteste? Das Gescheiteste?—Gibt ja überhaupt nichts anderes... Unsinn! Unsinn! Kein Mensch weiß was, kein Mensch weiß was! [...] ich weiß es doch, und das ist die Hauptsache! Ich spür', daß ich jetzt wer anderer bin, als vor einer Stunde--Ich weiß, daß ich satisfactionsunfähig bin, und darum muß ich mich totschießen (157)

Gustl is not simply pondering his situation: each statement is followed by a *negative* reaction as if coming from someone else who disagrees, which means that his thought does not develop in a straight line but is instead sent back and forth between two implicit *arguing* interlocutors.[29]

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[28] This is very similar to the optimist and the pessimist within the thinker's mind in "Four Days" where the same struggle takes place as Ivanov debates the possibility of suicide with himself (cf. Chapter 3).

In fact, the above-cited passage illustrates that the idea of suicide and Gustl's subsequent decision to kill himself appears to be actually *generated* by this internal dialectic as the "optimist" and the "pessimist" argue in an attempt to answer the question: "Was soll denn gescheh'n?". The initial reaction to this question comes from the optimist: "Nichts, nichts—es hat ja niemand was gehört... Wenn ich jetzt zu ihm in die Wohnung ginge und ihn beschwören möchte, daß er's niemanden erzählt?" However, this in turn generates an objection from the pessimist: "Ah, lieber gleich eine Kugel vor den Kopf, als so was!... Wär' so das Gescheiteste!", which seems at first to be just an *emotional* and largely figurative ("I'd rather die") reaction to the conciliatory tone of the status quo advocate. But this objection in the form of a figure of speech is immediately seized upon by the optimist who appears to view the "Kugel vor den Kopf" idea literally and is shocked by it: "Das Gescheiteste? Das Gescheiteste?" Now the thought of "literal" suicide has crystallized into a horrific realization: "Gibt ja überhaupt nichts anderes." And even though the optimist tries to hold out a little longer with the following objection: "Unsinn! Unsinn! Kein

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[29] Cf. J. Faryno's comments on dialogue in Chapter 3.

Mensch weiß was, kein Mensch weiß was!", the pessimist parries that argument and arrives at the morbid conclusion: "ich weiß es doch [...] ich [bin] satisfactionsunfähig [...] und darum muß ich mich totschießen."

This and other passages (cf. below) illustrate that interior dialogue in *Leutnant Gustl* frequently plays a problem-solving, i.e., *self-guiding* role whereby the thinker's intended course of action is actually born out of this dialectic process. This literary use of interior dialogue as a self-guiding and problem-solving mechanism for a UDIM thinker is especially noteworthy in view of data from psychology gathered by Kohlberg et al. Working from the "basic aspect of Vygotsky's view, [i. e.] his assertion of the fundamental equivalence of children's private speech and aspects of adult thought"[30] (cf. Chapter 2), Kohlberg et al. provide data in support of Radzikhovskii's theoretical hypothesis that much of inner speech is dialogic in form (cf. above), especially during problem-solving, where it plays a self-guiding role. And of course problem-solving is what Gustl's internal reflection UDIM is all about: "to be or not to be" is quite a problem indeed.

From their observations of the egocentric speech of preschoolers, i.e., following Vygotsky's methodological scheme and premises,

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[30] L. Kohlberg et al., p. 697.

Kohlberg et al. cite the following example:

> *Episode 3: Self-guidance Combined with Monologue Descriptions of Own Activity*
> *David (engaged in solitary play with tinkertoy, observer at desk at other side of room):* The wheels go here, the wheels go here. Oh, we need to start it all over again. We need to close it up. See, it closes up. We're starting it all over again. Do you know why we wanted to do that? Because I needed it to go a different way. Isn't it going to be pretty clever, don't you think? But we have to cover up the motor just like a real car.[31]

Citing G. H. Mead's work on inner speech (1934), Kohlberg et al. go on to say that

> Mead made the assumption that speech and thought always have implicit, if not explicit, dialogue forms and functions. This assumption clarifies some of the major puzzles as to the forms and functions of private speech... Early forms of private speech, in this view, should be forms in which the child mimics the external commands and comments of the adult upon his activity. With development, these replicas of the adult's responses should become more internalized, that is, silent, more guiding of action, and less dependent upon the physical presence of another person.... For the young child, the awareness of the meaning of his action to himself arises in the process of communicating it to the other... Even when the social dialogue has been internalized as thought or inner speech, Mead claimed, the speaking self and the self talked to are both social roles in a complementary relation, and the continuation of a train of thought depends upon replying to the self in the role of the other.

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[31] L. Kohlberg et al., p. 695.

> This rather abstruse notion of Mead's may be illustrated by the following example of David's speech in solitude:
> *Episode 4: Dialogue with an Absent Other*
> *(Alone in bed, after having been put to bed).* Do you know what this model plane is, Brian? It's a Cessna. Now you can have it but you can't take it home or break it or I'll get mad. Now can I go to your house and play? O.K.
> It is apparent that this dialogue is not egocentric in the Piaget sense, since it involves a clash of viewpoints between the child and his imaginary auditor.[32]

Thus, the findings and conclusions of Kohlberg et al., and especially their comment about the "clash of viewpoints" in David's interior dialogue, appear to validate not only Radzikhovskii's assumptions about dialogue and inner speech but also his implicit hypothesis (cf.

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[32] L. Kohlberg et al., pp. 703-5. cf. G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Here is another example of a real child's private dialogue cited by E. Levy: "(then) you know what we do / we (make) (?) house... and you know what we do when I play / we do something special / we get juice / we get (jui-) / (and then) you know what we do / we going outside..." E. Levy, pp. 162-63.

T. Akhutina, for example, argues that in real inner speech dialogue plays an essential role in the planning of external speech: "Inner speech expansion as a maximally creative process of meaning construction in a future utterance cannot be (cf. above statement about the dialogism of inner speech) a unilateral process of expression, i.e., only discoursification. Each internal nomination, resulting from the act of predication, is heard and checked as to its adequacy and fulness of expression. In the act of internal listening the speaker is placed in the position of a possible (or real) interlocutor and «understands what has been said» on the basis of normative linguistic (or rather usual--in common with the interlocutor) meaning." T. Akhutina, pp. 107-8 (my translation).

his reference to Dostoevsky) that certain authors appear to possess an intuitive understanding of the dialogic nature of real inner speech.

A number of passages from "Leutnant Gustl" recall Mead's above-cited view of interior dialogue in real inner speech as a mechanism used for the "*guiding of action...* [where the] continuation of a train of thought depends upon *replying to the self* in the role of the other" (my italics). As pointed out above, this reply to the self in Gustl's case tends to be a clearly *negative* reaction to a previous statement, and this polemic stresses the dialogic nature of Gustl's decision-making process even more. The most overt instances of self-guiding interior dialogue characterize Gustl's main problem-solving activity, i.e., making up his mind about the suicide: "Also, hast's gehört, Gustl:--aus, aus, abgeschlossen mit dem Leben! Punktum und Streusand drauf!... [...] Vielleicht hab' ich ihn doch nicht recht verstanden... am End' hat er ganz was anderes gesagt... [...] Nicht wahr, haha, nicht wahr!--Ich hor's ja noch..." (159) The fact that the thinker in this passage actually calls himself "Gustl" gives a clear identity to "the other," which sharpens the dialogic nature of the internal conflict taking place within Gustl's mind. In psychiatry the transformation of the "I" into a "you" is called "pronoun shifting" by H.C. Shands who views this as a self-protective device for shielding oneself from an unpleasant problem.[33] This phenomenon is also known as transferred deixes or "speaking of oneself as of another."

This self-guiding interior dialogue--self-guiding because it is an attempt to guide the self toward the best course of action--can be observed throughout the UDIM as Gustl debates the idea of suicide with his internal interlocutor: "Ich hab' ja nichts anderes zu tun, als meinen Revolver zu laden und... <-[unfinished syntactic construction] Gustl, Gustl, mir scheint, du glaubst noch immer nicht recht dran? Komm' nur zur Besinnung... es gibt ja nichts anderes... wenn du auch dein Gehirn zermarterst, es gibt nichts anderes!" (160)

In spite of the optimist's feeble attempts to argue against the suicide, the pessimistic internal interlocutor seems to guide Gustl "with a firm hand" toward the "honorable solution." Thus, at one point Gustl considers forgetting about military honor and running off to America: "Es ist schrecklich, es ist schrecklich!... Wenn ich lieber auf und davon fahren möcht'--nach Amerika, wo mich niemand kennt... In Amerika weiß kein Mensch davon, was hier heut' abend gescheh'n ist..." (164). However, he is guided in the

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[33] H. C. Shands, "Verbal Patterns and Medical Disease: Prophylactic Implications of Learning" in *Sight, Sound and Sense* T. A. Sebeok ed.(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 19.

"right" direction by the pessimist's reaction to the America option:

> "... jetzt ist es ja doch alles eins... Warum denn?—Ja, ich ich weiß schon: sterben muß ich, darum ist es alles eins—sterben muß ich... Also wie?—Schau, Gustl, du bist doch extra da herunter in den Prater gegangen, mitten in der Nacht, wo dich keine Menschenseele stört--jetzt kanst du dir alles ruhig überlegen... Das ist ja lauter Unsinn mit Amerika und quittieren, und du bist ja viel zu dumm, um was anderes anzufangen--und wenn du hundert Jahr alt wirst, und du denkst dran, daß dir einer hat den Säbel zerbrechen wollen und dich einen dummen Buben geheißen, und du bist dag'standen und hast nichts tun können--nein, zu überlegen ist da gar nichts--gescheh'n ist gescheh'n (166)

Thus, gradually, in the course of a discussion where one interlocutor proposes various options while the other interlocutor rejects these options, Gustl gets closer and closer to the final solution to his problem. And clearly confrontational interior dialogue appears to be the main problem-solving mechanism directing the thinker's plan of action.

The final internal argument, which results in a firm pro-suicide decision whereby Gustl's problem is solved, takes place toward the end of the text when the lieutenant wavers and rebuffs himself for the last time: "... das Gehen ist so angenehm--und das Schönste ist, daß mich keiner zwingt.--Wenn ich wollt', könnt' ich noch immer den ganzen Krempel hinschmeißen... Amerika... was ist das

«Krempel»? Was ist ein «Krempel»'? Mir scheint, ich hab' den Sonnenstich!..." (171) After this, Gustl reaches the point of no return with respect to the main problem-solving and self-guiding process, and only fate saves him from death: the baker suddenly dies of stroke.

Gustl seems to rely on interior dialogue as a self-guiding mechanism not only with respect to deciding *what to do* but also in determining *what to think and feel.* For example, when the lieutenant allows thoughts of his family to get in the way of the suicide plans, one of his internal interlocutors orders the other not to distract "them" from their common goal: "Um Gottes willen, die Mama!—Nein, nein, daran darf ich nich denken.—Ah, nein, daran darf absolut nicht gedacht werden... An Zuhaus wird nicht gedacht, Gustl, verstanden?—nicht mit dem allerleisesten Gedanken..." (161) Similarly, interior dialogue guides Gustl's *emotions* as he gradually accepts the inevitability of suicide. In the following passage Gustl's inner interlocutors help him to admit that he is afraid and then temporarily master his fear:

> Aber Gustl, sei doch aufrichtig mit dir selber:—Angst hast du—Angst, weil du's noch nie probiert hast... Aber das hilft dir ja nicht, die Angst hat noch keinem was geholfen, jeder muß es einmal durchmachen, der eine früher, der andere später, und du kommst halt früher dran... Viel wert bist du ja nie gewesen, so benimm dich wenigstens anständig zu guter

Letzt, das verlang' ich von dir!" (170)

This passage features pronominal reference to *both* inner interlocutors ("das verlang' *ich* von *dir*"), which makes it the most overtly dialogic of all the internal exchanges that take place in the thinker's mind. Furthermore, the dialogic nature of the last two passages is stressed by the fact that one interlocutor actually *orders* the other: "An Zuhaus wird nicht gedach, Gustl, verstanden?", "*sei* doch aufrichtig mit dir selber" and "*benimm* dich wenigstens anständig zu guter Letzt, das *verlang'* ich von dir." The use of the verb "sich benehmen" clearly stresses the fact that this conversation is guiding of (mental) *behavior*, and this echoes Mead's and Kohlberg's above-cited comments regarding the role of interior dialogue in real inner speech. Thus, we can say that the last two passages are probably the most explicit illustration of Mead's and Kohlberg's notion of interior dialogue as a self-guiding mechanism: psychological theory and experimental research appear to concur fully with Schnitzler's hypothetical literary representation of the human thought process during problem-solving.

Even when it comes to less important problems--those not directly related to the suicide proper--Gustl often appears to rely on this dialogue between two conflicting positions where a statement about a possible course of action is followed by a negative reply. For example, immediately after being insulted by the baker, the Lieutenant suddenly notices another member of the audience outside the concert hall. The subsequent internal exchange is definitely "guiding of action" since the thinker's course of immediate behavior is determined by a statement proposing a particular course of action and a negative *reaction* to this statement by the other self: "Warum schaut mich denn der Herr dort an der Säule so an?--hat er am End' was gehört?... Ich werd' ihn fragen... Fragen?--Ich bin ja verrückt."(156) Similarly, when Gustl decides not to hack the baker to death and not to report the incident at the concert to his commanding officer, his behavior is determined by an interior dialogue where each subsequent statement is not a continuation of the previous one but a negative response to it: "Wenn ich ihn seh', so hau' ich ihn zusammen... Nein, das darf ich ja nicht... [...] Ich werd' zum Obersten geh'n und ihm die Sache melden... [...] Was wird der Oberst sagen?--Was er sagen wird?--Aber da gibt's ja nur eins; quittieren mit Schimpf und Schand'--quittieren!" (156-57) It is especially this repetition of the last question and the subsequent answer that evoke not just dialogue but argumentative dialogue, a polemic and a rebuttal.

The story ends the way it developed, i.e., Gustl's final course of action appears to be linked to a self-guiding internal dialogue of the question-answer type, which also frames an outwardly directed internal dialogue with another (absent) character. When the Lieutenant has been miraculously saved from suicide by the baker's sudden death from a stroke, he does not decide on his next move (to fight the doctor--cf. above) in a straight-forward way; instead his decision is in the form of an answer to a repeated question, i.e., the very type of "reply to the self" mentioned by Mead (cf. above):

> Ich bin so froh!... Was mach' ich denn nur? ... Was mach' ich denn nur?... [...] In einer Viertelstund' geh' ich hinüber in die Kasern' und laß mich vom Johann kalt abreiben... [...] Und nachmittag um vier... na wart', mein Lieber, wart', mein Lieber! Ich bin grad' gut aufgelegt... Dich hau' ich zu Krenfleisch!(176)

Thus, Gustl's interior monologue is closed by interior dialogue: a question and a reply.

The Verbal Nature of Gustl's Interior Dialogue: Thought as Discourse

The *dialogic/conversational* structure of Gustl's UDIM is stressed by the clearly *verbal* nature of a number of the thinker's internal exchanges. This occurs when some formal element--syntactic or lexical--of a preceding thought segment is repeated by Gustl's internal interlocutor usually in the context of his on-going internal argument. Let us recall a passage already cited before: "Wenn ich wollt', könnt' ich noch immer den ganzen Krempel hinschmeißen... Amerika... was ist das «Krempel»? Was ist ein «Krempel»?" (171) The fact that "«Krempel»" is not just an abstract thought but an internal *word* actually sounded in the thinker's mind is obvious because the "other" appears to object not only to his more conciliatory counterpart's *idea* of escaping to America, but also to the choice of *terminology* used to express that idea. Since the "other" repeats "«Krempel»"--not once but twice--and since the word is placed in quotation marks, there is a clear sense that the word has been picked up, quoted and imitated in a mocking way by the pessimist as a *formal verbal entity.* As a result one has the impression that this exchange is a *conversation* in every sense of the term.

Similarly, the repetition of a syntactic construction in "Aber wenn ich dort geblieben wär', wär' mir das nich passiert, was mir heut' passiert ist... und ich möcht' lieber in Galizien alt und grau werden, als daß... als was? als was?—Ja, was ist denn? was ist denn? (160) serves to underscore the discursive/verbal nature of the

Lieutenant's dialogic thought process. The "als was? als was?" is not just an aggressive response by the internal interlocutor to his counterpart's hesitation to mention the upcoming suicide ("als daß..."). This syntactic repetition creates the impression that Gustl's internal "other" has heard the actual sound (form) of "als daß" and is irked by it.

An especially effective application of this device is observed as Gustl resorts to another form of interior dialogue--addressing another character who is not there at the moment--the baker: "Ja, wart', du glaubst, daß sowas geheim bleiben kann?—Du irrst dich—aufgeschrieben wird's zum ewigen Gedächtnis, und dann möcht' ich sehen, ob du dich noch ins Kaffeehaus traust—Ha!—«das möcht' ich sehen», ist gut... Ich möcht' noch manches gern sehen, wird nur leider nicht möglich sein—aus is!—"(169) The self-quotation stresses not only the dialogic and discursive but also the confrontational nature of the thinker's internal conversation: this is a clearly sarcastic reaction by one internal interlocutor to his counterpart's poor choice of words in light of Gustl's upcoming death, which excludes the possibility of "sehen." It is amusing to note that the "picky" interlocutor quotes and mocks this particular turn of phrase but fails to note the no less ridiculous sentence implying that the baker's punishment will consist of losing access to the café: "dann möcht' ich sehen, ob du dich noch ins Kaffeehaus traust—Ha!"

At one point the dialogic confrontational nature of a reaction to a previous statement is underscored by self-quotation involving a rather morbid pun: "Meiner Seel', mir ist geradeso, als wenn ich einen Rausch hätt'! Haha! ein schöner Rausch! ein Mordsrausch! ein Selbstmordsrausch!--Ha! Witze mach' ich, das ist sehr gut!" (161) This sardonic and self-conscious play on words and the previous example of sarcastic self-quotation indicate the clearly antagonistic position of the "other" in Gustl's interior dialogue. One interlocutor seems to be repeatedly *mocking* his counterpart, as if taking sadistic pleasure in stressing the hopelessness of the thinker's predicament. As a result we have the impression that we are witnessing one person tormenting another in a dialogue of anguish, which is quite fitting in view of the thinker's horrific dilemma.

Interior Dialogue and the Mnemonic Process

Interior dialogue, in the form of questions and answers, is used among other things for distancing Gustl's mnemonic process from conventional narrative. In a number of places where the thinker recalls incidents from his past, the author uses the dialogic question-answer form in order to create the illusion of a mind "straining to remember" and reconstructing the past by means of a *conversation with itself.* The effect of this device is quite considerable: whereas retrospectively-oriented discourse is the natural element of the conventional narrator, Gustl's *in actu* mnemonic reconstruction process makes his retrospectively-oriented discourse appear unplanned and therefore outside the realm of any public discourse, i.e. outside narrative.

For example, as Gustl recalls an amorous encounter with a peasant woman, her name is revealed as a result of his interior dialogue in the form of a question and an answer, i.e. it is not retrospectively *narrated* but instead *reconstructed in actu*: "Eigentlich langweilt man sich dort zum Sterben... Wenn ich die...<- [unfinished syntactic construction] wie hat sie nur geheißen?... Est ist merkwürdig, ich kann mir keinen Namen merken!... Ah, ja: Etelka!" (151) These remarks are clearly meta-discursive, with Gustl "talking" to himself about his mnemonic discourse. Similarly, Gustl's recollection of an encounter with some fellow-officers is also presented not as linear narration but in the dialogic question-answer form: "...der Kopetzky, der Ladinser und... wer war denn nur noch mit uns?--Ja, richtig, der Freiwillige, der uns auf dem Marsch die jüdische Anekdoten erzählt hat..." (160) In the same way instead of simply *relating* the name of the person who beat him at cards--as a conventional narrator would be expected to do--Gustl reconstructs it through the question-answer process of interior dialogue: "Hundertsechzig Gulden auf einem Sitz verspielt--zu dumm! Und wer hat alles gewonnen? Der Ballert, grad' der, der's nicht notwendig hat..." (151) And even such trivial information as the time of the thinker's last meal is not narrated (related) but simply *surfaces* as the result of a dialogue taking place within a mind "straining to remember": "Hunger hab' ich--meiner Seel', ich hab' Hunger--kein Wunder... seit wann hab' ich denn nichts gegessen?... Seit--seit sechs Uhr abends im Kaffeehaus... ja!" (168)

As is demonstrated by "Seit--seit sechs Uhr" in the last quotation, there is an attempt to suggest that this is not simple narration but the "mimesis" of a mind *straining* to remember *in actu*. And the mental effort involved in Gustl's mnemonic reconstruction process is stressed in other places as well when instead of a *straightforward* question-answer sequence we encounter an *extended* question-answer series: "Wie lang' hat denn die ganze G'schicht' gedauert?... Seit'm Jänner?... Ah nein, es muß doch schon vor Weihnachten gewesen sein..." (170) Thus, the thinker reconstructs the past not just by replying to himself but by first giving the wrong answer and then providing a correction, i.e., recall here takes dialogic "work." Similarly extended is the following mnemonic dialogue where the reply to a question about the past is provided not immediately but after some mental effort in the form of a calculation: "... aber ich war ja gar nicht so klein... vierzehn oder fünfzehn... Wie lang ist das jetzt her?--neun Jahr'... freilich--mit achtzehn war ich Stellvertreter, mit zwanzig Leutnant... und im nächsten Jahr werd' ich... Was werd' ich im nächsten Jahr? Was heißt das überhaupt: nächstes Jahr?" (162)

Recall in the form of interior dialogue of the question-answer type is used especially effectively from the quasi-mimetic point of view when Gustl relies on a whole series of *questions and replies,* i.e., a dialogue with his own internal addressee, to reconstruct a recent argument with a doctor whom the Lieutenant felt honor-bound to challenge to a duel:

> Wie sind wir denn d'rauf gekommen? Wieso hab' ich mich mit dem Sozialisten in ein Gespräch eingelassen? Wie hat's denn nur angefangen?... Mir scheint, die schwarze Frau, die ich zum Büfett geführt hab', ist auch dabei gewesen... und dann dieser junge Mensch, der die Jagdbilder malt--wie heißt er denn nur?... Meiner Seel', der ist an der ganzen Geschichte schuld gewesen! Der hat von den Manövern geredet; und dann erst ist dieser Doktor dazugekommen und hat irgendwas g'sagt, was mir nich gepaßt hat, von Kriegsspielerei oder so was--aber wo ich noch nichts hab' reden können... Ja, und dann ist von den Kadettenschulen gesprochen worden... ja, so war's... [...] Wenn ich nur erinnern könnt', was ich d'rauf geantwortet hab'?... Ah ja, etwas von Leuten, die sich in Dinge dreinmengen, von denen sie nichts versteh'n... Ja richtig....

(152-53)

Thus, the whole incident is presented not as something narrated for the sake of an external addressee, but as a reply to a number of questions: "Wie sind wir denn d'rauf gekommen? Wieso hab' ich mich mit dem Sozialisten in ein Gespräch eingelassen?" etc. Phrases, such as "irgendwas," "oder so was," "wenn ich mich nur erinnern könnt' " and "etwas," used with reference to the particulars of the quarrel, dramatize the difficult *in actu* reconstruction process in order to reinforce the illusion of private communication as opposed to narration: this is not retrospective but takes place right before our eyes.

Although Schnitzler did not employ this device in all instances of Gustl's mnemonic process, his use of the question-answer form of interior dialogue for the "mimesis" of recall is an important innovation and a significant step in the creation of the private communication illusion when compared to recall in Garshin's and Dujardin's respective texts. Garshin's thinker remembers past events essentially by narrating them, i.e., no interior dialogue or some other "mimesis" of mnemonic *reconstruction* is ever present in his suspiciously "smooth" recollection process, which undermines his presumably non-narratorial position: "I recall how we ran through the forest, how bullets whizzed by, how branches fell after being torn off by the bullets..."[34] Dujardin's rendering of Daniel's mnemonic process is also very much like conventional narrative for the most part: "C'était ennuyeux, les bijoux n'étaient engagés que pour cent vingt francs, et il y avait encore quinze jours de délai; je lui ai payé ses cent vingt francs; depuis lors elle ne m'a rien demandé; voilà déjà huit jours..." (80) Both of these passages are too well structured to convince the reader that they have not been organized before the thinker's mental discourse. And it is this typically narratorial aspect of recall that Schnitzler manages to avoid by using the question-answer form in order to "imitate" a mind straining to remember, thereby eliminating the *temporal distance* between recall and its verbalization: a distance, which is inextricably linked to the communicative position of a conventional narrator.

Plot Structure and Thought Association

As opposed to Daniel's UDIM in *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* where we are eavesdropping on the thought process of a very physically active and alert thinker whose sensorimotor experience guides or frames much of his inner discourse, the focus of *Leutnant Gustl* is on the thinker's internal reflection as he agonizes over his "duty" to commit suicide: after the incident with the baker, the outside world is almost completely blocked out of Gustl's mind.[35] Therefore, the development of the lieutenant's inner discourse is determined largely from within, and I have tried to show that interior dialogue is one of the mechanisms of thought progression in this text. However, underlying this mechanism there is another more fundamental one: *thought association*, which, in the absence of such thought-prompters as sensorimotor stimuli, is the only believable method of having a UDIM thinker move from one thought to another. In internal reflection thought association is the only fundamental mechanism of thought progression in UDIM that does not violate the illusion of unplanned inner discourse: otherwise the UDIM risks lapsing into something resembling *structured* narration.

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[34] "Я помню как мы бежали по лесу, как жужжали пули, как падали отрываемые ветки [...]" V. Garshin, p. 27.

However, thought association creates the potential for structurelessness, i.e., a kind of rambling or "associative drift," which may make the UDIM rather boring and/or difficult to read no matter how impressive its formal illusion-making devices. Thus, the form of a text dominated by internal reflection UDIM *may* undermine its content, and in this respect the choice of subject-matter for a given UDIM may be quite important. If a UDIM thinker has a *single pressing concern,* preferably a very important one, it can act as a kind of structural magnet, which would cause his/her thoughts--as wandering as they may be--to keep returning to this central issue. And the more urgent and crucial is this central issue, the more motivated this structuring mechanism appears to be.

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[35] The same comparison can be made with respect of Joyce's *Ulysses* where Leopold Bloom's interior monologue is guided by his "travels" through Dublin and all the sensorimotor stimuli produced by this activity, while Molly's monologue is purely associative since she is immobile (in bed) and her mind is therefore a self-contained discourse space.

In Garshin's "Four Days" and in Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl,* where the internal reflection mode makes up most of the UDIM, this central structuring mechanism is the life-and-death situation in which the two respective thinkers find themselves. The fact that both Ivanov and Gustl think that they are about to die--coupled with Ivanov's profound guilt about the murder of the Turk and Gustl's ever-present obsession with military honor--easily motivates the constant return of the two protagonists' thoughts to their plight. This gives a definite structure to the two texts, i.e., there is a clear *point* to Ivanov's and Gustl's internal reflection. We can say that such an urgent concern can make it easier to keep a UDIM thinker *focused* without harming the private communication illusion even though structural focusing is normally the realm of the conventional retrospectively-oriented narrator who has time to consider and organize his/her material. On the other hand, although Larbaud's *Amants heureux amants...* is formally quite convincing as a "mimesis" of private thought, the fact that nothing compels the thinker to keep returning to some important central issue makes the text rather bland, since there appears to be no end to the protagonist's associative stream. This results in virtually absolute structurelessness. We have the impression that, just as with *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* Larbaud's UDIM is about nothing: merely a series of associatively linked musings going through the mind of a dandy protagonist. While this question will be discussed in more detail in our next chapter, let us now turn to Schnitzler's text and consider his "mimesis" of the associative process in light of the above discussion of mental "agony" as a structuring mechanism in internal reflection.

Before the incident with the baker, Gustl's internal reflection is similar to that of Larbaud's thinker in that it is about "this and that." Although it reveals a number of important background facts and helps to expose and mock Gustl's prejudices, hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness, his "pre-crisis" discourse has no distinct structuring center: there is no central "obsession" to focus on. As a result the lieutenant rambles, which appears very convincing at the microcommunicative level in that his discourse is purely associative and therefore non-narratorial, which reinforces the illusion of private communication. However, it would have been difficult to make the text interesting if this sort of associative drift dominated all of Gustl's internal reflection.

Here is a "pre-crisis" example where the thinker--while sitting at the above-mentioned concert--goes from the thought of his mistress and her other lover, to anti-Semitic "musings," to the recollection of a party in a purely associative manner with nothing to guide the direction of his inner discourse:

> O Steffi, Steffi, Steffi!--Die Steffi ist eigentlich schuld, daß ich dasitz' und mir stundenlang vorlamentieren muß. [...] sie kann nicht kommen, weil sie mit ihm nachtmahlen gehen muß... [...] Muß übrigens ein Jud' sein! Freilich, in einer Bank ist er, und der schwarze Schnurrbart... Reserveleutnant soll er auch sein! Na, in mein Regiment sollt' er nicht zur Waffenübung kommen! Überhaupt, daß sie noch immer so viel Juden zu Offizieren machen--da pfeif' ich auf'n ganzen Antisemitismus! Neulich in der Gesellschaft, wo die G'schicht' mit dem Doktor passiert ist bei den Mannheimers... die Mannheimer selber sollen ja auch Juden sein, getauft natürlich... denen merkt man's aber gar nicht an--besonders die Frau... so blond, bildhübsch die Figur... War sehr amüsant im ganzen. Famoses Essen, großartige Zigarren... Na ja, wer hat's Geld? Bravo, bravo! Jetzt wird's doch bald aus sein? (150)

Not having anything central to "cling to," Gustl's thought is directed only by occasional stimuli from the external world (the concert), e.g., "Bravo, bravo!" The fact that Gustl cannot keep his mind on the music throughout the entire concert and cannot help drifting off in such associative reveries may imply the cultural primitiveness of the lieutenant and by extension his entire military caste. Thus, Schnitzler's use of "associative drift" in the concert scene can be viewed not just as a formal quasi-mimetic device but a tool of satire, i.e., not merely the medium but also the message.

However, once the crisis has taken place, i.e., once the incident with the baker moves Gustl's thoughts into the direction of inevitable suicide, the thinker's internal reflection acquires a definite orientation and becomes much more focused until the very end of the text. The use of Gustl's mental agony over his impending suicide as a structural magnet, which keeps bringing the protagonist back to his main concern, is very consistent in Schnitzler's text even when the thinker temporarily strays from his grave concerns. For example, the sight of a passing carriage causes the thinker to digress from his anguish in a rather long passage where one association leads to another:

> ... ein Wagen fährt da? Um die Zeit? Gummiradler--kann mir

> schon denken... Die haben's besser wie ich--vielleicht is es der Ballert mit der Berta... Warum soll's grad' der Ballert sein?--Fahr nur zu!--Ein hübsches Zeug'l hat Seine Hoheit in Przemysl gehabt... mit dem ist er immer in die in die Stadt hinuntergerfahren zu der Rosenberg... Sehr leutselig war Seine hoheit--ein echter Kamerad, mit allen auf du und du... War doch eine schöne Zeit... obzwar... die Gegend war trostlos und im Sommer zum Verschmachten... an einem Nachmittag sind einmal drei vom Sonnenstich getroffen worden... auch der Korporal von meinem Zug--ein so verwendbarer Mensch... Nachmittag haben wir uns nackt auf's Bett hingelegt.--Einmal is plötzlich der Wiesner zu mir hereingekommen; ich muß grad' geträumt haben und steh' auf und zieh' den Säbel, der neben mir liegt... muß gut ausg'schaut haben... der Wiesner hat sich halb tot gelacht--der ist jetzt schon Rittmeister... --Schad', daß ich nicht zur Kavallerie gegangen bin... aber das hat der Alte nicht gewollen--wär' ein zu teurer Spaß gewesen--jetzt ist es ja doch alles eins... Warum denn?--Ja, ich ich weiß schon: sterben muß ich, darum ist es alles eins--sterben muß ich... (165)

This long series of thought associations, which discloses indirectly a considerable amount of information about Gustl's past etc. and therefore enriches the fictional world and our understanding of the protagonist, inevitably comes back to the lieutenant's main obsession: the suicide. And it is interior dialogue of the question-answer type that guides Gustl's thoughts back on track.

Similarly, the following digression about promiscuity and the advantages of life in Vienna can pull Gustl away from the "suicidal center" of his UDIM only for so long before the thinker's associative thought process brings him back to his main concern:

> Da geh'n zwei Artilleristen... die denken gewiß, ich steig' der Person nach... Muß sie mir übrigens anseh'n... O schrecklich!--Ich möcht' nur wissen, wie sich so eine ihr Brot verdient... da möcht' ich doch eher... Obzwar, in der Not frißt der Teufel Fliegen... in Przemysl--mir hat's nachher so gegraut, daß ich gemeint hab', nie wieder rühr' ich ein Frauenzimmer an... Das war eine gräßliche Zeit da oben in Galizien... eigentlich ein Mordsglück, daß wir nach Wien gekommen sind. Der Bokorny sitzt noch immer in Sambor und kann noch zehn Jahr dort sitzen und alt und grau werden... Aber wenn ich dort geblieben wär', wär' mir das nich passiert, was mir heut passiert ist... und ich möcht' lieber in Galizien alt und grau werden, als daß... als was? als was?—Ja, was ist denn? was ist denn? (160)

This passage is a very good example of how rigorously Schnitzler observes the associative thought progression principle in his effort to maintain the UDIM illusion. This, however, does not prevent his thinker from staying focused and "on track," thereby making sure that the reader is given a definite *story* and not just a series of associative ramblings. The dialogic exchange at the end of this passage, as in the previously-cited passage, emphasizes this focusing mechanism: it is as if one part or voice in Gustl's mind strays from its main preoccupation, and the other part or voice brings its wandering counterpart back to the "business of the day." Similarly, the question-answer format of interior dialogue is observed when Gustl is brutally brought back to his main concern after straying from the suicide and associatively recalling this and that:

> ... und dunkel ist es, hu! man könnt' schier Angst kriegen... Das ist eigentlich das einzigemal in meinem Leben, daß ich Furcht gehabt hab', als kleiner Bub, damals im Wald... aber ich war ja gar nicht so klein... vierzehn oder fünfzehn... Wie lang ist das jetzt her?--neun Jahr'... freilich--mit achtzehn war ich Stellvertreter, mit zwanzig Leutnant... und im nächsten Jahr werd' ich... Was werd' ich im nächsten Jahr? Was heißt das überhaupt: nächstes Jahr?" (162)

Even the most pleasant thoughts, of his girlfriend, for example, cannot keep the terrified lieutenant from returning to his suicide: "Hübsche Einrichtung hat sie--das kleine Badezimmer mit der roten Latern'.--Wie sie neulich in dem grünseidenen Schlafrock hereingekommen ist... den grünen Schlafrock werd' ich auch nimmer seh'n--und die ganze Steffi auch nicht..."(161) It is perhaps such happy thoughts, i.e., thoughts of love, that come into the sharpest contrast with Gustl's inevitable returns to thoughts of death, thereby stressing the horror of the thinker's plight:

> Ja, wenn's noch die Adel' wär'... Nein, die Adel'! Mir scheint, seit zwei Jahren hab' ich an die nicht mehr gedacht... [...] Na, Gustl, hätt'st schon noch warten können—war doch die einzige, die dich gern gehabt hat... was sie jetz macht? [...] Freilich, das mit der Steffi ist bequemer—wenn man nur gelegentlich

> engagiert ist und ein anderer hat die ganzen Unannehmlichkeiten, und ich hab' nur das Vergnügen... Ja, da kann man auch nicht verlangen, daß sie auf den Friedhof hinauskommt... (167-68)

Thus, the danger of death appears to play a double role in "Leutnant Gustl": it constitutes the subject-matter of the protagonist's thought process and at the same time gives this thought process enough structure to create a "mental story." Of course this is not to say that the structuring function of a central obsession in internal reflection is essential: Molly's monologue in Joyce's *Ulysses* does not have a central obsession (except for sex perhaps), which means that the thinker does in fact "ramble"; but this does not make her inner discourse less interesting and meaningful, since it is based on a series of preceding discourses of other characters, which place her monologue in a specific explanatory context. However, in the absence of such preliminary contextualizing discourse a central obsession can be an effective and most of all *believable* internal structuring mechanism counteracting the disorganizing effect of associative drift required by the UDIM premise.

Sensorimotor Discourse

Even though I have pointed out that internal reflection plays a dominant role in *Leutnant Gustl,* since the main focus of this story is the thinker's problem-solving thought process and its "mental events" rather than the external events in the lieutenant's physical environment, some physical events and other sensory stimuli are registered by the lieutenant's internal discourse. And here, just as in the internal reflection sections of the text, we observe considerable mastery of illusion-making devices and a definite awareness of the communicative implications inherent in the UDIM premise. As in a number of other respects, Schnitzler is quite different from his French predecessor in his approach to sensorimotor discourse. Although, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 4, Dujardin's reliance on nominal phrases for rendering his thinker's sensorimotor experience helps a great deal to distance Daniel's UDIM from the externally-communicative mode of conventional narration, we find a significant number of instances where the protagonist lapses into a typically narratorial mode of discourse. For example, here is Daniel's mental verbalization of his perceptions and actions at his apartment:

> Je me redresse, je me retourne... Les bougies sont allumées sur la cheminée; voici le lit blanc, moelleux, les tapis; je m'appuie sur la croisée ouverte; dehors, derrière moi, je sens la nuit; la nuit noire, froide, triste, lugubre... les murs vides; et

> les fenêtres obscures d'inconnu et le fenêtres éclairées... le secret des ombres opaques... J'ai un frisson; précipitamment, je me retourne... Ma jaquette, là, sur le lit; mon gilet, aussi, sur le lit; maintenant, dans le cabinet de toilette; mon cabinet de toilette est vraiment très en ordre...(63-4)

It is the intermittent use of complete *declarative* sentences that makes the style of this passage so similar to conventional narration where the reportorial/declarative sentence is normally the main vehicle for referring to physical objects and events. And when this is combined with such non-narratorial segments as "ma jaquette, là, sur le lit; mon gilet, aussi, sur le lit; maintenant, dans le cabinet de toilette," a rather jarring effect is produced. The artificiality of such illusion-making devices as the nominal phrase is underscored and the self-communication illusion is compromised by direct contrast with adjacent narratorial passages. As a result, the reader is forced to alternate between frames of formal reference, which undermines his/her suspension of disbelief so necessary for the reception of a genre as "unbelievable" as UDIM.

In the sensorimotor passages of Schnitzler's text, on the other hand, we detect much more awareness on the part of the author of the need to avoid as much as possible the *declarative* sentence and the *reporting* of immediate physical experience. As a result in most cases we do not have the impression that Gustl is *relating* his sensorimotor experience: the illusion is created that this experience is revealed to us *incidentally* as the thinker reacts to the outside world. This avoidance of the narratorial declarative sentence in Gustl's sensorimotor discourse leads to a very noticeable reliance on the other three basic sentence types: the interrogative, the imperative and the exclamatory.[36] The idea that the tendency to avoid the declarative mode constitutes an anti-narratorial device is evident from the following comment made by V. Artyomov who views the terms "narrative" and "declarative" as virtual synonyms: "all the seemingly endless varieties of speech acts can be divided into four main classes, i.e., so-called communication types: narrative, question, inducement and exclamation."[37] Consequently, the avoidance of the declarative mode means that Gustl's sensorimotor UDIM consists mainly not of the *reporting* of events and sensory stimuli, but rather of his *reactions* to sensory stimuli and external events, i.e., the focus of attention shifts from the physical objects and events themselves to their significance in the lieutenant's mind.

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[36] H. Shaw, *McGraw-Hill Handbook of English* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 33-4.

[37] Quoted by E. Zimniaia, "Verbalnoie myshleniie (psikhologichesky aspekt)" in *Issldedovaniie rechevogo myshleniia v psikholingvistike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 92 (my translation).

The preference given to the non-declarative mode is evident right from the beginning of the text as we first encounter the boorish protagonist who is languishing at the concert:

> Wie lange wird denn das noch dauern? [...] Erst viertel auf zehn? [...] Was ist es denn eigentlich? Ich muß das Program anschauen... Ja, richtig: Oratorium? [...] Das Mädel drüben in der Loge ist sehr hübsch. Sieht sie mich an oder den Herrn dort mit dem blonden vollbart?... Ah ein Solo! [...] Was guckt mich denn der Kerl dort immer an?" (149-150)

Thus--unlike the physical experience of a retrospectively-oriented conventional narrator whose addressee is not there and therefore needs to know "what was out there"--the presence of these stimuli in Gustl's perceptual field is taken for granted and therefore does not need to be conveyed as such. What matters here is Gustl's reaction to these stimuli: the concert, the time on his watch, the people around him etc. Hence the virtual absence of declarative sentences and the predominance of the interrogative and exclamatory mode.

As the concert draws to a close, Gustl filters the associated physical stimuli in the following indirect way: "Bravo!, bravo! Ah, aus!... So, das tut wohl, afsteh'n können... Na, vielleicht! Wie lang' wird der da noch brauchen, um sein Glas ins Futteral zu stecken?"

(153) Once again, the sensorimotor facts per se in this passage are not central, as they would be in conventional narrative. We find out that the concert is over, that Gustl is standing up and that his neighbor is putting away his binoculars only incidentally as the thinker verbalizes his relief and frustration, i.e., his reactions to the outside world. Similarly, as Gustl heads for the vestibule after leaving the concert hall, his sense of the crowd is rendered by one exclamatory and two interrogative sentences: "Ist das eine Gedränge!... Warum drängt denn der Idiot hinter mir?... Wer grüßt mich denn dort von drüben?" (154) Likewise, the thinker's confrontation with the baker, which closes the concert episode, is also characterized by interrogatives and exclamatory or emotionally-colored phrases: "Ja, was macht er denn? Mir scheint gar... ja, meiner Seel', er hat den Griff von meinem Säbel in der Hand... Ja warum laßt er denn meinen Säbel net aus?" (155)

As Gustl finds himself out in the street, it is once again an interrogative rather than a declarative sentence that indirectly reveals the thinker's sensorimotor experience: "Was, ich bin schon auf der Straße?" (156) and later, as Gustl wanders through Vienna: "Wo lauf' ich denn da herum?" (157) or "Warum renn' ich denn so?" (158). And it is through interrogative and exclamatory sentences that we learn of the thinker's whereabouts, as his journey through

Vienna continues, bringing him to the Prater: "Ich will mich auf die Bank setzen... Ah!--wie weit bin ich denn da? So eine Dunkelheit!" (162) Once in the Prater, the terrified Lieutenant feels overwhelmed by the prospect of suicide and begins to cry, which is rendered by an exclamatory sentence: "Herrgott, ich fang' noch zu schreien an mitten in der Nacht!" (165). Then Gustl's attention is diverted by a carriage: "Was is denn das... ein Wagen fährt da? Um Die Zeit?" (165) And shortly afterwards he falls asleep on the park bench; the verbalization of his awakening is especially illustrative of Schnitzler's avoidance of the reportorial style of conventional narrative:

> Was ist denn?—He, Johann, bringen S' mir ein Glas frisches Wasser... Was ist?... Wo... Ja, träum' ich denn? Mein Schädel... o, Donnerwetter... Fischamend... Ich bring' die Augen nicht auf!—Ich bin ja angezogen!—Wo sitz' ich denn?—Heiliger Himmel, eingeschlafen bin ich! Wie hab' ich denn nur schlafen können; es dämmert ja schon!" (166)

As Gustl begins his new day, he registers the sunrise in the following indirect manner: "Was, geht schon die Sonne auf?"(169) and then notices a young woman: "Ist das ein liebes G'sichtel!... der kleine Fratz mit den schwarzen Augen, den ich so oft in de Floriangasse treff'!" (173) Thus, it appears that the declarative sentence and the straight report is avoided for the most part in the rendering of Gustl's physical experience: especially his *physical* progression from the concert hall to the vestibule to his fight with the baker to the deserted streets of Vienna to the darkness of the empty Prater in the middle of the night and finally to his awakening on a park bench.

One of the most "mimetically" impressive sensorimotor passages in the text has to do with Gustl's registering the chimes of a clock. It is especially significant because it illustrates the way in which the dramatization of the thinker's reactions to (rather than narratorial descriptions of) the outside world helps to eliminate retrospection from Gustl's discourse. Instead of a declarative reference to the clock's chimes, we are first given the thinker's reaction to this sound in the form of an interrogative sentence: "Wieviel schlagt's denn?" and then an attempt is made to *stress* the illusion of eavesdropping on a mind registering experience *in actu*: "1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11... elf, elf" (158) This ingenious use of sensorimotor *scene* and the corresponding avoidance of narratorial *summary* (cf. Chapter 3) just to indicate to the reader that "it is late" eliminates all possibility of retrospection: until the clock stops chiming, the thinker is just as incapable as we are to say what time it is. Thus, we appear to be occupying the same temporal position as the thinker with respect to on-going events, i.e. Gustl's sensorimotor *story* and *discourse* appear to be totally simultaneous, which is one of the main goals of the UDIM illusion.

In addition to the interrogative and the exclamatory, the self-imperative is the third sentence type used quite frequently in order to avoid the declarative mode and distance Gustl's sensorimotor discourse from communicative trends typical of conventional narrative. Thus, unlike Daniel who often simply narrates his own movements ("[...] je m'appuie sur la croisée ouverte [...] J'ai un frisson; précipitamment, je me retourne [...]" — cf. passage cited above), which D. Cohn compares to a "gymnastics teacher vocally demonstrating an exercise,"[38] Gustl verbalizes his own motor behavior in the following way: "Ja, applaudieren wir mit." (149), "Na, geh'n wir hinein..." (173), "Herrgott, ist das ein Gedränge bei der Gardrobe!... Warten wir lieber noch ein bissel..." (154), "Na, geh'n wir nun weiter..." (162), "Also geh'n wir nach Haus, ganz langsam..." (166), "Aufstehen! Aufstehen!... Ah, so ist es besser!" (167) Such self-imperatives, according to N. Tamir, introduce a dialogic element into monologue, which is quite consistent with the general dialogic trends inherent in Gustl's UDIM:

> ... one cannot command oneself. The imperative is a form that

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[38] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 222.

> applies mainly to the second person... but never to the first person... When we do 'command' ourselves, we temporarily activate a mechanism of self-alienation or splitting of personality that enables us to 'see' ourselves from the outside, as if the 'I' were a 'you'.[39]

In her discussion of the self-communication illusion created by the predominance of the interrogative and the exclamatory mode in Molly's monologue in Joyce's *Ulysses* D. Cohn sums up what I have been discussing regarding Gustl's UDIM:

> ...exclamation and interrogation... orient [Molly's discourse] away from a neutral report of the present moment, and away from the narration of past events. Since language-for-oneself is by definition the form of language in which speaker and listener coincide, the technique that imitates it in fiction can remain convincing only if it excludes all factual statements, all explicit report on present and past happenings.[40]

This need to exclude "all factual statements, all explicit report on present and past happenings" calls to mind the private communication situation found in a dialogue where two interlocutors are discussing events *well-known* to both of them: a situation often observed in drama where such a discussion is used to relate indirectly to the audience background information in order to place the action into some kind of context. Such indirection has to do with the fact that the audience of a realistic play, just as the reader of UDIM, is placed in the position of an eavesdropper, since the characters are not aware of anyone's but each other's presence, i.e., they do not know that their house only has three walls. In order to avoid the violation of the "realistic" illusion by acknowledging the presence of the audience, such interlocutors cannot appear to be *relating* already known facts and must therefore "inadvertently" allow them to "slip out" while they analyze and react to this information or appear to be talking about something else. This is why such "contextualizing" dialogue is often dominated by questions and exclamatory or emotionally-colored statements rather than a neutral report of events. For example, in the very beginning of E. O'Neil's "Long Day's Journey into Night" Tyrone's and Jamie's emotionally charged argument provides indirect background information about the consumptive Edmund:

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[39] N. Tamir, pp. 409-10.

[40] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 226.

> **Tyrone**. *Bitterly*: And what could the finest specialist in America do for Edmund, after he's deliberately ruined his health by the mad life he's led ever since he was fired from college?....
> **Jamie**: ... What had I to do with all the crazy stunts he's pulled in the last few years—working his way all over the map as a sailor and all that stuff. I thought that was a damned fool idea, and I told him so. You can't imagine me getting fun out of being on the beach in South America, or

living in filthy dives, drinking rotgut, can you?[41]

This once again reveals the similarity of the communicative situations in UDIM and dialogue, which are both forms of private communication and can be quite reasonably expected to exhibit similar tendencies.

Conclusion

In addition to introducing considerable refinements to the apparent violation of narratorial cohesion and informativity, as compared to Dujardin's text, Schnitzler developed a whole panoply of devices aimed at distancing *Leutnant Gustl* from conventional personal narrative. His approach to UDIM as a communicative premise, his conscious avoidance of narratorial language in Gustl's monologue, his consistency in maintaining the UDIM illusion and his choice of subject-matter all amount to a truly impressive text. F. Kuna calls "Leutnant Gustl" "the first and the only sustained interior monologue of any quality in German literature."[42] After Garshin's and Dujardin's admirable attempts at the new genre, *Leutnant Gustl* can be viewed as a veritable "success story." As M.

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[41] E. O'Neil, *Long Day's Journey into Night* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 33-35.

[42] F. Kuna, p. 126.

Vanhelleputte points out,

> ... der Leser wird zu keinem einzigen Zeitpunkt den Eindruck los, daß er alle inneren Vorgänge des Daseins Leutnant Gustls von der Ungeduld in dem Konzert bis zur draufgängerischen Freude beim Frühstuck im Kaffeehaus lückenlos mitmacht. Die epische Distanz, die alles bloß Berichtete bald deutlich, bald unmerklich relativiert, ist hier verschwunden. Vom Anfang bis zum Ende wird szenisch erzählt: Eine Gestalt führt einen stillen Monolog, der uns unvermittelt erreich, sogar direkter als die kurzen Dialoge, die vor der Garderobe bzw. im Kaffeehaus stattfinden.[43]

With respect to the above-mentioned "epische Distanz," we can say that Schnitzler has successfully achieved that for which Garshin seems to have striven only with partial success. We can also add that the term "erzählen" in Vanhelleputte's statement that "vom Anfang bis zum Ende wird szenisch erzählt" is not the best choice of words in light of what he is saying in this passage and given the main premises of our thesis. Nothing is actually "erzählt," and that is the very feature which makes Schnitzler's text so impressive: we do indeed have the feeling that we have just overheard the inner verbalization of private shame, which the protagonist would never have wanted us to overhear. Gustl has not *told* us anything; we simply "stole" a series of thoughts from his mind without his knowledge.

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[43] M. Vanhelleputte, p. 223-24.

Introduction

Valéry Larbaud published his first UDIM, entitled *Amants, heureux amants...*, in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* in 1921. As is evident from the dedication: "To James Joyce, my friend, and the only begetter of the form I have adopted in this piece of writing,"[1] Larbaud was at that time still unaware of Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. According to B. Fabrizzi, Larbaud

> came to discover the existence of this form [interior monologue - V.T.] through his contacts with Joyce. Larbaud had first met the Irish writer in November, 1920, in Paris, at the bookstore of Miss Sylvia Beach. [...] In April, 1921, in the bookstore of Adrienne Monnier, Joyce spoke to Larbaud of Edouard Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and of his use of the interior monologue. Whatever the reason, Larbaud seems to have taken little notice of Joyce's references at that time.[2]

Therefore, whatever influence of Dujardin one might find in Larbaud's writing, it is most likely there through Joyce's mediation.

At the same time Larbaud's indirect debt to Dujardin should not be underestimated because many of the devices and especially the key premises of the UDIM genre introduced by the author of *Les Lauriers sont coupés* are present in *Amants, heureux amants...* To quote E. van der Staay,

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[1] V. Larbaud, *Amants, heureux amants...* (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), p. 114. All subsequent page references will be to this edition.

[2] B. Fabrizzi, "Valéry Larbaud and the Interior Monologue," *Kentucky French Quarterly,*1 (1966), p. 20. Also cf. M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method,* p. 173.

> bien qu'une influence directe des *Lauriers sont coupés* sur le monologue intérieur de Valéry Larbaud soit exclue selon les documents historiques, l'œuvre de Dujardin peut montrer, néanmoins, des ressemblances syntaxiques avec "Amants, heureux amants..." et "Mon plus secret conseil..."[3]

The latter novella, which is also in the form of a UDIM, appeared in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* in 1923. That same year *Amants, heureux amants...*, *Mon plus secret conseil...* and an impersonal narrative entitled *Beauté, mon beau souci...* were published by Gallimard in one volume under the title *Amants, heureux amants...*

Amants, heureux amants..., just as the other two works in the cycle, is about an unconventional love affair involving a dandy protagonist. The discourse time of the UDIM covers about one day in the leisurely life of Felice Francia, a decadent, independently wealthy French aesthete, and, as J. L. Brown indicates, "there is little or no 'plot' in this first conscious experiment of Larbaud with the 'stream of consciousness' technique."[4] Brown's view of *Amants, heureux amants...* as a virtually plotless text is understandable, since the events of the main story-line are too few and too insignificant to merit our attention on their own. Francia's UDIM takes place in Montpellier where the protagonist is visited by Inga, a bisexual dancer of Swedish origin and his off-and-on mistress. In the company of her current "flame," an Italian dancer called Romana Cerri, Inga is on her way to an engagement in Nice. The three bohemian friends spend the night together, and, after this brief sexual encounter followed by a walk in a park the next morning, the protagonist sees his two friends off at the train station. He then toys with the idea of following them to Nice, decides against it and ends up staying in Montpellier. The text is divided into three sections, and in each one the thinker is in a different location: 1) in the hotel room the morning after the "ménage," 2) later that day in the hotel lobby as Francia waits for the two women to join him and finally, 3) in the streets of Montpellier, as he walks back from the train station after having seen Inga and Romana off.

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[3] E. van der Staay, *Le Monologue intérieur dans l'œuvre de Valéry Larbaud* (Paris: Slatkine, 1987), pp. 118-19. For a discussion of Joyce's role in the Dujardin-Larbaud connection cf. the chapter entitled "Mise en analogie des *Lauriers sont coupés* et d'*Ulysse* avec les deux nouvelles en monologue intérieur de Valéry Larbaud" in E. van der Staay, pp. 118-124.

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[4] J. L. Brown, *Valéry Larbaud* (Boston: Twayne, 1981), p. 108.

The thinker's UDIM opens in his Montpellier hotel room "the morning after." As he contemplates Inga and Romana asleep in the adjacent room, Francia reestablishes where he is and recalls the previous night's "disportment":

> Des flots et de Palavas-les-Flots le soleil qui vient tout droit jaillit à travers les lames de la persienne; c'est bon, de pouvoir laisser la fenêtre ouverte toute la nuit, à ce commencement de novembre. Les bouteilles et les coupes sur la table et sur le guéridon, la bouteille encore bouchée, dans le seau à glace; ce désordre. Et la porte ouverte qui tous ces derniers jours était verrouillée. Elles dorment encore. Tant mieux. (115)

According to D. Cohn, in order to avoid the conventions of narratorial introductions, a number of authors of interior monologue have resorted to the device used here by Larbaud: having the thinker's consciousness emerge out of a semi- or unconscious state, such as sleep, a daze or a faint. The latter is the case in Garshin's "Four Days" (cf. Chapter 3). As Cohn points out,

> the effectiveness of a matinal beginning is enhanced by the opportunity it offers for locating the speaker in the time, space, and circumstances of his life, since it is the moment when the consciousness, momentarily disoriented, most naturally reminds itself of all it has left behind during its somnolent absence.[5]

In other words, an awakening is a way of *motivating* the presence of an introductory context in a UDIM text without violating the illusion of self-communication. And this is in fact the case in *Amants, heureux amants...* where Francia not only locates himself in time and space--Palavas-les-Flots is near Montpellier--but also surveys "the damage" from the night before and recalls that the previous night's party marked the beginning of his ménage with Inga and Romana: "Et la porte ouverte qui tous ces derniers jours était verrouillée. Elles dorment encore." It ought to be stressed, however, that Cohn's idea that the awakening mind in UDIM "most *naturally* reminds itself of all it has left behind during its somnolent absence" (my italics) can be misleading if one sees this literary device as a reflection of what *actually* happens in real inner speech. The only "natural" thing about such an awakening is that most readers, on the basis of certain logical assumptions, are probably likely to find it *believable* and nothing more.

Although Francia's discourse begins with his on-going physical experience, sensorimotor UDIM in Larbaud's text is even less prominent than it is in "Leutnant Gustl," and much less so than in

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[5] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, 241.

Les Lauriers sont coupés and "Four Days." Given that Francia *recalls* most of the events of the two days spent with Inga and Romana in Montpellier, only a minute portion of the main story-line is disclosed *in actu.* As a result, the present moment in this text is used only as a point of departure for memories of the thinker's past affair with Inga, the analysis of Inga's and Romana's personalities, imaginary scenes from Inga's biography, disdainful thoughts about Pauline (a conventional "fille à marier" who is staying at the same hotel), reflections on an unnamed pious and yet sensual mistress, the evocation of various hypothetical and real events from history, musings on literature and certain historical figures, and most of all: the philosophical contemplation of love and emotional commitment. In many ways the latter seems to be the whole point of *Amants, heureux amants...*, the rudimentary story-line serving as a mere pretext. This is why M. Raimond's view of interior monologue in general seems particularly appropriate for Larbaud's uneventful story:

> Le monologue intérieur permet au lecteur d'entrer dans le présent d'un héros qu'aucun événement n'accapare, et qui, puisqu'il demeure dans un état neutre, esquisse, au cours d'une rêverie libre, diverses fantaisies qui sont comme les tentations de l'avenir.[6]

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[6] M. Raimond, p. 291.

And so, although *Amants, heureux amants...* is even more "about nothing" than *Les Lauriers sont coupés,* and although it has none of the life-and-death drama of "Leutnant Gustl" and "Four Days," it by no means appears banal or purely experimental. Larbaud's handling of the premises implied by the UDIM genre and especially the aesthetic and philosophical concerns raised by this text make "Amants, heureux amants..." anything but a mere formalistic exercise.

Because, in the absence of a strong main story-line, there is really no focusing mechanism (cf. Chapter 5) to structure Francia's inner discourse--perhaps save for the thinker's preoccupation with erotic love[7]--the resulting associative drift creates a distinctly non-narratorial effect. This disorganized and unstructured quality of *Amants, heureux amants...* is reinforced by the absence of paragraph divisions or formal chapter breaks within each section, as in "Leutnant Gustl": only blank spaces between the three parts of the story indicate a change in the thinker's spatiotemporal position.[8] Such blanks are used in "Four Days," "Leutnant Gustl" and *Amants, heureux amants...* to *accelerate* the story by indicating the passage of time.

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[7] M. Friedman, "Valéry Larbaud: the Two Traditions of Eros," *Yale French Studies,* 11 (1965), pp. 91-100. Friedman argues that the erotic theme is common in the interior monologue genre, citing such texts as *Les Lauriers sont coupés, Ulysses* and *The Sound and the Fury.* M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness,* p. 166.

However, whereas in Garshin's and Schnitzler's texts these divisions are motivated by the thinkers' loss of consciousness, in Larbaud's story no such motivation is present. As D. Cohn argues, "by tuning in and out of Franca's [sic] mind in this fashion 'Amants' in effect consists of three discontinuous mental 'entries,' a structure that moves the monologic genre back in the direction of the traditional diary form [...]."[9] Although Cohn is probably correct in her criticism, this is a relatively minor "defect" in *Amants, heureux amants...*: especially in comparison to Larbaud's other UDIM *Mon plus secret conseil...* In the latter text the illusion of spontaneous inner verbalization is truly compromised by such traditional narratorial structuring devices as paragraphs and chapter breaks marked by Roman numerals. And in this respect *Mon plus secret conseil...* is reminiscent of *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. In fact, I would argue that in general *Mon plus secret conseil...* is more coherent and organized, i.e., more like conventional narrative, than is *Amants, heureux amants...* As M. Friedman points out,

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[8] Cf. M. Friedman, "Valéry Larbaud: the Two Traditions of Eros," p. 97.

[9] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 241.

> Lucas' [the thinker in *Mon plus secret conseil...* - V.T.] monologue has none of the feverish instability which characterizes the distortions of Francia's mind, especially in the middle section of *Amants, heureux amants.* His thoughts proceed in a regular sequence, and there are guide posts along the way to point out direction. *Mon plus secret conseil* begins with an identification of place, "Palazzo Ristori, Vomero, Napoli," and of plot, "Et si je la ramenais à son mari." The place designation is the first in a long series of railway stations traversed by the train [carrying Lucas who is fleeing from his mistress across Italy - V.T.]. These Italian names are offered at odd intervals to check the continuous flow of Lucas' monologue and reorient the reader in space.[10]

However, although no such direct indicators are used in *Amants, heureux amants...*, and although this UDIM appears in a number of ways to have succeeded more than *Mon plus secret conseil...* in creating the illusion of private communication, in both texts Larbaud "discreetly refrains from plunging too deep into the murk of the subconscious, from exploiting 'free association' to the full."[11] As M. Raimond puts it, "il n'atteignait pas, bien sûr, à la puissance de Joyce; mais ses deux œuvres, *Amants, heureux*

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[10] M. Friedman. *Stream of Consciousness*, p. 171.

[11] J. L. Brown, p. 102. Also cf. B. Fabrizzi, p. 28.

amants et *Mon plus secret conseil,* courtes nouvelles toujours exquises, opposaient aux excès joyciens «la revanche de la mesure»"[12]

What makes the illusion of self-communication in *Amants, heureux amants...* often more powerful than it is in the three texts discussed so far is the fact that in a number of places the reader feels truly "unwanted." There is a clear sense--and this must be more Joyce's influence than anyone else's--that the author is making a special effort to create the impression that the reader's needs are not an issue in Francia's UDIM, which is full of obscure references, quotations (often in foreign languages) without an explicit context and/or reference to the source etc. And so, it is the fact that the thinker often appears so *explicitly* unconcerned with "dotting his i's and crossing his t's" that makes the UDIM in Larbaud's story so impressive.

Context v. Syntax and Other Forms of Discourse Abbreviation: Echoes of Dujardin

As in Dujardin's and Schnitzler's respective DIM's, much of the private communication effect in *Amants, heureux amants...* is achieved by reliance on elements related to spontaneous oral discourse. Abbreviation and other forms of reliance on context as opposed to syntax, i.e., E. Ochs's "principle of nextness" (cf. Chapter 3), are very common in Larbaud's text: hence van der Staay's above-cited comment regarding "ressemblances syntaxiques" between Larbaud's and Dujardin's respective texts. Francia's discourse is full of Ref+Prop constructions where syntactic links between Theme and Rheme elements are left out (cf. Chapter 3). Here are three typical examples, all involving marked word order with the Rheme element in first place: Francia's verbalization of touching a cushion: "Horrible, le toucher du velours" (115); his recollection of the conservative Pauline's prudish reaction to the lesbian overtones in Inga's and Romana's behavior: "Un peu surprise, Pauline [...]" (132); and his memory of the way he had walked into the hotel dining room with Inga and Romana: "Très correcte, notre entrée dans la salle à manger [...] (132).[13]

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[12] M. Raimond, p. 282. Also cf. F. Weissman, "Valéry Larbaud et le monologue intérieur," *Colloque Valéry Larbaud* (Paris: A.G. Nizet, 1975), p. 297.

Abbreviation through the *elimination* of Theme elements is also very widely used in this text and often much more boldly than it is done in Dujardin and even Schnitzler. For example, as the thinker reflects on Romana's character, he defines it using the following

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[13] Cf. E. van der Staay, p. 174.

Themeless adjectival phrases: "«Douce et belle?» Belle et dure plutôt; dure et sévère comme le laurier." (130) Or later on, recalling the way he seduced the inebriated Romana, Francia produces similarly clipped sentence fragments containing only Rheme elements, which suggests communicative privacy and distances his discourse from conventional narrative practice: "Son petit air modeste; les yeux baissés sous le beau front bombé. Piglio di Madonnina. [Air of a small Madonna - V.T.] Les mains sont très belles. Pensé aux vers: «O bella mano...» J'aurais dû les lui réciter. Et dire que sans la connaître, brutalement, sottement." (132-133)[14] It is especially in the last sentence (about the sexual act itself) that the absence of Theme elements is truly striking and conducive to the illusion of private communication. The nominal phrases regarding Romana's appearance and behavior at the beginning of this passage represent a typical and frequently used form of discourse abbreviation in Larbaud's text.[15]

Larbaud also relies on the principle of nextness when his thinker draws *mental parallels* without verbalizing any explicit (syntactic) links between the elements being compared. And this specific form of reliance on context at the expense of syntax is much closer to Joyce's technique than to anything found in Dujardin's or Schnitzler's respective DIM's. For example, as Francia recalls the way a young village boy had looked at him and the two women in a park, he imagines a whole scene where Inga seduces this adolescent admirer. Then he remarks: "Il avait peut-être gardé les troupeaux, ce gentil gamin. «Le Pâtre et la Danseuse, conte.» Tout de même, ça aurait été joli, et ça l'aurait changée, elle, des amis et admirateurs. Minerve déguisée en berger." (148) Whereas a conventional narrator might have used an explicit link, such as "(ils auraient été) **comme** Le Pâtre et la Danseuse" or "(le jeune berger) **ressemblait** à Minerve déguisée en berger," Francia makes these comparisons not only in the form of Themeless (nominal) sentences, but also uses nothing concrete to bridge the "metaphoric gap" between these images and their context. The private communication effect is further stressed by the use of *copy pronouns/nouns* (cf. Chapter 3) in "**il** avait peut-être gardé les troupeaux, ce gentil **gamin**" and "**ça** aurait été joli, et **ça l**'aurait changée, **elle**, des **amis** et **admirateurs**" (my emphasis), which is another widely used element of spontaneous oral communication in *Amants, heureux amants...*

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[14] The associatively evoked «O bella mano...» is the first line of Petrarch's Sonnet No. 199: "O bella man, che mi destringi'l core [...]" In A. M. Armi's translation it sounds like this: "O lovely hand that clasp and hold my heart [...]." Petrarch, *Sonnets and Songs*, A.M. Armi trans. (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1946), pp. 290-91. Naturally, the source of the quotation is not given by the self-communicating thinker.

[15] cf. E. van der Staay, p. 119.

A similar instance of reliance on the implicit at the expense of the explicit, i.e., context rather than syntax, when it comes to parallels drawn by the thinker, is an imaginary scene, which appears in Francia's mind as he considers Inga's preference for affairs with women:

> Nulle place pour autre chose [women - V.T.], dans ce cher cœur d'Inga. Des aventures [with men -V.T.], oui, mais c'est leur profession qui l'exige. Les jeunes patriciens, accablés par le vin et le sommeil, tombant confusément sur les coussins avec les jeunes joueuses de flûte, à la fin des festins; et même dans cette ivresse et ce trouble, les yeux et les mains des petites se cherchent encore. (119-120)

Only the principle of nextness implicitly suggests a connection between the hypothetical Roman orgy and the preceding musings on Inga's lesbianism. And however easy it is for the reader to make the missing explicit link, its absence indicates that this is not written narrative and is therefore not meant to be overheard.

In the "Roman orgy" passage the private communication illusion is further accentuated not only by discourse abbreviation through Theme dropping--"nulle place" implies something like "il n'y a," while "des aventures" would be presumably preceded by something resembling "elle a" or "elle cherche"--but also by *Rheme modification*. It is a device involving the use of a nominal phrase, which creates the effect of discourse abbreviation without actual Theme dropping: "Les jeunes patriciens [...] tombant confusément sur les coussins [...]." The Rheme element "tombant" is a participle, which in conventional narrative would appear most likely in the form of a verb. The result is what *looks* like a sentence fragment where the Rheme is modified in order to create the impression of discourse abbreviation without the elimination of any information from the sentence.

Rheme modification is also used as Francia imagines the seduction of the virginal Pauline by Inga: "Oh, Inga s'attaquant à une fille comme celle-là; à une demoiselle à marier; et complétant son éducation" (135) or compares Inga to Romana: "Inga, ne mettant personne dans ses secrets; Romana, sage, pleine d'expérience, fermée" (137). His thought looks abbreviated even though nothing has been actually *eliminated* from the phrases in question. Rheme modification, although less frequent than in Larbaud's text, already makes its appearance in Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, as in this sensorimotor passage where Daniel is walking through the streets of Paris: "...maintenant la rue Monceau; encore ces hautes maisons majestueuses, et le gaz y jetant sa lumière jaune..."(84) or in the following reference to Léa's maid Marie: "Marie, qui rentre." (97) In both texts Rheme modification constitutes an effective compromise between the quasi-mimetic and the informatory goals of the UDIM genre.[16]

Verba Dicendi

Verba dicendi are virtually absent from Larbaud's text, and this tendency is part of Francia's general reliance on context at the expense of explicit links between discourse elements. When recalling or imagining someone else's discourse, Francia usually "quotes" it without explicitly linking it with its source.

For example, as the thinker muses over Romana's lack of aesthetic awareness demonstrated the day before during a stroll through Montpellier, he suddenly associatively recalls Inga's letter where her Italian companion is mentioned:

Hier elle [Romana - V.T.] a admiré Palavas et quand,

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[16] Cf. L. E. Bowling's idea that during discourse abbreviation "[in interior monologue texts] a noun is commonly used to designate an object not in motion, and a participle is attached if movement is indicated." L. E. Bowling, "What is the Stream of Consciousness Technique?" L. E. Bowling, p. 361.

> traversant l'Œuf avec elles, je lui ai montré le groupe des Trois Grâces, elle l'a à peine regardé. «Au lieu de m'arrêter deux jours à Marseille, j'irai vous voir à Montpellier. Mon amie Romana Cerri, dont je vous ai parlé, sera avec moi.» (123)

The author of the letter is not mentioned anywhere near this passage, let alone explicitly linked with it: only from the context, i.e., by elimination, can we determine that it is Inga. Similarly, Romana Cerri is not explicitly linked to her own words, as the thinker recalls an incident with Romana's dog Zitto: "Ah, le chien de Cerri a bougé. Sa chute hier, à Palavas. «Poverino! tutto bagnato! Giù!» [Poor dear: all wet! Down! - V.T.] Désagréable animal."(118) The principle of nextness, underlying the fact that the quoted passages and the surrounding text are simply "strung together" instead of being formally linked, stresses the thinker's isolation: because here the addresser and the addressee are the same individual, the knowledge of the context of discourse can and should be taken for granted.

The fact that Francia, who tunes out his present moment almost entirely, *recalls* the discourse of others instead of registering it *in actu*, as do Schnitzler's and Dujardin's respective protagonists, creates a problem discussed in Chapter 4. Because the thinkers in

Leutnant Gustl and *Les Lauriers sont coupés* are not viewing the discourse of others retrospectively, there is no need to *motivate* their ability to reproduce dialogue verbatim. However, Francia's retrospective position with respect to extraneous discourse evokes a situation typical of most personal fictional narrative where the narrator inevitably violates *vraisemblance* by not paraphrasing but actually quoting dialogue without motivating such mnemonic prowess.

Thus, when Francia recalls Inga's account of her lesbian love affairs, the absence of an explicit link between the quotation and its source is "realistic" in that it is suggestive of self-communication. However, the fact that Inga's words appear in the form of direct speech, as well the length of the quoted passage, undermine this *vraisemblance*:

> Comme c'est secret pour nous, les pensées d'une femme à la vue d'une autre femme. La première rencontre d'Inga et Cerri. Mais avec Inga il n'y a pas de doute. Pourquoi cela ne se passe-t-il plus souvent? «Je n'ai eu que des brunes pour amies, de ces femmes qui ont toujours l'air d'être à l'ombre, comme les sources. A l'école j'avais Greta Kromer, au Conservatoire Rosele Mayer; ensuite il y a eu Carmela Savini, et j'ai pensé mourir quand Maria Ferrero m'a quittée.»" (119)

This problem of motivation disappears as soon as Francia ceases to *remember* and begins to *imagine* discourse. For example, as Francia mentally recreates a "composite" heterosexual affair from Inga's past, he first imagines the behavior of one of Inga's typical jealous lovers and then pictures something that the young woman might have said in response to this jealousy. The future and present tenses in Francia's own discourse indicate the "generic" nature of this incident:

> Quand il se montrera jaloux, elle fera tout ce qu'elle pourra pour le calmer, le rassurer, l'empêcher de souffrir. «Je resterai à genoux jusqu'à ce que tu m'aies pardonné.» Il sera dérouté et charmé. Surtout s'il est français. Toute cette humilité, tous ces «esclavages», ces agenouillements et ces abaissements, il n'en a pas l'habitude. («Dis donc, mon chéri, si c'est une scène que tu cherches.») (126)

Such "quotations" do not interefere in any way with plausibility, and the absence of *verba dicendi* in this case is as effective a device for the creation of the illusion of self-communication as it is when a thinker registers discourse *in actu.*

Inflections

The above-cited passage about Inga's jealous lover illustrates not only the principle of nextness when it comes to linking a quotation with its source in UDIM, but also the role of inflections as an additional means of compensating for the absent *verba dicendi*. Inga's second "line" (in parentheses) provides a morphological clue as to the identity of the speaker: "mon chéri." We have encountered this phenomenon in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* where in a number of exchanges without *verba dicendi* between a male speaker (Daniel) and a female speaker (Léa) the presence or absence of gender-related inflections in adjectives, nouns and participles is used as an indication of who is speaking (cf. Chapter 4). In this case, given that Inga is speaking to a man, the form of the possessive pronoun "mon" and the lack of a feminine ending in "chéri" clearly indicate that the speaker is Inga. The context alone does not guarantee this.

The advantage of inflections as a tool in the macrocommunicative process, which compensates for the "realistic" (abbreviated) form of the microcommunicative process, is especially evident in Francia's first reference to the provincial Pauline and her mother:

> Le grand coup d'aile de l'œil noir, à la rencontre. Un vers, et mauvais. Elle est gentille. Son parfum? Sage comme les images du *Monde illustré* qu'elle lit pendant que Madame Mère regarde d'un air important les chaises vides, les

> jardinières et les murs du vestibule de l'hôtel. (Les propriétaires disent: le hall.) Un peu trop parées pour l'heure. Et habillées, sans doute, par la grande couturière de Toulouse." (131)

The presence of plural inflections in "parées" and "habillées" indicates that the thinker's vestmental Parisian snobbery concerns *not just* Pauline but her mother as well. Such morphological markers make it possible to abbreviate the thinker's discourse, thereby making it look more private, by dropping the subjects (Themes) of the last two sentences in this passage without, however, interfering with the reader's recovery of the missing referents. This sort of compromise is not as easy to achieve in English, as is suggested by M. Friedman's translation of these two Themeless sentences: "A trifle overdressed for the time of day. And fitted, doubtless, by the great Toulouse dressmaker."[17] The participles "overdressed" and "fitted" do not communicate the *plural* nature of the missing Theme, which is a minor loss in the macrocommunicative process. Conversely, the "reintroduction" of the missing "they" would naturally compromise the vraisemblance of the microcommunicative process.

Missing Links and Cultural Echoes

As I pointed out in the introduction, the most interesting aspect of Larbaud's text is what I have termed "the unwanted reader effect." While all the devices discussed so far seek to create the illusion of self-communication without really stressing the reader's role as outsider, there are many instances in *Amants, heureux amants...* where the reader is made to feel truly unwanted, i.e., the eavesdropper that s/he is supposed to be according the UDIM premise. This is done mainly through the **a)**omission of important linking elements in the thinker's discourse and the **b)**absence of key contextual information. As B. Fabrizzi points out, "Larbaud's painstaking adherence to objective fact is realistically true; inner thoughts are swiftmoving, far-reaching, unconnected, wandering."[18] The key words here are "unconnected, wandering" because in many instances the reader has the impression that s/he is not meant to follow the thinker's thought development and understand the mechanism behind his associative links. In this way Beaugrande's and Dressler's standards of coherence and intentionality are violated in a very purposeful way: Francia's monologue is not intended to be communicable.

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[17] M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness,* p. 168.

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[18] B. Fabrizzi, pp. 25-26. The term "objective fact" in Fabrizzi's comment is probably not the best one, given that in UDIM we are dealing not with the imitation of objective reality but rather a hypothetical concept. Therefore, as we have pointed out, all illusion-making devices in this genre are "realistically true" only in as much as they make a given thinker's discourse look different from conventional narrative.

J. L. Brown observes that "Larbaud, with his vast literary culture, was constantly quoting, sometimes, indeed, without realizing it."[19] The use of quotations, as well as references to literary works and figures constitute the main mechanism in the "unwanted reader" effect of *Amants, heureux amants...* Francia's quotations and other literary/historical references--which are often in the original Latin, ancient Greek and Italian--appear in such a poorly contextualized and *conceptually disjointed* manner that even if the reader manages to reconstruct their context, it appears incidental, something taken for granted by the thinker and accidentally overheard by the reader. Although this type of associative *referential incoherence* is observed in lyric poetry--which, according to I. I. Kovtunova, is related to inner speech and the interior monologue[20]--it is very unlikely to be present in *communicatively realistic* conventional narrative (cf. Chapter 1).

For example, Francia begins to think of Homer and the *Odyssey* associatively after hearing some Greek students talking in the streets of Montpellier:

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[19] J. L. Brown, p. 103.

[20] I. I. Kovtunova, "Poeticheskaia rech kak forma kommunikatsii," *Voprosy Iazykoznaniia*, 1 (1986), pp. 3-14.

> Je ne comprends pas trois mots sur dix. Quand je pense que j'ai su les chants six et seize de *l'Odyssée* presque entièrement par cœur. Que m'en reste-il? Dans le six, je serais bien vite arrêté. Les discours d'adieu du treize, et quelques passages encore. Étonnants, l'arrivée à l'aurore et ensuite le réveil sur le rivage, dans le brouillard. Il a bien vu cet épais brouillard amer qui monte parfois de la Méditerranée [...] Tout le début de la conversation avec Minerve déguisée en berger a lieu dans ce brouillard, sous cette menace d'un cataclysme silencieux, d'un commencement de periode glaciaire. Et soudain la Déesse disperse la nuée, et la terre apparaît, telle qu'on l'a toujours connue, frappée de soleil, et tout sur elle agité de vent. Le vent dans le jardin, cet après-midi, au bord du Lez. (146-47)

Francia's preliminary remarks about passages from the *Odyssey* that he can still quote from memory do not provide a context *explicit* enough for the reader to situate the subsequently paraphrased snippets in a specific place in Homer's text. In other words, even if the reader succeeds in identifying the thinker's musings as a reference to the beginning of Book 13, s/he still has the impression of having done so on her/his own, i.e., not *with* Francia's help but *in spite of* his communicative isolation. The references to Odysseus's return to Ithaca, the fog created by Athene to fool him and his subsequent encounter with the disguised goddess are all mentioned in such unclear terms that communication with anyone outside of Francia's mind is out of the question. The thinker feels no need to mention Odysseus as the referent of the Themeless nominal phrases "l'arrivée à l'aurore" and "le réveil sur le rivage, dans le brouillard." Neither does he make it clear that Odysseus is Athene's interlocutor in "tout le début de la conversation avec Minerve déguisée en berger a lieu dans ce brouillard." Furthermore, an explicit referent is also missing in "Il a bien vu cet épais brouillard amer qui monte parfois de la Méditerranée," and although we may assume that "il" refers to Homer, the absence of the poet's name from anywhere near this passage indicates that the use of this seemingly contextless deictic ("il") is part of a private communication process (cf. below).

As the last sentence in the above-cited passage indicates, Francia's ever-present associative drift leads him away from the *Odyssey* to other matters, namely, the outing to a park on the shore of the river Lez with Inga and Romana before their departure for Nice. However, two pages later, as he recalls the graceful physique of a shepherd-boy who was also at this park, Francia compares him to Athene (cf. above) and thereby returns to thoughts about the *Odyssey*:

> Minerve déguisée en berger. La description est sommaire; mais il y a le détail: πaváπalos [delicate/tender - V.T. (l.

> 323)]: le corps délicat et tendre comme l'ont les fils des Princes. Et les fils des Princes étaient là, assis aux tables, tandis que l'aède chantait. [...] La description de l'antre des Naïades, obscure et belle comme l'antre lui-même." (148)

Only an implicit clue--the repetition of "Minerve déguisée en berger" from the first passage about the *Odyssey* (cf. above)--indicates indirectly that Francia has returned to Book 13. The associative references to the "fils des Princes" and to the cave of the Naiades (where the Phaeacians deposit Odysseus at dawn) appear as fragments of a larger implicit discourse without an explicit context, repeating the effect produced by the first passage about the *Odyssey.*

Even more private sounding is a quotation from Book II of Vergil's *Georgics* in a passage where Francia reflects on Romana's mind-set:

> Comme son esprit: tout fait, sans rien qui soit d'elle seule et qu'on n'oublie pas. *Magna parens frugum* [Great parent of the fruit/grain - V.T.]: les fruits parfaits; les colonnes; «fragments d'un torse de Diane trouvé à Herculanum»; les courbes ombres bises sur une coulée de blanc mat; l'absence d'éclat et de ces adorables défauts; et le voile de crêpe au bas de l'urne d'or(130)

Magna parens frugum (l. 173) is Vergil's reference to Italy as a source of agricultural wealth, and it appears associatively in Francia's mind because Romana is Italian. The subsequent connection with Diana may be attributable to her origins as a Cretan fertility goddess: *frugum*→Diana. However, all these links are absent, i.e., taken for granted, leaving the reader with a disjointed stream of private associations where *Magna parens frugum,*without any reference to its source, appears unrelated to Romana and acts as a pivotal but unclear self-communication mechanism. The implicit outweighs the explicit, and, as a result, even the knowledge of Latin on the reader's part may be insufficient to make up for the all that is left unsaid in this passage.

A similar effect is achieved when Francia quotes from Ugo Foscolo. As the thinker looks at the statues of the Three Graces at the Œuf (another name given to the Place de la Comédie in Montpellier), he associatively arrives at a passage from "Venere" ("Venus")--the first of three poems, which constitute Foscolo's "Le Grazie" ("The Graces") cycle:

> Bienheureux cet homme-là [the sculptor of the Three Graces - V.T.] d'avoir pu dresser sur la place publique, nues et sans honte, les filles de son esprit. Quelle expérience, quelle longue méditation du corps féminin... «Io, finché viva Ombra daranno a Bellosguardo i lauri...» [As long as I live, laurels will cast

their shadow on Bellosguardo - V.T.](141)[21]

Although the thinker does mention the author of this excerpt, he not only fails to translate it, but he also gives no other information as to its source. As a result, Francia's thought association--the statues of the Three Graces in Montpellier on the one hand and Foscolo's poem cycle about the Three Graces--appears completely private and obscure, since no attempt is made by the thinker to make this associative link explicit. Thus, even a reader versed in Italian would have to know the exact source of the quotation in order understand why *that* particular passage comes to Francia's mind as he passes in front of the Three Graces group at the Place de la Comédie. However, whatever the reader manages to understand, s/he is still very likely to feel "unwanted" in this self-communicative process.

Exactly the same kind of *seemingly* missing associative link is observed when Francia's constant associative drift leads him to a passage taken not from literature but from a historical text. The thinker's recollection of the holiday spent in Sweden with Inga brings him to various musings and imaginary scenes related to Inga's Viking ancestors, which in turn evokes a statement by Pope Gregory I:

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[21] "Venere," ll. 335-36. Bellosguardo is the area in Florence where Foscolo wrote this poem, and at the same time it is a reference to the poet's sylvan temple to the Graces. Cf. D. Radcliff, *Ugo Foscolo* (N.Y.: Twayne, 1970).

> "Fille et femme [Inga - V.T.] des Rois de la Mer: la même race, les mêmes yeux farouches et tendres,--ses longs yeux clairs,--que ces filles qu'ils emportaient dans leurs navires hérissées de longues rames, à la proue en forme de tête de cheval ou de dragon. [...] Et parfois il dut y avoir la rencontre d'une fille d'Italie ou de la Narbonnaise avec une de ces grandes païennes toutes claires et dorées comme l'ancienne Aphrodite d'or. La façon dont elles se considéraient sans rien dire; leur étonnement. Comme ce pape, au marché des esclaves à Rome: «Non pas Angles mais Anges.»(119)

Given this passage as it appears, the connection between "«Non pas Angles mais Anges»" and the preceding text is likely to appear problematic for many readers. The preposition "comme" in "comme ce pape, au marché des esclaves à Rome" makes it clear that this is not a randomly inserted quotation, which means that "«Non pas Angles mais Anges»" is definitely linked to its context. The question is how? The answer hides behind Francia's reference to the blond hair of the "grandes païennes" and the impression that such a northern hair color would have made on a southern woman in the Middle Ages. According to the English historian-monk Bede or the Venerable Bede (c673-735), Pope Gregory the Great--the alleged originator of the Gregorian chant who is also known as Gregory I or Saint Gregory (c540-604)--was very impressed by the blond hair of two captured English children for sale at a Roman slave market. When he was told that they were Angles, he punned: "Not Angles but Angels."[22] All this contextual information is taken for granted by the thinker, which is in keeping with the private-communication premise of UDIM. And even if the reader is aware of this incident and Pope Gregory's pun, s/he still does not feel "wanted," since there is a clear sense that Francia is leaving out more than he is "saying," i.e., he is leaving out the kind of contextual information that a conventional narrator would be unlikely to omit.

Such missing or partial contextualization--which keeps reminding the reader that s/he is an eavesdropper, a mental interloper, privy to little "islands" of reference with much of the message submerged by the internal communication process--is also present when the thinker's inner discourse is brought associatively to thoughts of the painter Fabre and his biography. Francia's decision to reread Lucian of Samostata brings him to the idea of going to the Fabre Library:

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[22] R. McCrum, W. Cran and R. MacNeil, *The Story of English* (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1986), p. 64.

> Il [Lucian - V.T.] sera sans doute dans la bibliothèque de Fabre: l'amant de l'Albany devait avoir un Lucien. [...] L'Albany... [...] Et Fabre: cet homme jeune dans cet illustre vieux ménage. Mais Alfieri savait-il? Indifférent peut-être. Tenant à ses habitudes et, pour le monde, la nécessité de continuer à être le poète amant d'une reine. Et toute cette histoire qui finit à Montpellier. Oh, oui, indifférent. Ses promenades, seul, le soir, au bord de l'Arno, ruminant les vers d'Homère. Pieno il capo... [head full of... - V.T.]" (138)

As with the above-mentioned story about Pope Gregory I, we have the impression of glimpsing pieces of a larger picture that would be made available if this were a form of public discourse, such as conventional narrative. This hypothetical "narrative" would yield the following information: "La bibliothèque de Fabre" is located at the Musée Fabre in Montpellier. "L'Albany" is Countess Louise of Albany, wife of Charles-Edouard Stuart, Count of Albany, who, upon her husband's death in 1788, joined the Italian poet Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803). Later, without separating from the ageing Alfieri, Louise of Albany became involved with François-Xavier Pascal Fabre (1766-1837), a Montpellier-born painter, hence: "Mais Alfieri savait-il? Indifférent peut-être." Alfieri bequeathed his art collection to "d'Albany" from whom Fabre inherited it and in his turn bequeathed it to the city of his birth: Montpellier. This reconstruction illustrates the number of contextual gaps, i.e., information taken for granted by a self-communicating character ignorant of the reader's presence. The self-communication illusion is reinforced here by such devices as the unfinished "Pieno il capo..." and Themeless phrases like "Indifférent peut-être. Tenant à ses habitudes et, pour le monde, la nécessité de continuer à être le poète amant d'une reine" (cf. above).

Therefore, J. L. Brown is quite right in saying that "Larbaud, willingly enigmatic, demands much more 'reader participation' than the majority of his contemporaries."[23] M. Raimond, on the other hand, is only partially correct when, comparing *Amants, heureux amants...* to *Ulysses,* he argues that "l'intelligibilité, chez Larbaud, n'est pas à conquérir, elle est donnée par l'auteur [...] Chez Larbaud le lecteur ne perd jamais le fil, dans cet entremêlement voulu du présent, du passé, de l'avenir, du réel et de la rêverie."[24]

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[23] J. L. Brown, p. 104.

[24] M. Raimond, pp. 285-86. Similarly, although F. Weissman is correct to say that "comparé à celui de Joyce, qui demande au lecteur un vrai travail de critique pour être compris, le monologue intérieur larbaldien parait le comble d'intelligibilité," the phrase "le comble d'intelligibilité" is perhaps not the best choice of words in light of the above-cited private quotations and literary references from Francia's discourse. F. Weissman, p. 297.

Although Joyce's text is undeniably far more difficult to decode than is Larbaud's, Francia's private quotations and literary references not only underscore the privacy of the thinker's UDIM, but pose a real challenge to the reader. The information gaps created in this way constitute a major difference between Garshin, Dujardin and Schnitzler on the one hand, and Larbaud on the other. While the first three authors make the *entire* UDIM of their respective protagonists perfectly intelligible--a situation suggestive of *public* communication, such as conventional narrative--the author of *Amants, heureux amants...* is much closer to the UDIM premise. After all, it makes perfect sense that, when eavesdropping on private discourse, we should not be able to understand everything.

Unnaming

As the above-cited literary allusions and quotations demonstrate, the "unwanted reader" effect is based in part on *private reference,* i.e., the thinker seems to be implying that he knows to whom or to what he is referring, and that is all that counts. And one of the most innovative forms of referential privacy is observed throughout the text where Francia frequently refers to a mistress whom he never names; instead her refers to her as "celle à qui je pense." The peculiar way in which the thinker uses "celle à qui je pense" to designate his mysterious friend is especially noticeable because it is in contrast with his manner of referring to the three other women at the center of his attention: Inga, Romana and the prim Pauline. Because he names the latter three and consistently avoids naming "celle à qui je pense," her absent name suggests perhaps that this woman appears in Francia's mind as a *pure image*, i.e., in the form of non-verbal thought. It is as if he does not "say" her but simply "sees" her in his mind, which may very well mean that this is a symbolic way of suggesting that the reader would hear a blank in the discourse instead of "celle à qui je pense" if s/he were eavesdropping on this UDIM. For example: "Très bien, ce pyjama. Havane et crème. Frais et souple. Acheté le jour où celle à qui je pense... Cerri. Chérrie Cerri (difficile à prononcer)." (123)[25] The reference to the phonic aspects of the word "Cerri" stresses the specifically *verbal* nature of Romana Cerri in Francia's UDIM, which is set off against the seemingly "wordless" representation of the other woman whose image seems to be merely *thought* into existence, as the verb "penser" may be suggesting.

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[25] Here the unfinished construction "acheté le jour où celle à qui je pense..." results when the association of "celle à qui je pense" with Romana Cerri interrupts Francia's thought process. This type of interruption is an illusion-making device that we have already seen in Dujardin's and Schnitzler's respective texts. As E. van der Staay points out, "le caractère 'continu' de la structure syntaxique est une méthode souvent appliquée au monologue intérieur pour marquer, au moyen de points de suspension, une interruption réelle dans le flux mental du locuteur." E. van der Staay, p. 121

"Celle à qui je pense" appears again and again in Francia's UDIM, and usually it is as a result of parallels associatively drawn by the thinker between "his women." For example, as Francia goes over the above-mentioned imaginary composite "jealous lover" scene from Inga's life, Inga's feigned humility (cf. above) reminds him of "celle à qui je pense" and her false piety: "Comme moi la première fois que j'ai accompagné celle à qui je pense dans une église: refuse la chaise et s'agenouille sur le pavé, comme le font, sans doute, les femmes du plus bas peuple de son pays." (126) Later on Francia associates Inga with "celle à qui je pense" again, as he considers Inga's passionate nature:

> Elle [Inga - V.T.], ce n'est pas ainsi qu'elle aime; la passion et non la vanité la mène, et rien au monde ne l'empêcherait, elle, de rejoindre ce qu'elle aime. Celle à qui je pense, le jour où je lui ai dit cette pauvreté: que je l'aimais autant que moi-même.--«Alors tu m'aimes bien peu.» [...] Elle [Inga - V.T.] a ce

> qu'elle aime. Tant pis pour moi si... Mais j'ai celle à qui je pense, et dont je ne lui parlerai pas. (128-29)

It could be further argued that by denying "celle à qui je pense" a name, the author, however *symbolically*, appears to be distancing his thinker from a key element of conventional narration: conventional *characterization*. The importance of some kind of concrete *verbal* marker, which is usually a proper name, for unifying all the traits of a particular character into an intelligible whole in narrative is stressed by S. Cohan and L. Shires: "Characterization assembles traits at a proper name so that the name can serve as a substitution for those traits [...]."[26] J. Culler, drawing on R. Barthes's theory, also points out that "the proper name provides a kind of cover; an assurance that these qualities, gathered from throughout the text, can be related to one another and form a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts."[27] Therefore, if we assume that "celle à qui je pense" does not have any *verbal* representation in Francia's discourse, then it is as if this "blank space" could not be used as Barthes's "cover" in order gather this woman's character traits into a single entity. And even though "celle à qui je pense" effectively replaces a proper name, making Francia's absent mistress just as easy to naturalize as it would be if she were actually named, the non-narratorial nature of Francia's UDIM appears to be suggested by this symbolic namelessness and the illusion of self-communication is enhanced.

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[26] S. Cohan & L. Shires, *Telling Stories: A Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction* (Routledge: 1988), p. 75.

[27] J. Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralist Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge, 1975), pp. 236-37. Also cf. R. Barthes, *S/Z* (Paris: Seuil, 1970, pp. 98-99, 197.

The link between this device and the unwanted reader" effect--the idea that what matters is that Francia knows the name of "celle à qui je pense," while the reader's needs are simply not an issue--appears to be thematized at one point when Francia compares the "well-behaved" conventional Pauline to another unnamed "honnête femme": "Elle [Pauline - V.T.] se croit sage, et on l'étonnerait bien si on lui disait qu'avec ces yeux-là, et malgré la bouche et le menton un peu sévères, elle fera, elle aussi, des sottises, comme tant d'autres. Ainsi Madame..., oui je sais qui je veux dire." (135). Similarly, while on the topic of the typical bourgeois woman's seeming social conservatism, Francia recalls another case of sudden "bohemianization" without finding it necessary to name his referent: "Et encore Madame... Celle-là une veuve. [...] Elle découvrait les amusements de la ville, et les jours du ménage n'étaient plus qu'un souvenir [...]" (136)

The thinker's "je sais qui je veux dire" is reminiscent of one instance in Dujardin's text where Daniel, while thinking about a book, finds himself unable to remember its author and easily replaces his name with something like "celle à qui je pense": "[...] oui; j'emporterai un livre; justement le roman de chose, le journaliste; je ne sais pourquoi je l'ai acheté l'autre soir[...]"(42-3) This unwillingness to make an effort in order to recall a particular name on the part of Larbaud's and Dujardin's respective thinkers stresses their communicative isolation in a way that does not make their DIM's any more difficult to read. Although the reader needs neither the journalist's name in Daniel's monologue nor the names of the two "honnêtes femmes" in Francia's discourse to make sense of the text, s/he still feels like the "odd man out" in the silent world of a self-communicating thinker.

Pronominal Privacy

Related to Francia's failure to name certain characters is *pronominal privacy*, i.e., the use of pronouns with unclear referents or referents for which the context is not made explicit. As Beaugrande points out, the larger the distance between a pronoun and its referent, the greater is the potential for the violation of cohesion (cf. standards of textuality in Chapter 1).[28] I have already quoted a passage where Francia muses about Odysseus's arrival at Ithaca in Book 13 of the *Odyssey*: "Étonnants, l'arrivée à l'aurore et ensuite le réveil sur le rivage, dans le brouillard. Il a bien vu cet épais brouillard amer qui monte parfois de la Méditerranée [...]" (146) Just as this reference to Homer--"il" in "il a bien vu"--is wholly contextually based, since the bard's name does not appear anywhere near the pronoun, so are the following references to Pauline, Inga and Cerri: "Pauline et Madame Mère qui entrent dans la boutique de Meuton. Elle m'a vu sans me reconnaître. J'ai bien fait de les mener chez Meuton: elles ne trouveront pas d'aussi bons chocolats, à Nice." (144) The ambiguous referent of "elle" in "Elle m'a vu sans me reconnaître" is most likely Pauline, but we assume this only because of Francia's keen interest in this woman, which is suggested by the repeated references to Pauline a considerable number of pages before this passage. However, without this rather removed context, Pauline's mother could just as easily be the referent. As for the pronoun "les" in "j'ai bien fait de les mener chez Meuton," it too appears very far away from its referent--Inga and Cerri--but can be attributed to them because twenty-three pages earlier (121) Francia mentions Nice as their destination. The fact that the thinker does not appear at all worried that the reader might mistakenly view Pauline and her mother as the referents of the pronoun "les" in "j'ai bien fait de les mener chez Meuton" is especially suggestive of the reader's irrelevance in Francia's mind.

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[28] R.-A. de Beaugrande and W. U. Dressler, pp. 60-61 and pp. 64-65.

Because this text is largely about love, and because the thinker is a heterosexual male, the pronoun "elle" or "elles" tends to dominate his thoughts about those around him and those who play some kind of role in his life. This makes Francia's pronominal privacy that much more private, since "il" or "ils" are rarely available to make the protagonist's referents more easily distinguishable. For example, while observing Pauline at the hotel lobby, Francia goes through his mail and realizes that "celle à qui je pense" has not written anything again:

> Madame Mère l'a appelée Pauline. Joli nom pour une fille de la Province romaine. Lui trouver un nom de famille. Rien au courier! je m'en doutais. Cela fait dix jours qu'elle ne m'écrit pas. «Ça ne fait rien», ma belle. Un nom de famille pour mademoiselle Pauline de Septimanie. Consolat. Oui, ça va, Consolat; en prononçant légèrement le t." (131)

The thinker's clear insouciance about any possible ambiguity resulting from such "loose" use of pronouns is a very effective means of creating the "unwanted reader" effect characterizing so much of this text. E. van der Staay sums up the mechanism at work with respect to pronominal privacy, stressing the illusion of eavesdropping on a private conversation:

> Un symptôme, peut-être le plus révélateur, de ce qui oppose le discours monologique à celui du récit classique, et même à toute communication, réside dans la profusion des pronoms et dans l'instabilité de leur référence. Ce système pronominal peut être tout à fait déroutant au début d'un monologue intérieur, lorsqu'il place le lecteur dans une situation qui est un peu celle de quelqu'un qui surprendrait une conversation entre des amis intimes, portant sur des personnes et des événements dont il ignore tout [...][29]

Let us sum up by saying that pronominal privacy and Francia's unwillingness to name "celle à qui je pense" in *Amants, heureux amants...* is indicative of how much further Larbaud was willing to go in his attempts to create the illusion of self-communication than did Garshin, Dujardin or Schnitzler. And in this respect, Joyce's influence is the most likely source of inspiration for the author of this UDIM.

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[29] E. van der Staay, p. 187. Also cf. T. Givon's discussion of anaphoric pronouns and sentence topics in *Topic Continuity in Discourse: A Quantitative Cross-Linguistic Study,* T. Givon, ed., (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1983), p. 17.

Passé Composé v. Passé Simple

I would like to conclude by turning to a specifically French phenomenon observed in Larbaud's and Dujardin's respective texts. Unlike English or Russian, the French language places at the UDIM author's disposal a very natural and easily applicable means of distancing a thinker's discourse from conventional narrative practice and increasing its self-communicative dimension by associating it with elements of *oral* discourse: the use of the *passé composé* (indéfini) instead of the narratorial *passé simple* (défini) in the recall of past events.

As is evident from a letter that Larbaud wrote to Jacques Rivière just before completing *Amants, heureux amants...*, he was quite conscious of the need to avoid making his text look like a narrative (récit): "*Amants, heureux amants...* ne sera pas prêt avant la rentrée. Mais c'est si peu «récit» que je ne crois pas que ça puisse passer en revue."[30] And one of the elements that contribute to the fact that *Amants, heureux amants...* indeed does appear "si peu

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[30] Quoted by G. Moix, *Poésie et monologue intérieur: problèmes de l'écriture dans l'œuvre de Valéry Larbaud* (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires de Fribourg, 1989), p. 20.

«récit»" is Francia's consistent use of the *passé composé* during recall and other retrospectively-oriented discourse. For example, this is how he recreates the seduction of Romana the night before:

> À ce moment-là, c'était un défi, et je l'ai accepté. Et quand j'ai senti ses mains se poser sur mes cheveux (ce geste si tendre, comme pour constater qu'on est bien là), j'ai compris qu'elle cédait. Mais elle s'est reprise aussitôt. Comme elle s'est jetée en pleurant de colère, dans les bras d'Inga, qui riait. Pas un baiser à moi.(130)

Francia also uses the *passé composé* for more remote memories, as for example in his recollection of an incident from his adolescence:

> Un jour, j'avais seize ou dix-sept ans et je lui ai dit, comme un collégien, pour l'étonner, ou pour voir si elle me prendrait au sérieux, que c'était par timidité et par faiblesse de caractère, et non par amour, que la plupart des femmes étaient fidèles. L'effet, formidable. M'a fait peur. Je crois même qu'elle l'a répété à son mari [...](136)

Dujardin had also availed himself of this simple device in his UDIM. In Daniel's recall of any event from his past, the *passé composé* is always used in those places where a conventional narrator would rely on the *passé simple.* As in Larbaud's text, this is the case whether the events in question are very recent--as in this reference to the thinker's last platonic encounter with Léa: "Elle m'a tendu sa main; moi, j'ai baisé son front; très chastement; sur mon épaule elle s'est penchée, et un instant nous sommes restés sans bouger..."(36)--or more remote, as in this passage about Léa's illness when Daniel gets to "play" at caring:

> Qu'y a-t-il encore eu ce soir?... Le soir où elle a été malade; la nuit que j'ai passée à la soigner. Comme elle était meurtrie, froissée et affaissée, suffocante! je l'avais attendue longtemps; elle est arrivée toute défaite; elle s'est couchée et je suis demeuré auprès de son lit; nous lui mettions des compresses sur le front; elle a renvoyé sa femme de chambre; je l'ai soignée; j'ai ainsi passé la nuit, dans un fauteuil...(77)

Given that Larbaud had not read *Les Lauriers sont coupés* before writing his novella (cf. above), the use of the *passé composé* in both texts appears to be suggested by the conventions of the French language itself in light of the communicative situation implied by the UDIM genre: *unwritten* private discourse. And, as D. Cohn points out, this "unwrittenness" is a key element in the creation of the UDIM illusion: "[autonomous monologue] can create the illusion that it renders an unrolling thought only if it effaces the illusion of a causal link between this language and written text."[31]

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[31] D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 175.

The fact that in UDIM we are dealing with written discourse that pretends to be unwritten, i.e., literature that pretends not to be literature, is of utmost importance when the effect of the *passé composé* is considered. As A. Banfield points out, "the *passé simple* is for the French speaker the single most striking mark of literature [...] In French the border between speech and writing is clearly signaled by the existence of this verbal tense which is confined to the written language."[32] Therefore, for distancing UDIM from narrative and for making it sound private by associating it with elements of *oral* discourse, the use of the *passé composé* is the most easily applicable illusion-making device conceivable. While the *passé simple* is the classic tense for narrative because by convention it is not used in ordinary conversation, because it is predominantly found in written accounts of past events, and because it tends to detach the narrator from the narrated events, the *passé composé* does exactly the opposite.

This question is addressed at length by M. Grevisse in *Le Bon Usage* where he stresses the link between the *passé simple* and narration on the one hand, and the *passé composé* and oral communication on the other:

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[32] A. Banfield, "Écriture, Narration and the Grammar of French" in *Narrative: From Malory to Motion Pictures,* J. Hawthorn ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), p. 4. Cf. J. Culler's remark that "the passé simple itself serves as the formal sign of the literary (in that it is generally excluded from speech)." p. 199.

> [...] le passé simple (passé défini) exprime un fait complètement achevé à un moment déterminé du passé, sans considération du contact avec le présent... Le passé simple... a presque totalement disparu de la langue parlée, qui l'a remplacé par l'imparfait et surtout par le passé composé... Quand il s'agit d'actions multiples, le passé simple les présente comme successives; c'est pourquoi il convient particulièrement à la narration...[33]

While Grevisse adds that the *passé composé* "indique un fait [...] que l'on considère comme étant en contact avec le présent,"[34] A. Banfield points out that "the notion of distance in time associated with the *passé simple* is precisely defined as an absolute distance from the moment of the speech act, this 'aujourd'hui' which is deictically referred to the speaking subject; hence it is a time absolutely cut off from the experiential time of subjectivity, of *la durée*."[35] Therefore, in UDIM the *passé composé* creates the kind of link between the thinker's present moment and the events being recalled that is absent from the detached position of the writer-narrator who uses the *passé simple*. The events recalled by Francia and Daniel are still not part of "history"--whether they are recent or more remote--and the two UDIM thinkers appear to *visualize* their respective memories in a very *personal* way instead of giving a *public account* of the past.

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[33] M. Grevisse, *Le Bon Usage* (Paris: Duclot, 1980), pp. 837-38

[34] M. Grevisse, p. 839.

[35] A. Banfield, p. 7.

This absence of narratorial detachment from the events in UDIM becomes especially clear if Larbaud's tense usage in *Amants, heureux amants...* is compared to what occurs in one of his earlier texts: a personal narrative entitled *Journal de A. O. Barnabooth* (1913). A. O. Barnabooth, the narrator/protagonist of this *journal intime* relies on the *passé composé* only in reference to the most recent events (usually of the same day), but as soon as he turns to something more remote, the narratorial *passé simple* emerges:

> J'ai vécu de nouveau ma fuite de l'ambassade, un matin de septembre, lorsque j'allai rejoindre Tassoula au Phanar, pour l'enlever [...] A Ortakoei, je croisai un groupe d'eunuques à cheval. Ils étaient vêtus de redingotes noires et portaient des chapeaux hauts de forme étincelants. J'aperçus leurs visages plats et glabres; j'entendis leurs voix, et quand je me retournai, je vis leurs grands chevaux brillants passer dans l'ombre d'un bosquet de cèdres.[36]

Furthermore, even when the same day's events are evoked, the

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[36] V. Larbaud, *Œuvres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 109-110.

passé composé is used only in the beginning of a sequence. As soon as a given recollection of the day's events is extended into a narrative, the narratorial *passé simple* reemerges:

> Ce matin, rentrant sur la rive gauche de la Néva par le pont Troïtsky, ma voiture a heurté et renversé, au coin du Champ-de-Mars et de la Millionnaïa, un fiacre où se trouvaient un moujik et une femme du peuple [...] Je descendis; mais que pouvais-je faire? Je vis l'homme se relever, aider la femme à se dégager des coussins qui étaient tombés sur elle [...] Le moujik s'approcha aussitôt de la boîte, qui avait été projetée contre le mur du palais; et au moment où il la prit, je vis qu'elle s'était cassée, et qu'elle contenait le cadavre d'un petit enfant.[37]

The fact that the *passé composé* is used at all in Barnabouth's discourse is attributable to the nature of the diary form, which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is a relative of UDIM in terms of the communicative situation involved. If we consider tense usage in most other forms of conventional personal narrative in French--especially narratives contemporary with Dujardin's and Larbaud's texts respectively--it becomes clear that the above-mentioned remarks by Grevisse and Banfield are quite accurate. For example, here is a typical passage from A. Daudet's *Le Petit Chose,* a personal narrative written in 1868 and recounting the trials and tribulations of a young man who comes to Paris to make his fortune with his brother Jacques:

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[37] V. Larbaud, *Œuvres*,pp. 279-80.

> Alors je baisai la petite rose rouge et je la mis dans ma poitrine. Ce soir-là, quand Jacques revint, il me trouva comme à l'ordinaire penché sur l'établi aux rimes et je lui laissai croire que je n'étais pas sorti de la journée. Par malheur, en me déshabillant, la petite rose rouge que j'avais gardée dans ma poitrine roula par terre au pied du lit: toutes ces fées sont pleines de malice. Jacques la vit, la ramassa, et la regarda longuement.[38]

The same typical reliance on the *passé simple* is observed in G. Duhamel's *Le Jardin des Bêtes Sauvages,* a personal narrative written closer to Larbaud's time--in 1933:

> Au réveil, j'entendis que mon père était chez nous. Je fis, pour ne pas le rencontrer, des efforts non médiocres et que l'on peut imaginer réels, puisque toute notre vie brûlait sur quelques pieds carrés. Je l'entendis se laver, s'habiller, siffler ses airs familiers, raconter, non sans beaux détails, la cérémonie de la veille. Quand je sentis qu'il allait partir, pour ne pas avoir à le saluer, je me glissai dans le vestibule et fis semblant de monter chez Valdemar.[39]

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[38] A. Daudet, *Le Petit Chose* (Paris: Le Livre de poche, 1966), p. 175.

[39] G. Duhamel, *Le Jardin des Bêtes Sauvages* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1933), p. 215.

This is why the appearance in 1942 of A. Camus's *L'Étranger,* a personal narrative written in the *passé composé,* was such an innovation. To quote A. Banfield:

> What made *L'Étranger* appear to a French reading public as a kind of writing unexampled not simply in content but in form as well was quite obvious from the start and quite simple to isolate. The special strangeness of this novel was due above all else to a grammatical quality which would have been remarked by any French reader from its very first lines: not only was *L'Étranger* recounted in the first person (after all, Sartre's *Les Mots* is, Proust is), but its tense is not the *passé simple,* as theirs is.[40]

Whereas Camus's text may have appeared as a bold experiment in narrative to a reader used to the *passé simple* and all its communicative implications, in *Amants, heureux amants...* and in *Les Lauriers sont coupés* the use of the *passé composé* fits in perfectly with the UDIM premise. If the *passé composé* is not normally used in written narrative, then these DIM's must represent not written but *spoken* discourse, and since the speakers in both texts clearly have no external interlocutors (except for a few instances of embedded external dialogue in Dujardin's text), they must be addressing themselves, i.e., we are dealing with inner speech.

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[40] A. Banfield , p. 15.

Even after Camus's text the *passé simple* has remained the norm in most written narratives, as is demonstrated by the two following examples from P. Daninos's *Les Carnets du Major Thompson* (1973) and M. Yourcenar's *Mémoires d'Hadrien* (1974). Daninos:

> La fréquentation du désert m'ayant accoutumé aux mirages, je n'en crus d'abord pas mes yeux. Discrètement, je me rapprochai. Je vis alors M. Taupin reculer de quelques pas, lever les bras en l'air et revenir d'un air menaçant sur M. Charnelet, qu'il saisit par le revers de son manteau et commença à secouer d'avant en arrière.[41]

Yourcenar: "J'écrivis à Attianus d'agir vite. Ce vieillard frappa comme le foudre. Il outrepassa mes ordres, et me débarrassa d'un seul coup de tout ce qui me restait d'ennemis déclarés."[42] We may thus conclude that it is especially *in contrast* with conventional narratives, such as those cited above, that Francia's and Daniel's reliance on the *passé composé* during recall denarratorializes their discourse and makes it sound private.

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[41] P. Daninos, *Les Carnets du Major Thompson* (Paris: Le Livre de poche, 1973), p. 83.

[42] M. Yourcenar, *Mémoires d'Hadrien* (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), p. 113.

Finally, I would like to illustrate the advantage of the *passé composé/simple* dichotomy in French when it comes to distancing a UDIM thinker's discourse from narrative, by considering a passage from Garshin's "Four Days" where the protagonist recalls the circumstances of his wounding:

> I recall that I fired my gun a few times, already having emerged from the woods: in the clearing. Suddenly the 'hurray' sounded louder, and we moved forward immediately. That is not we but our men, because I stayed. I thought this strange. Even stranger was the fact that everything suddenly disappeared; the screams and firing ceased.[43]

Since there is only one past tense in Russian, this passage lacks the naturally *oral* quality found in the recollections of Larbaud's and Dujardin's thinkers who remember in the *passé composé*. In this respect Ivanov's verbalized inner recall appears closer to *written* narrative than do the two above-mentioned French texts, and only the self-correction in "suddenly the 'hurray' sounded louder, and we moved forward immediately. That is not we but our men, because I stayed" is suggestive of unplanned and therefore unwritten discourse.

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[43] "Помню я сделал несколько выстрелов, уже выйдя из лесу, на поляне. Вдруг «ура» раздалось громче, и мы сразу двинулись вперед. То есть не мы, а наши, потому что я остался. Мне это показалось странным. Еще страннее было то, что вдруг все изчезло; все крики и выстрелы смолки." V. M. Garshin, p. 27.

Conclusion

M. Friedman hypothesizes that "without the curious interest Larbaud cultivated for *Ulysses*, and the meeting with the Irish writer, he might have continued writing semiconventional stories about childhood infatuations and adolescent love."[44] Joyce perfected and enlarged Dujardin's innovations and passed them on to Larbaud in a much more subtle and refined form than what we find in *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. When this influence was combined with Larbaud's impressive erudition, his superior understanding of the UDIM premise, his approach to the communicative situation characterizing inner discourse and his grasp of the differences between self-communication and narrative, the result was *Amants, heureux amants...*

Larbaud, probably with Joyce's help, realized something that Dujardin clearly did not: the reader must not only feel *unaddressed*, but also clearly *unwanted* when dealing with what is supposed to "imitate" discourse intended for no one outside the speaker's cranium. This is why we find that in *Amants, heureux amants...*, in addition to the apparent violation of Beaugrande's and Dressler's standard of cohesion through various syntactic means (cf. Chapters 4 and 5), the standards of coherence and intentionality also appear to be violated, which results in the "unwanted reader" effect. Although, as many critics have pointed out, this story is, by and large, not a challenge to decipher--at least not in the way *Ulysses* is--it tries to balance the two goals of UDIM with great care. Readability (*informatory* goal) and the creation of a convincing illusion of private communication (*quasi-mimetic* goal) were clearly both on Larbaud's mind when he wrote *Amants, heureux amants...* And with respect to this dual purpose, *Amants, heureux amants...* is clearly a success.

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[44] M. Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness*, p. 166.

The time has come to conclude the present study of "realistic" UDIM by summing up the key features of this difficult genre. It is characterized first and foremost by constant tension between two potentially contradictory goals: the *quasi-mimetic*, i.e., the creation of the illusion of self-communication, and the *informatory*, i.e., the effective communication of a *fabula* by an author to a reader. As a result, the degree of communicative *vraisemblance*, which can be achieved in UDIM, is unlikely to match that of narrative genres based on observable modes of communication. And this makes any instance of "realistic" fictional inner discourse all the more impressive.

As we have seen, the "realism" of internal communication is defined in UDIM primarily in contrast to realistic, standard, public literary personal narrative, which means that UDIM is nothing but a *conventionally accepted illusion* of inner speech. Therefore, it requires a tolerant and patient reader on the one hand, and a very resourceful author on the other. I have offered the controlled violation of Beaugrande's and Dressler's standards of textuality (cf. Chapter 1) as a possible scheme for the process of distancing UDIM from conventional narrative, i.e., of avoiding discourse modeled on planned *public* communication.

The "minus" device defined by the avoidance of the written narrative model in UDIM is counterbalanced by the imitation of the only observable form of private communication: spontaneous oral discourse. Thus, fictional *vraisemblance* in UDIM is not the mirroring of some kind of *communicative reality*, but rather a combination of anti-narrative and conversational tendencies. The major devices responsible for the self-communication illusion and stemming from the anti-narrative and conversational features of UDIM include: Theme-dropping, Rheme-modification, marked word order, repetition, awkward constructions, pronominal privacy, interior dialogue, incomplete contextualization, the synchronization of discourse and experience, self-correction, the avoidance of the declarative mode, associative drift and the absence of *verba dicendi*. Taken together, they achieve the effect of disorganized, spontaneous and hesitant emerging thought, i.e., the kind of thought that is presumably intended for no one but one's own self.

On the other hand, any similarities between data about real inner speech and fictional inner speech have only an indirect basis. UDIM often does not and cannot resemble what is known or assumed about real inner speech because the author must communicate with an *external* addressee (the reader) and is therefore faced with the communicative obstacles typical of conventional *written* narrative: the absence of extensive extralinguistic contexts, such as shared sensory perception; the addresser's inability to communicate via facial expressions, gestures and intonation; the addressee's inability to ask for clarifications etc.

In the final analysis, no matter how masterfully the illusion of silent self-communication is achieved, there remains one element in the process, which cannot be realistically motivated, namely, the written text. The very fact of *reading* something, which could not have been recorded de facto, and which is being presented to us without any explanation, foregrounds the inherent artificiality/literariness of UDIM. No matter how Unframed and Direct is a given Interior Monologue, the written text remains a mediator, which cannot be hidden from view. Thus, the UDIM genre consists of a compounded paradox, which can be resolved only by the reader's willing and active suspension of disbelief.

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